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ABSTRACT 
Despite the fact that in 2006 Russia celebrated the golden jubilee of 
unintenupted research on the Antarctic continent, there has been no attempt to 
eXarJ.1ine the history of Soviet interest in the Antarctic in the English language. While 
Russian authors have written histories of Soviet Antarctic expeditions based on 
expedition reports, this study analyses Russian and Australian archival material, most 
of which has not been accessed before. 
After the end of World War 11, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
providentially acquired a complete German whaling flotilla as war reparations. From 
the time of the flotilla's first whaling operations in the Southern Ocean, a physical 
Soviet presence in the Antarctic was assured. The later US proposal for a solution to 
conflicting Antarctic territorial claims which . attempted to exclude Soviet 
participation and the proposal of scientists for an International Geophysical Year 
(IGY) in 1957 - 1958 not only stimulated Soviet resolve to obtain a foothold on the 
icy continent, but provided the opportunity to do so. 
The main. body of the study deals with Soviet political and logistical 
preparations for their IGY operations in Antarctica and their thrust into the interior of 
the continent to establish observatories, all situated in the Australian Antarctic 
Territory. In a time of Cold War tensions and unresolved Antarctic claims, the 
Anglo-Arnerican world (and the Australian government in particular) was especially 
wary of Soviet intentions. In the fimll months of the IGY, the political and scientific 
future of the Antarctic was being shaped, with new proposals for an international 
Antarctic regime and proposals for continuation of Antarctic research being 
discussed. This study explores the thinking of political and scientific decision makers 
that helped mould Soviet Antarctic policy during this time and demonstrates that the 
two perspectives did not necessarily coincide. Whatever the divergences of opinion, 
the evidence indicates that from the day the Soviets set foot on the Antarctic 
continent, they had no intention of leaving. 
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INTRODUCTION 
'Half of Antarctica is rapidly turning from white to red ... ,1 
For half a century Antarctica has been governed by a set of international 
institutions that, collectively, is known as the Antarctic Treaty System. At the centre 
of this System is the Antarctic Treaty that was signed on 1 December 1959 and, 
subsequently, entered into force on 23 June 1961. 
The Antarctic Treaty was negotiated by twelve countries whose 
representatives sought to solve an international dispute concerning the southemmost 
region of the world. Known at the time as the Antarctic Problem, the dispute centred 
on overlapping sovereignty claims to Antarctic territory; the non-recognition by 
some countries, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), of these 
claims; and attempts by some countries to exclude the USSR from participating in 
any international decision making about Antarctica and, later, at the prospect of its 
penetration of, and on-going presence in the region. This dispute had gathered pace 
during the 1940s and 1950s, and in the years directly preceding the International 
Geophysical Year (lGY) of 1957 - 1958 and prior to the signing of the Antarctic 
Treaty in 1959, Antarctica itself had become 'the centre of a many-nationed activity 
on a scale far beyond what had ever been seen before.,2 All of these developments 
and Antarctic activity occurred against the background of an evolving Cold War. 
The Antarctic Treaty has turned out to be.an unmitigated success if measured 
against its goal of ensuring that Antarctica is used for peaceful purposes only 
(Antarctic Treaty: Article 1). The USSR was an active participant in the negotiation 
of the Antarctic Treaty following an invitation by United States President 
Eisenhower on 2 May 1958, to confer with eleven other directly interested countries 
to ensure that Antarctica would not 'become an object of political conflict.,3 Yet 
I Missiles and Rockets June 1959 cited in Burke, D. 1994. Moments of terror. The story of Antarctic 
aviation. Kensington, NSW: NSW University Press: 310 (note 23). 
2 Bertram, G.C.L. 1957. Antarctic prospect (Reprinted from International Affairs 33 (2) April 1957). 
London: Royal Institute of Intemational Affairs: 143. 
3 Text of the Presidential invitation is reprinted in the Department of State Bulletin, XXXVIII, 988 
(June 2,1958): 911-912. . 
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little is known about the Soviet interest in Antarctica during the 1940s and 1950s 
prior to the signing of the Treaty. 
What were the prevailing motives for Soviet interests in the Antarctic during 
this period? Why did the USSR consider them significant? How did it go about 
pursuing them? It is the central aim of this thesis is to address these questions. The 
timeframe of the thesis is restricted to the years 1946 to 1958, i.e. the period after the 
Allied victory in World War II until the beginning of, but not including, the 
negotiations leading to the signing of the Antarctic Treaty. It is a time in Antarctic 
history when the USSR was able to achieve a physical presence in a part of the world 
which was the subject of sometimes conflicting, internationally ambiguous and 
largely unrecognized territorial claims. 
An analysis of the motives which guided large scale multinational activities 
in the Antarctic is provided by Or. George Colin Lawder Bertram, the Director of the 
Scot! Polar Research Institute from 1949 till 1956 in his article entitled 'Antarctic 
Prospect' which appeared in the journal International Affairs in 1957.4 Bertram 
postulates that five chief motives were responsible for the vast increase of interest 
and activity by certain countries in the South Polar region: 
I. The adventurous motive, which includes 'curiosity, courage, the search 
for knowledge and new lands, dissatisfaction with the familiar, 
excitement, the desire to be first, the desire to help one's nation.'5 
2. The economic motive, which relates mainly to the sealing and whaling 
industry, although '[a]nother aspect of the economic motive is the desire 
to ensure that a rival nation shall not gain control of what might be 
valuable one day, even though its very existence is unknown as yet.'6 
4 Bertram, G.C.L.1957. Antarctic prospect (Reprinted from International Affairs 33 (2) April 1957). 
London: Royal Institute oflntemational Affairs: 143 - 153; Bertram was also an Honorary Secretary 
of the Royal Geographical Society and Chairman of its Expedition's Committee for a decade. 
, Ibid, 143. 
6 lnid, 144. 
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3. The scientific motive, which includes both fundamental and applied 
research, 'is a powerful force with many educated people and nations',1 
especially during the IGY, during which there was a special emphasis on 
research in Antarctica. 
4. The political motive, which 'is easier to appreciate than to define, but its 
strength is great. National prestige and national pride are factors in a 
greater whole: so is the desire not to be backward while others 
advance.'8 Bertram believed that the political motives in Antarctica were 
'concerned with the maintenance, the new establishment, or the 
upsetting, of claims to territory. ,9 He also recognized that scientific and 
political aims are by no means separate, since '[t]here are scientists who 
appreciate that Governments will provide funds for science even though 
they may not be motivated by science. Likewise there are political 
people who fully recognize that political ends may be achieved under a 
scientific cloak.' 10 
5. The strategic motive, which at the time concerned the importance of the 
Drake Passage for potentially controlling sea navigation between the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. It also had a bearing on the possibility of 
developing trans-Antarctic air routes." 
Bertram's analysis provides a helpful perspective for examining the particular 
instance of Soviet activities in the Antarctic. As is the case with all other countries 
with Antarctic interests, Soviet Antarctic policy was governed to a greater or lesser 
degree by all five of the chief motives outlined above, although, as this thesis will 
demonstrate, the political motive was predominant. The USSR's status as a post 
World War 11 'superpower'; the concomitant notion of Soviet national prestige; and 
7 Bertram, G.C.L.1957. Antarctic prospect (Reprinted from International Affairs 33 (2) April 1957). 
London: Royal Institute of International Affairs: 144. 
8 Ibid. 144 - 145. 
9 Ibid, 146. 
10 Ibid, 146. 
11 Ibid, 147. 
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the political imperative to prove the superiority of the socialist system in a world of 
conflicting ideologies and Cold War tensions, all dictated that its influence extend to 
the far corners of the Earth. The fortuitous opportunity to extend its influence to a far 
(and at the time contentious) corner of the Earth, the South Polar region, was 
provided by the acquisition of an Antarctic whaling flotilla as war reparations from 
Germany. Additional Soviet motives, such as the economic and strategic potential of 
the Antarctic and the post war progress of science in the USSR ensured that the 
Antarctic could not but become an arena for concerted Soviet interest. After a hiatus 
of 127 years, when last their compatriots had visited the South Polar region, the 
Soviets had the motivation and the means to secure a physical presence in the 
Antarctic. This study examines the USSR's motives in relation to the Antarctic and 
the progressive stages that resulted in a sizeable presence in the South Polar region. It 
demonstrates that the Soviets viewed their objectives as ongoing and permanent. 
The study also investigates how Soviet Antarctic activity was perceived by countries 
such as Australia, which saw such activity as a threat not only to Australian Antarctic 
aspirations, but to its own national security. 
This persistent activity, though varying in intensity from year to year, has 
continued for many decades. In 20.06, Russia celebrated the 60th anniversary of the 
commencement of whaling operations and the 50th anniversary of uninterrupted 
SovietlRussian research in the Antarctic. 12 These noteworthy anniversaries have 
stimulated a resurgence of Russian interest in the early period of Soviet activities on 
the icy continent. The Whalers' Society held a commemorative convention of 
seafarers from the Antarctic Whaling Flotilla (A WF) Slava and A WF Sovetskaya 
Ukraina in Odessa from 25 - 26 November 2006, while the Arctic and Antarctic 
Research Institute hosted a 'Russia in the Antarctic' conference in St Petersburg 
from 12 - 14 April 2006. The conference was co-chaired by the Deputy Director of 
the Russian Hydro Meteorological Service Aleksandr Frolov and the Director of the 
Institute of Geography of the Russian Academy of Sciences Vladimir Kotlyakov and 
has published an anthology of conference proceedings. 13 
t2 For the purposes of this study, the terms USSR/Soviet refer to the period 1917 - 1991. The term 
Russia refers to either the pre - 1917 Russian Empire or the post - 1991 Russian Federation. 
13 Rossiya v Antarktike. Nauchnaya konferentsiya k 50-letiyu nachala regulyamih issledovaniy 
Antarktiki Rosszskimi (Sovetskimi) expeditsiyami [Russia in Antarctica. Scientific conference 
dedicated to 50 Anniversary of regular research in Antarctica by Russian (Soviet) expeditions], St 
Petersburg, Russia, 12 - 14 April 2006. St Petersburg: AARI, 230 p. 
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The anniversaries did not go unreported in the wider Russian media: various 
newspapers and magazines have published articles and interviews with the 
participants of the first expeditions. For example, journalist Vladimir Strugatskiy has 
interviewed Antarctic veterans and written on Soviet Polar history in the St 
Petersburg newspaper Smena. 14 The geographer Vyacheslav Markin from Moscow 
has profiled the biographies and scientific contributions of prominent Polar scientists 
in the Earth and Universe magazine, published jointly by the Russian Academy of 
Sciences and the Society of Astronomy and Geodesy.15 The Director of the Russian 
Antarctic expedition, Valery Lukin, together with Nikolai Komilov and Nikolai 
Dmitriev' has published a reference book entitled Soviet and Russian Antarctic 
expeditions - facts and figures (1955 - 2005); 16 and the head of the Department of 
Polar Geography at the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, Lev Savatyugin, and 
his assistant Marina Preobrazhenskaya have published two volumes on Russian 
research in the Antarctic encompassing the period from 1955 to 1986, based 
essentially on expedition reports. 17 Savatyugin completed the third volume alone ls 
and followed it with a further work, Russian Science in the Antarctic, which reviews 
Russian scientific research on the icy continent from 1956 to 2004. 19 His latest 
manuscript on the history of research at Vostok station (situated on the South 
14 Strugatskiy, V. 2006. Polusa Vladimira Hodireva [the Poles of Vladimir Hodirev]. Smena, St 
Petersburg, 20-21 February: 6,10. 
IS M·arkin. V. 1993: Otkrytiya kak nagrada [Rewarding discoveries]. Zemlia i Vselennanya (Earth and 
Universe) 5: 61-66; Markin, V. 2006. Polveka Rossiiskih rabot v Antarktide [A half century of 
Russian research in Antarctica]. Zemlia i Vselennanya (Earth and Universe) 4: 11. 
16 Lukin, V., N. Kornilov and N. Dmitriev 2006. Sovetskiye i Rossiiskiye Antarkticheskiye expeditsii v 
tsifrah ifaktah (/955-2005) [Soviet and Russian Antarctic expeditions -facts andfigures (1955-
2005)]. St Petersburg: AARI, 456p. 
17 Savatyugin, L. and M. Preobrazhenskaya 1999. Rossiiskiye issledovaniya v Antarktike. Tom I, I -
20 SAE [Russian research in the Antarctic. Vol. I, 1- 20 SAE]. St Petersburg: Hydrorneteoizdat 
(Hydro meteorological Service Press), 337 p.; Savatyugin, L. and M. Preobrazhenskaya. 2000. 
Rossiiskiye issledovaniya v Antarktike. Tom 11, 21 - 30 SAE [Russian research in the Antarctic. Volll, 
21 - 30 SAE]. St Petersburg: Hydrometeoizdat (Hydro meteorological Service Press), 387 p. 
18 Savatyugin, L. 2001. Rossiiskiye issledovaniya v Antarktike. Tom Ill, 31 - 40 RAE [Russian 
research in the Antarctic. Vo1 Ill, 31 - 40 RAE]. St Petersburg: Hydrometeoizdat (Hydro 
meteorological Service Press), 334 p. 
19 Savatyugin, L. 2004. Rossiiskaya nauka v Antarktike [Russian science in the Antarctic]. Moscow: 
Gorodets, 303 p. 
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Geomagnetic Pole) tentatively entitled The Pole of Colci° IS still awaiting 
publication. 
However, there is a dearth of contemporary English language publications 
based on Russian language sources investigating the Soviet interest in Antarctica 
prior to and during the International Geophysical Year. In 1956, Peter Toma used 
Russian language publications on jurisprudence as sources for his study, the 'Soviet 
Attitude towards the Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty in the Antarctic', which 
appeared in The American Journal of International Law, as did Boleslaw Boczek in 
'The Soviet Union and the Antarctic Regime' published in 1984 in the same journal. 
English language literature on the topic subsequent to Torna's and Boczek's studies 
refer in the main to translations of newspaper and magazine articles and books such 
as J. Smuul's Antarctica Ahoy (1961),21 E. Suzyumov's A Life given to the Antarctic 
(1968),22 A. Nudelman's Soviet Antarctic expeditions 1955 -1959 (1966 )23 and N. 
Gvozdetski's Soviet geographical explorations and discoveries (1974).24 In 1962, 
John Hanessian compiled 'A select bibliography of the Polar regions', which 
includes literature in Russian on both the North and South Polar regions.25 More 
recently, in 2008, Rip Bulkeley has written a paper for the Russian Journal of Earth 
Sciences entitled 'Aspects of the Soviet IGY' with references to Russian 
documents.26 
There remains, however, no comprehensive examination of the early period 
of Soviet activities in the Antarctic based on a wide cross section of primary sources 
in either Russian or English. This gap in knowledge has inspired the author of this 
20 Savalyugin, L. 2007. Polus holoda [Pole of Cold). Unpublished manuscript (copy in possession of 
author). 
21 Smuul, 1. 196 L Antarctica ahoy! The ice book. Moscow: Foreign languages publishing house. 
309 p .. 
22 Suzyumov, E. 1968: A Life given to the Antarctic. Adelaide: Libraries Board of S.A., 60 p. 
23 Nudelman, A. 1966. Soviet Antarctic expeditions 1955-1959. Jerusalem: Israel Program for 
scientific translations, 138 p. 
24 Ovozdetski, N. 1974. Soviet geographical explora(ions and discoveries. Moscow: Progress, 344 p . 
. "Hanessian, J. 1962. A select bibliography of the Polar regions. Polar area series 11 (I): 21-24. 
26 Bulkeley, R. 2008. Aspects of the IOY. Russian Journal of Earth Sciences 
(hnp://elpub.wdcb.ruJjournals/rjes) 
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study to utilize her knowledge of the Russian language to bring to light sources that 
were previously unknown to the reader with no knowledge of Russian. Both Russian 
and English primary and secondary sources were drawn upon to investigate the 
Soviet interest in the Antarctic over the period from the first whaling expedition, 
through the IGY to the beginning of negotiations prior to the signing of the Antarctic 
Treaty in 1959.27 
The research incorporated primary research in Russian institutions: 
• The National Library of Russia, St Petersburg (rare book collection dedicated to 
Russian/Soviet interest in South polar regions) 
• Library of the Arctic and Antarctic Museum, St Petersburg 
• Arctic a.nd Antarctic Research Institute (AARI), Library and special collection 
(stations leaders ' reports), St Petersburg 
• Archives of the Russian Academy of Sciences, St Petersburg Branch (File 804, 
the 'Lev Berg' collection) 
• Central State Archives of scientific and technical documentation, St Petersburg 
(file 369 of Main Directorate of the Hydro-meteorological Service, Council of 
Ministers, with its vast collection of reports, decrees, scientific results, working 
plans, correspondence, excerpts from protocols and IGY documents) 
• Russian State Economics Archives, Moscow, (file 9570 of the Ministry of the 
Merchant Fleet and its Directorate of the Northern Sea Route (Glavsevmorput in 
Russian) which includes correspondence between the Ministry of the Merchant 
Fleet and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Presidium of the Academy of 
Sciences and the AARI relating to the Soviet preparations for the first Soviet 
Antarctic expedition and the I G Y) 
• Russian State Archives of Film and Photo Documents, Krasnogorsk, Moscow 
region (SAE, I G Y and other Antarctic related matters) 
• Russian State Archives of Contemporary History, Moscow (File 475 of the 
Political Administration of Glavsevmorput, Council of Ministers, which includes 
27 The other significant Soviet achievement during the IGY, the launching of Sputnik, the first satellite 
to orbit the Earth in outer space, is not dealt with in this thesis. For works on Sputnik, see for example: 
Bulkeley, Rip. The Sputniks Crisis and Early United States Space Policy: A Critique 0/ the 
Historiography a/Space. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991; Launius, R.; 
Logsdon, J. and Smith, W. (Ed) 2002. Reconsidering Sputnik: forty years since the Soviet satellite. 
London: Routledge. 
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correspondence with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union) 
In Australia research was undertaken at the: 
• National Archives of Australia (NAA), Canberra: Correspondence files A1838, 
documents relating to Soviet interest in Antarctica and how the Australian 
government responded to that interest 
• South Australian Museum, Mawson collection, Adelaide: File 23 OM 
'Russians', documents relating to Douglas Mawson and the Russians in 1956 -
1957 
• Library of the Australian Antarctic Division (AAD), Kingston, Tasmania. At the 
AAD Library's filing cabinet collection there are reports and photographs of 
Australian visits to Soviet stations and newspaper clippings. The Russian book, 
periodicals and map collection held at the AAD Library had its beginning in the 
early 1950s due to exchange between the Soviet libraries (mainly the 
Fundamental Library on the Social Sciences of the Soviet Academy of Sciences 
and Soviet Committee on Antarctic Research - through SCAR Working Group 
on Cartography) and the Division of National Mapping, Department of National 
Development in Canberra. The collection was later augmented by the efforts of 
the Director of the AAD, Philip Law, who asked the Australian Embassy in 
Moscow to purchase all published reports of USSR Antarctic operations. Further 
material' was sent from the USSR as a consequence of the Antarctic Treaty's 
obligation to freely exchange information. Personal exchanges of publications 
between Soviet and Australian scientists were also a source of materials for the 
AAD library up until the breakup of the USSR in 1991 
• The AAD Multimedia collection, Kingston, Tasmania. Its vast collection of 
photographs, films and videos helped visualize the personalities and 
circumstances of various meetings that occurred between Australian and Soviet 
expeditioners in the 1950s. 
The archival material mentioned above was supplemented by meetings with 
participants of the SovietlRussian and Australian Antarctic programmes. These were 
the primary sources, which were supported by secondary published material. The 
visual sources used in this thesis (photographs, maps, drawings, paintings and other 
figures) are further means of revealing the evolution of Soviet policies regarding 
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Antarctica and the principal decision-makers responsible for them. They add a 
human dimension to the evolution of government policy and the rationale behind it. 
Certain individuals, their political perceptions as influenced by their special interests 
and the ways in which they reacted to various events were largely responsible for 
determining the evolution of Soviet Antarctic policy during that era. The 
photographs and figures serve as pieces of evidence for helping unravel the Soviet 
Union's Antarctic puzzle during the specified period. The maps are valuable for 
illustrating the progressive march of the Soviet Union's basing operations toward the 
inner continental regions as the IGY progressed. They also hint at the creeping 
presence of the USSR in Antarctica, which the Western governments saw as slowly 
crawling across and extending their influence over the continent. 
The difficulty of conducting research in the Russian archives is that they are 
'all administered by different agencies: researchers must make written application for 
access to each individual archive, indicating the researcher's home institution and 
research topic. Permission to use the archives may arrive within several days or 
several weeks - or, alternatively, permission may be denied. Almost all the archives 
from which permission was sought granted access their records. The exception was 
the Archives of the Foreign Politics of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Moscow, which refused access on the grounds that it 'is not in possession 
of material on the topic that interests you which can be accessed in the reading 
room. ,28 This denial of access was disappointing, insofar as one of the goals of this 
study, namely, to examine the Soviet input into the Antarctic Treaty negotiations, 
could not be fulfilled. Access to Russian libraries was not difficult, except for the 
Library of the Russian Geographical Society, St Petersburg, where access to its 
library catalogue is a privilege reserved for members only. In the later stages of this 
study, information regarding the role of the Arctic Research Institute Director Victor 
Buinitskiy and his plans for an expedition South soon after the World War II (some 
ten years earlier than the IGY) became available. Given additional time and an 
opportunity to pursue study in Russia, a profitable direction for further research 
would be to investigate these plans by locating Buinitskiy's personal documents, 
diaries and research plans. 
28 Mozzhuhina, N. 2007. Fax from the the Archives of the Foreign Politics of the Russian Fede~ation, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, 23 April 2007. 
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The study was approached chronologically and written as a series of separate 
papers covering various aspects of Soviet Antarctic activities during the designated 
period. It highlights the consecutive steps taken by the USSR to consolidate its 
presence in the South Polar region and thereby eventually achieve its aim of 
becoming an active participant in contributing to a decision on the future of the 
Antarctic. During the course of my research, I was able to share my findings with. 
others interested in Antarctic history by presenting papers at the annual Scientific 
Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) Workshops on the History of Antarctic 
Research. 29 The editor of the Polar Record, Ian Stone, has also encouraged the 
author to share the fruits of her studies by contributing to the Scott Polar Research 
Institute's peer reviewed journal. 
Chapter I, however, has not been submitted for publication, since its purpose 
is to give a general historical overview of Russian and Soviet, mostly speculative, 
interest in the Antarctic. It mentions Bellingshausen's Antarctic expedition of 1819-
1821 and briefly reviews the waxing and waning Russian interest in the Antarctic up 
until the conclusion of World War 11. 
Chapter 2 deals with the acquisition by the USSR of a German Antarctic 
whaling flotilla after World War II and the opportunity this provided for the Soviets 
to achieve a physical presence in the South Polar region. This event marked the 
beginning of Soviet whaling in the Southern Ocean and was the first practical step 
towards the USSR gaining a foothold in the Antarctic. 
Chapter 3 exammes the role of Soviet scientists in overcoming political 
differences in their efforts at international cooperation to achieve the scientific 
objectives of the IGY. The first composite Soviet Antarctic expedition was sent to 
Antarctica in 1955 to establish a research station in preparation for the IGY. The 
presence of the USSR on the Australian Antarctic Territory was of particular concern 
for the Australian government. Notwithstanding the Australian concerns, the Soviets 
managed to establish themselves in the Antarctic and thus ensured that they would be 
included in any further negotiations for an Antarctic regime. 
29 At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile in Santiago in September 2006; the Byrd Polar Research 
Center in Columbus, Ohio in October 2007; the SCAR! International Arctic Science Committee 
(IASC) Open Science Conference in St Petersburg, Russia in July 2008. 
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Chapter 4 reconstructs the voyage of the Soviet expedit!on ships to Antarctica 
and back to Leningrad. In a time of Cold War tensions and unresolved Antarctic 
claims, the Australian and New Zealand governments were wary of Soviet intentions 
and barely tolerated the visits by Soviet vessels. However, in their interactions with 
Australians and New Zealanders, the Soviet scientists were careful to underline the 
friendly nature of their visits and avoided any sensitive ·political questions. 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 trace the preparatory steps taken by the Soviet 
Antarctic pioneers in their attempt to reach and establish scientific bases in the most 
remote locations of Antarctica. National prestige and the desire to reap a rich 
scientific harvest were the forces driving the Soviet expedition in its quest to 
establish stations deep in the Antarctic interior in preparation for research to be 
carried out during the IGY. 
Chapter 7 exammes the Soviet responses to· initiatives of international 
scientific institutions for post - IGY collaborative research in the Antarctic through to 
the formation of the Special Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR) and the year 
of International Geophysical Cooperation (IGC) as an extension of the IOY. It 
demonstrates the consistently positive attitudes of the USSR to these initiatives and 
the steps that were taken at the national level to ensure the continuation of 
international collaboration. 
Chapter 8 explores the thinking of both political and scientific figures in the 
USSR that helped mould Soviet Antarctic policy during the final months of the IGY. 
It demonstrates that the two perspectives did not always coincide, although the 
overall strategy with regard to a Soviet presence in the Antarctic remained consistent. 
1 . 
HISTORICAL PRELUDE 
. As mentioned in the Introduction, the purpose of this chapter is to give a 
general, though by no means comprehensive, historical overview of Russian and 
Soviet interest in the Antarctic from the time when Russian science first speculated 
on the possibility the existence of a Southern continent until the end of World War It 
Russian interest in the Antarctic can be traced back to the development of 
modem scientific thought in the Russian Empire, which was stimulated by reforms 
instigated by Tsar Peter the Great (1672 - 1725). The Tsar's policy of 'introducing 
foreign technical ideas into Russia' and 'making them the basis of a new state-
sponsored type of education' had resulted, shortly after his death, in the 
establishment in St Petersburg of the first institute of secular scientific learning, the 
Russian Academy of Sciences. 30 
In the mid 1730s, the director of the Academy 'requested that a number of 
well-trained Russian students be transferred from theological academies for scientific 
training at the gymnasium ofthe academy.,3! One of this small group of students was 
Mikhail V. Lomonosov (1711 - 1765), who went on to study at the University of 
Marburg in Germany, where he 'acquired not only the scientific training which 
enabled him to become a pioneer in the field of physical chemistry, but also a 
fascination with the institution of a university hitherto nonexistent in Russia. Upon 
his return, he immersed himself in the scientific activities of the SI. Petersburg 
Academy, and also helped found Moscow University.,32 Lomonosov's interests were 
varied and multifaceted; his scientific investigations both practical and theoretical. In 
1763, he sent his treatise entitled 'A brief description of various voyages on the 
northern seas and the possibility of a route through the Siberian ocean to the East 
Indies' to the president of the Russian Admiralty and proposed that Empress 
30 BiIlington, J. 1970. The Icon and the Axe. An interpretive History of Russian Culture. New York: A 
Division of Random House: 214. 
31 Ibid, 216. 
"lbid,216. 
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Catherine II give royal assent to an expedition to the northern high latitudes. 
Catherine was intrigued by the suggestion and ordered that the Admiralty bring it to 
fruition. In 1764 three corvettes under the command of Vasiliy Chichagov, Nikifor 
Panov and Vasiliy Babayev were fitted out in the city of Arkhangelsk and sailed 
north to latitude 80° 26' N before being stopped by ice.33 
Lomonosov's interest in the Polar regions, however, was not limited to the 
northern high latitudes. In his treatise 'On the Earth's Layers' (§ 29) which was 
published in 1763, he postulated the existence of a land mass in the South Polar 
region. He wrote that: 'approximately 53° South, across from the Cape of Good 
Hope near the Straits of Magellan, giant icebergs are to be found, so there is no doubt 
that at a further distance one would find islands and a larger landmass which are 
covered by immense and perpetual snows and that more of the earth's surface is 
covered by them in the area of the South Pole than the North.'34 Although 
Lomonosov had proposed and indeed helped organize an expedition to the Arctic, he 
never went as far as suggesting a voyage to explore the Southern high latitudes to 
confirm his theories of a southern landmass. 
Instead, it was the British Admiralty that sent its own Captain James Cook in 
July 1772 with instructions for 'prosecuting [his 1 discoveries as near to the South 
Pole as possible.'35 After this, his second voyage, where he went 'further south than 
any man', Cook had been unable to prove the existence of such a landmass, though 
his voyage was recognized as an exceptional achievement. In fact, the chairman of 
the scientific committee of the Russian Ministry of Naval Affairs, Login I. 
Golenishchev-Kutuzov (1769 - 1846), was so impressed by Cook's exploits that he 
33 Shirokorad, A. 2008. Bitva za Russkuyu Arktiku XVI-XXI vv. [Bailie for the Russian Arctic XVI -
XXI]. Moscow: Veche: 80-81. 
34 Lomonosov, M. 1954. 0 sloyah zemnih [On the Earth's Layers]. In: Lomonosov, M. Polnoe 
sobranie sochineniy .. tom 5. Trudy po mineralogii. metallurgii i gornomu delu (1741-1763) [Complete' 
works. vol 5. Studies in mineralogy. metallurgy and mining (/741-1763)). Moscow: AN SSSR 
(Academy of Sciences Press): 543; see also Gakkel, Y. 1961. Lomonosov i Antarktika [Lomonosov 
imd Antarctica]. Informatsionniy Bulleten Sovetskoi Antarkticheskoi Expeditsii (Information bulletin 
of the Soviet Antarctic expedition) 25: 5-7. 
" McGonigal, D. and L. Woodworth (Ed). 2001. Antarctica. The complete story. Noble Park: The 
Five Mile Press: 388. 
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translated 'A Voyage towards the South Pole and Round the World' into Russian and 
published it in five parts from 1796 to 1800.36 
The turn of the century also happened to be a time of rapid progress in 
Russian seafaring prowess, with several circumnavigations of the globe to its credit. 
The first was undertaken by I van Th. Kruzenstern (1770 - 1846) and Yuri Th. 
Lisyanskiy (1773 - 1837) in the Nadezhda and Neva (1803 - 1806); then Vasiliy M. 
Golovnin (1776 - 1831) in the Diana (1807 - 1809); Mikhail P. Lazaiev (1788 -
1851) in the Suvorov (1813 - 1816) and Otto E. Kotzebue (1787 - 1846), in the brig 
Ruirik (1815 - 181 :8). Upon the return of the latter expedition to St Petersburg, its 
organizer, Chancellor Nikolai P. Rumyantsev (1754 - 1826) was visited by the 
Emperor Aleksander I (1777 - 1825) and the Minister of Naval Affairs, the Marquis 
de Traversey (1754 - 1830). Rumyantsev made the point that: 'Scientific expeditions 
are extremely costly. However, we should not forget that the strength of the state is 
in its science. At the present time, there are two questions that preoccupy the 
geographers' world: is there a northern passage linking the Pacific and Atlantic 
Oceans and is there a continent at the South Pole?' Aleksander asked: 'Do you 
consider that this is something that should be done by Russia?' To which he received 
the reply: 'If that should eventuate, then to the glory of conquering Napoleon 
Bonaparte will be added the glory of Russia as a mighty sea power!' 37 
1.1 The first Russian Antarctic expedition 
After having this conversation, it did not take long for the Emperor to act. On 
25 March 1819 the Minister of Naval Affairs announced that His Imperial Majesty 
had been pleased to order the dispatch of two expeditions on voyages of discovery: 
one to the Antarctic (known as the First Squadron), and the other to the Arctic 
regions (the Second Squadron)?8 The first Russian circumnavigator, Kruzenstern, 
who was advising de Traversey about the planned expeditions, in his note of 31 
36 Slevich, S. 1965. K voprosu 0 redaktirovanii knigi-dnevnika Bellingshausena [Editing 
Bellingshausen's diary]. lnformatsionniy Bulleten Sovetskoi Antarkticheskoi expeditsii (Information 
bulletin of the Soviet Antarctic expedition): 52: 63. 
37 Quoted in Strugatskiy, V. 2006. Chya zhe ona, Antarktida? [To whom does Antarctica belong?] 
Smena, St Petersburg, 14 February: 10. 
38 Debenham, F. (Ed). 1945. Voyage of Captain Bellingshausen to the Antarctic Seas, /819-1821. 
Translated from the Russian. Vol. 1-11. London: Hakluyt Society: 5. 
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March 1819, advocated that the expedition leave as soon as practicable because 'we 
should not allow ourselves to be deprived of the glory of this undertaking, as it will 
certainly be taken by the English or the French in the near future,39 and suggested 
Golovnin as commander of the First Squadron. Golovnin, however, was on a voyage 
circumnavigating the globe. The alternate candidate was Baron Thaddeus 
Bellingshausen, who had previously served under Kruzenstern on the latter's voyage 
of 1803 - 1806. Bellingshausen was appointed leader of the expedition and 
Lieutenant Mikhail Lazarev was appointed second in command. 
Two sloops, the 985 ton Vostok (under the command of Bellingshausen) and 
the 884.5 ton Mirny (under the command of Lazarev) set out from Kronstadt on 3 
July 1819 (Julian calendar) / 15 July (Gregorian calendar) with the aim of making 
every effort 'to approach as closely as possible to the South Pole, searching for as yet 
unknown land, and only abandoning the undertaking in the face of insurmountable 
obstacles. ,40 The Second Squadron under the command of Lieutenant-Commander 
Mikhail Vasiliev and Lieutenant Gleb Shishmarev was to proceed to Bering Strait, 
and 'having entered [it], was to look for a passage along the north of North America 
and, after circumnavigating it, return to Russia via the Western Ocean. ,41 The voyage 
of the Second Squadron is beyond the scope of this work. However, 
Bellingshausen's Antarctic expedition, which was 'one of the greatest Antarctic 
expeditions on record, well worthy of being placed beside that of Cook,42 according 
to the 'highest authority on the history of Antarctic exploration, Dr. Hugh Robert 
MiII',43 was certainly of crucial importance, not in his own lifetime, but some two 
centuries later. It became pivotal to the political strategy pursued by the Soviet Union 
39 Cited in: Shvede, E. 1949. Pervaya russkaia Antarkticheskaia expeditsia [First Russian Antarctic 
expedition 1819-1821). In: Bellingshausen, F. 1949. Dvukratnoe izYskanie v Yuzhnom Ledovitom 
Okeane i plavanie vokrug sveta v prodolzhenii 1819, 1820 i 1821. godov, sovershennoe na shlupah 
Vostok i Mirny pod nachalstvom kapitana Bellingshausena [Two voyages in the Southern ocean and 
around the world in 1819-1821 undertaken on the Vostok and Mirny under the command of Captain). 
Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press): 9. 
40 Debenham, F. (Ed). 1945. Voyage of Captain Bellingshausen to the Antarctic Seas, 1819-1821. 
Translated from the Russian. Vol. 1-11. London: Hakluyt Society: 14. 
41 Averianov, V. and Y. Koblenz, 1970. 150-letie otkrytiya Antarktidi i Sovetskye issledovaniya v 
Antarktike [150" Anniversary of discovery of Antarctica and Soviet research in the Antarctic). 
Informatsionniy Bulleten Sovetskoi Antarkticheskoi expeditsii (Information bulletin of the Soviet 
Antarctic expedition) 77: 6. 
42 Debenham, F. (Ed). 1945. Voyage of Captain Bellingshausen to the Antarctic Seas, 1819-1821. 
Translated from the Russian. Vol. 1-11. London: Hakluyt Society: Xl. 
43 Ibid, Xl. 
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in the mid twentieth century during the time of conflicting territorial claims in the 
Antarctic. 
Russian geopolitical considerations of the early nineteenth century, however, 
derived no practical advantage from what the Soviets in the twentieth century 
referred to as Bellingshausen's 'First Russian Antarctic expedition'. The expedition 
returned to St Petersburg in July 1821; although Bellingshausen's report of his 
voyage, edited by Golenishchev-Kutuzov, was only published in St Petersburg ten 
years later in 1831,44 without generating any particular interest. Although 
Kruzenstern continued to show an interest in Russia's exploration in the southern 
latitudes (in 1829, he proposed a new plan for an expedition to follow up and expand 
on Bellinghausen's voyages), he met with little success in having it realized. His son, 
Pavel Kruzenstern (1809 - 1881), took up his father's idea. In 1833, he submitted 
another plan for further exploration of the Antarctic which would provide infinite 
benefits to science and glory to the country. His attempts were no more successful 
than his father's. The Russian Imperial government seemed to have lost interest in 
the Antarctic and ne,;,er instigated any claims to its discoveries as it could see no 
practical economic, political or strategic benefits of doing so. 
For seventy years, Bellinghausen's report was all but forgotten. Only in 1899, 
when the International Geographical Conference held a meeting in Berlin, which 
discussed proposals for Antarctic research, was Bellingshausen' s voyage 
remembered. His report was translated into German and published in Leipzig in 
1902,45 which made it available to western readers. An English translation of the 
report appeared during World War I, which was read and ultimately edited by the 
Director of the Scott Polar Research Institute in Cambridge, Professor Frank 
Debenham.46 It was published by the Hakluyt Society in London in 194547 In his 
44 Belov, M. 1969. Istoriya otkrytiya i issledovaniya [History of discovery and exploration]. In: 
Tolstikov, E. (Ed.) Atlas Antarktiki Tom 11 [Atlas a/Antarctica Vo!. /I]. Leningrad: Hydrometeoizdat 
(Hydro meteorological Service Press): 42. 
" Ibid. 
46 Debenham was in Scot!' s expedition to the South Pole, with the Scot! Polar Research Institute set 
up as a 'memorial' to Scot!. Debenham was its first director from 1925 till 1946. 
47 Debenham, F. (Ed). 1945. Voyage a/Captain Bellingshausen to the Antarctic Seas, 1819-1821. 
Translated from the Russian. Vol. 1-11. London: Hakluyt Society, 474 p. 
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introduction to The Voyage a/Captain Bellingshausen to the Antarctic Seas 1819-
1821, Debenham notes that Bellingshausen's 'first real reward in the discovery of 
new land, the island which he named after Peter the Great was the first time that land 
had ever been seen within the Antarctic Circle. ,48 Debenham also mentions that on 5 
and 6 February, 1820 (Julian calendar) or 17 and 18 February (Gregorian calendar) 
Bellingshausen 'describes very clearly the appearance of land [the mainland of the 
Antarctic continent 1 without claiming it as such.'49 Debenham goes on to point out 
the 'fierce. controversy' that has 'of recent years ranged round' 50 the supposed 
priority of discovery of the Antarctic continent. Due to the almost simultaneous 
sightings of the continent by the Englishman naval Master Edward Bransfield, the 
American Captain Nathaniel Palmer,and the Russian Bellingshausen, the three 
countries involved were eager to claim that their seafarers were the first to discover 
the new continent. 
It was precisely this controversy about priority of discovery that flared up 
agam in the second quarter of the twentieth century. The Soviet Naval historian 
Evgeniy Evgeniyevich Shvede (1886 - 1991) wrote that 'the expansionist politics' of 
the Anglo-American block had 'turned its attention to Antarctica and intends to 
~ange a regime for that continent without the participation of the Sovi~t Union.'51 
For this reason, the Geographical Societ/2 of the USSR spearheaded a movement to 
48 Debenham, F. (Ed). 1945. Voyage o/Captain Bellingshausen to the Antarctic Seas, 1819-1821. 
Translated from the Russian. Vo\. 1-11. London: Hakluyt Society: XXII - XXIII. 
49 Ibid, XVIII. 
'0 Ibid, XXIII. 
'I Shvede, E. 1949. Predislovie redaktora [Editor'S foreword]. In: Bellingshausen, F. 1949. 
Dvukralnoe izyskanie v Yuzhnom Ledovilom Okeane i plavanie vokrug sveta v prodolzhenii 1819, 
1820 I 1821 godov, sovershennoe na shlupah Vostok i Mirny pod nachalstvom kapitana 
Bellingshausena [Two voyages in the Southern ocean and around the world in 1819-1821 undertaken 
on the Vostok and Mirny under the command 0/ Captain BellingshausenJ. Moscow: Geografizdat 
(Geographical Literature Press): 3. 
52 The Geographical Society was founded in 1845 in St Petersburg and is the oldest non-government 
scientific body in Russia. It was known under different names: Russian Geographical Society 1845-
1850, 1917-1926; Imperial Russian Geographical Society 1850-1917; State Geographical Society 
1926-1938; Geographical Society of the USSR (1938-1992); Russian Geographical Society from 
1992. The Arctic researcher, Admiral Fedor Petrovich Litke, was its first president and the Russian 
Antarctic explorer, Thaddeus Bellingshausen, was one of its first members. 
It has branches in many regions of Russia: the Moscow branch alone had 2000 members in 2008. It 
began publishing iis bimonthly journal, Geographicheskie izvestiya, in 1846. During the Soviet 
period, the journal was named Izvesliya Vsesoyuznogo Geographicheskogo obshchestva (News of the 
All Union Geographical Society), at present known as lzvestiya Russkogo Geographicheskogo 
obshchestva (News of the Russian Geographical Society). 
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shape Soviet public opinIOn by educating the public about the eminent role of 
Russian explorers in discovering Antarctica and the consequent 'indisputable right of 
the Soviet Union to participate in decisions about the Antarctic.'53 Shvede, an active 
member of the Geographical society, prepared an updated Russian edition of 
Bellingshausen's narrative, which was published in 1949 with an introduction 
explaining the 'great political significance' 54 of the renewed interest. 
1.2 The first International Polar Year 
Meanwhile, in 1879, before the renewed interest in Bellingshausen's 
expedition, the Russian Academy of Sciences sent academician Robert E. Lents as a . 
delegate to the first International Polar Conference in Hamburg. The conference 
came about as a result of the ideas of the German Arctic explorer and leader of the 
Austrian expedition that discovered Franz losef Land, Karl Weyprecht. (1838 -
1881),55 who conceived of the idea of 'a series of synchronous expeditions' to the 
Polar regions in order to 'obtain one year's series of observations.'5.6 Since this 
research was far too complex to be completed by anyone nation; the idea of an 
International Polar Year (I.PY) was born. The conference in Hamburg, consisting of 
representatives from Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Norway, Russia 
and Sweden, was the first of three held in order to prepare for the First IPY, which 
was to be conducted between August 1882 and August 1883. A second conference 
was held in Berne in 1880 and a third in St Petersburg in 1881 under the 
chairmanship of the director of the St Petersburg Geophysical Observatory, Heinrich 
von Wild. An International Polar Commission was formed with von Wild as 
" USSR 1949. Resolution of 10 February 1949 concerning Antarctica adopted by the All-Union 
Geographical Society. In: Bush, W. 1982. Antarctica and International Law. A Collection of inter-
state and National Documents, vol3. London-Rome-New York: Ocean Publications Inc.: 207. 
54 Shvede, E. 1949. Predislovie redaktora [Editor'S foreword]. In: Bellingshausen, F. 1949. 
Dvukrainoe izyskanie v Yuzhnom Ledovitom Okeane i plavanie vokrug sveta v prodolzhenii 1819. 
1820 I 1821 godov. sovershennoe na shlupah Vostok i Mirny pod nachalstvom kapitana 
Bellingshausena {Two voyages in the Southern ocean and around the world in 1819-1821 undertaken 
on the Vostok and Mirny under the command of Captain Bellingshausen]. Moscow: Geografizdat 
(Geographical Literature Press): 4. 
" Summerhayes, C. 2008. International collaboration in Antarctica: The International Polar Years, the 
International Geophysical Year, and the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research. Polar Record 44 
(231): 322. 
,. Ibid: 322, 323. 
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president; Lents was elected president of the national Russian Polar Commission. A 
research plan was developed and two stations planned: one on the Sub-Antarctic 
South Georgia Island, and one at Cape Horn, the most southerly point of South 
America, although only the Germans managed to organize a station on South 
Georgia Island.57 
William Barr, from the Department of Geography, University of 
Saskatchewan in Saskatoon, has extensively researched Russian Arctic history. He 
has written about the Russian contribution to the first IPY and notes that although 
Russia did not plan any research in the Antarctic, it did establish two Arctic stations: 
one at Malyye Karmakuly on Zaliv Mollera on the south island of Novaya Zemlia 58 
and the other on the island Sagastyr in the Lena delta. 59 Obviously, the Russians 
were more interested in exploring the Arctic during the first IPY, although various 
individuals did not abandon the possibilities of exploring the Antarctic. 
Admiral Stepan O. Makarov, for example, who also happened to be a naval 
architect, was one of the enthusiasts who considered the requirements for shipping in 
the far southern latitudes. In his note to the Admiralty dated 9 January 1897, he wrote 
that, unlike in the Arctic. Ocean, contemporary icebreakers 'are unable to take on the 
mountains of ice in the Southern Polar Ocean.'60 In early 1899, he had commissioned 
a powerful icebreaker, the Ermak, to be built in England for the Russian Navy 
according to his own design. While in England, Makarov was asked by the 
oceanographer and member of the Royal Geographical Society of Scotland, Sir John 
Murray, to outline his ideas of using the Ermak in the Baltic and Kara Seas and of 
exploring the Arctic Ocean. Apparently, Makarov's ideas created quite an interest: 
the meeting of the British Association which was discussing Scott's first Antarctic 
. expedition suggested that an icebreaker be used for the voyage. Pinhenson quotes 
57 Belov, M. 1969. Istoriya otkrytiya i issledovaniya [History of discovery and explorationj. In: 
Tolstikov, E. (Ed). Atlas Antarktiki Tom 11 {Atlas 0/ Antarctica Vol. 11]. Leningrad: Hydrometeoizdat 
(Hydro meteorological Service Press): 48. 
58 Barr, W. 1985. The Russian Expedition to Malyye Karrnakuly, Novaya Zemlya. In: Barr,' W. The 
expeditions o/theftrst IPY, 1882-83. Calgary: Arctic Institute of North America: III - 122. 
" Barr, W. 1985. The Russian Expedition to Ostrov Sagastyr' in the Lena Delta. In: BaiT, W. The 
expeditions o/theftrst IPY, 1882-83. Calgary: Arctic Institute of North America: 82 - 110. 
60 Pinhenson, D. 1962. 0 Makarovskom proekte ledokola dlia Antarkticheskoi expeditsii [Makarov's 
project for an icebreaker for an Antarctic expedition]. Informatsionniy Bulleten Sovetskoi 
Antarkticheskoi Expeditsii (Iriformation bulletin 0/ the Soviet Antarctic expedition) 36: 41. 
9 
Makarov writing to the vice president of the Russian Geographical So~iety that 'Sir 
John Murray asked me to come up with plans for an icebreaker for the Antarctic 
expedition.'61 Pinhenson considers that Makarov actually did come up with the plans 
for such an Antarctic icebreaker, though he, Pinhenson, was unable to locate them. 
Unfortunately, Makarov was killed in action when the battleship Pelropav!ovsk was 
blown up by a mine in March 1904 during the Russo-Japanese war when he was 
commander of the Pacific Ocean Squadron; his plans were apparently lost. Although 
Makarov's· connection with plans for an icebreaker for the British Antarctic 
expedition was cut short, Russian ties to international Polar research initiatives 
continued. Three of Makarov's countrymen were sent as delegates to the First 
International Polar Congress in Brussels. 
1.3 First International Polar Congress (1906) and Russian participants in 
Scott's and Amundsen's expeditions of 1910-1912 
In September 1906 Mikhail Rykachev, oceanographer Yuli Shokalski and 
Innokenti Tolmachev attended the First International Polar Congress. The Congress 
was convened in order to revive the International Polar Commission, which was to 
direct and co-ordinate polar research, including expeditions to both the North and 
South Poles. The fourteen countries taking pari were Argentina, Chile, Congo, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, 
Sweden and USA. Austro-Hungary and Great Britain did not send official delegates, 
although they were represented by private interests. In this instance, Russia did not 
organise any government-assisted or private expeditions to Antarctica, but the two 
expeditions which were competing to reach the South Pole, the British one of 
Captain Robert F. Scott and the Norwegian one of Roald E. G. Amundsen included 
Russian participants.62 
Moira Dunbar, from the Defence Research Establishment of Canada, 
.translated N. Bolotnikov's Russian article about the dog-driver Dmitriy Girev (1888 
- 1932) and stable-man Anton Omelchenko (1883 - 1932), who went to Antarctica 
61 Pinhenson, D. 1962. 0 Makatovskom proekte ledokola dlia Antarktieheskoi expeditsii [Makarov's 
project for an icebreaker for an Antarctic expedition]. Informatsionniy Bulleten Sovetskoi 
Antarkticheskoi Expeditsii (Information bulletin of the Soviet Antarctic expedition) 36: 42. 
62 While Amundsen was always aiming for the South Pole, his public planning and information to his 
crew were related to an expedition to the North Pole. The race to the South Pole occurred after Seott's 
expedition had left the UK. 
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with Scott's ill-fated expedition of 1910 - 1912.63 Girev was well known as one of 
the best dog handlers in the Lower Amur in the Russian Far East. When in 1910 
Scott's assistant, Cecil Meares, came to Nikolaevsk to purchase sledge dogs for the 
future expedition, Girev was recommended as an excellent dog-team driver, a hardy 
hunter and a brave man. He assisted in purchasing the dogs for the expedition in 
Siberia, then transporting them from Vladivostok via Sydney to Lyttleton, New 
Zealand to board Scott's ship, the Terra Nova. Together with Meares, Girev 
accompanied Scott's party to 84° S, where a supply base was set up and named 
Dmitrovsk in his honour. He was in Priestley's party which ascended Mount Erebus, 
one of the peaks of which was named Dmitriy Peak. Girev experienced many 
dangers during the three Antarctic winters. 'More than once, he was on the verge of 
death. But probably his worse moment came on 12 November 1912, when taking 
part in the search for Scott and his party. He was one of the witnesses to the horrible 
discovery - the snow covered tent with the bodies of the explorers. ,64 The British 
government awarded him a silver medat"in appreciation of his work. 
Girev's compatriot, Anton Omelchenko, worked in Vladivostok as a jockey 
at the hippodrome. Late in 1909, he met Scott's agent, Lieutenant Wilfred Bruce, 
who recruited him for Scott's expedition. Omelchenko accompanied Bruce to Harbin 
to buy Manchurian ponies and later met up with Scott. Anton and Dmitriy took part 
in support parties, accompanying Scott on his way to the South Pole. They are 
spoken of warmly in Scott's journal; they not only worked hard and devotedly with 
their respective charges, but also got along very well with their British messmates.65 
'Wednesday, 18 January 1911', Scott wrote in his diary, 'Anton and Dmitriy are 
always ready to help; they are both excellent fellows. ,66 'I became convinced that our 
Russian boys deserve as much praise as my English fellows. ,67 
63 Ounbar, M. 1971. Anton and Dmitriy: Two Russian members of Scott's last expedition (From the 
Russian ofN. Bolotnikov). Polar Record 15 (97): 499-502. 
64 Yuzefov, V, 1998. Northern Sakhalin to the Antarctic: the story of a Russian participation in Scott's 
expedition to the South Pole. 1910-1913. Translated from Russian by Ella L. Wiswell. Polar Record 
34 (190): 253. 
6' Dunbar, M. 1971. Anton and Dmitriy: Two Russian members of Se ott's last expedition (From the 
Russian ofN. Bolotnikov). Polar Record 15 (97): 499-502. 
66 Bolotnikov, N. (Ed.) 1955. Poslednyaya expedi/sia Scolta {Scott's last expedition}. Moscow: 
Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press): 99. 
67 (bid: 163. 
11 
Aleksandr Kuchin (1888 - 1912), 'the Russian who went South with 
Amundsen' in 1909 - 1911 as pilot and oceanographer, was a former student of the 
Arkhangelsk Maritime College.68 Being an experienced sailor, Kuchin had been 
accepted into the 2nd year of the College in 1904 to study oceanography. During this 
period he frequently worked on sealing schooners in Norway, which historically had 
close trade relations with Northern Russia. In 1907 at the age of 18 he published a 
small Russian-Norwegian dictionary containing 4000 words in the 'Pomor' 
publishing house in Norway, which is perhaps one of the first dictionaries of its kind. 
Aleksandr graduated from the College with a gold medal in 1909. 
After graduating, Kuchin returned to Norway to study oceanography in 
Bergen under Professor Helland-Hansen, head of the Bergen biological station. 
During his time there, he became acquainted with the famous Norwegian Polar 
explorer, FridtjofNansen. Both Helland-Hansen and Nansen later recommended him 
to Roald Amundsen as an outstanding and talented oceanographer. It was for this 
reason that Kuchin became the sole foreigner in Amundsen's Antarctic expedition, 
undertaking oceanographic studies on board the Fram. Kuchin, in a letter dated 29 
April 1910 addressed to his father and sisters in Russia, writes that he 'will try to 
work hard so that Amundsen will not regret taking a foreigner with him, let alone a 
Russian.'69 Returning to Russia in 1912, Kuchin was recruited by the geologist and 
explorer Vladimir Rusanov to join him in a scientific expedition to Svalbard. As 
deputy leader of the party and captain of the expedition's ship Gerkules, Kuchin 
played an important role in· surveying Svalbard. Unexpectedly, he found himself 
heading in another direction: Rusanov decided to reach Bering Strait by the North 
Sea route. Somewhere along the way, Gerkules disappeared. Her loss brought to an 
end the career of the promising 24 year old polar explorer Aleksandr Kuchin. The 
search party found the remains of the ship in the Kara Sea in 1934.70 
68 Barr, W. 1985. Aleksandr Stepanovich Kuchin: the Russian who went South with Amundsen. Polar 
Record 22 (139): 401-412. 
69 Kuchin, A. 1910. A letter dated 29 April 1910. Museum of Arkhangelsk MaritilJ1e College, 
Arkhangelsk, Russia. 
70 Dorozhkina,.M. and E. Pavlova 2003. Zdes ih pomnili i lubili [Here t\ley were remembered and 
loved]. Severnyye pros/ory 1-2: 76. 
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1.4 The Northern scientific/economic expedition - precursor of the Arctic 
Research Institute 
The years following these Antarctic exploits were a time of upheaval in the 
Russian Empire: World War I, the February and October Revolutions of 1917 and 
the ensuing civil war put a damper on any scientific Polar interests. The military 
strategic significance of the Russian Arctic, however, was becoming increasingly 
apparent. 71 Yuri Zhukov, in his monograph Stalin: The Arctic Shield, focuses on this 
strategic interest. Zhukov considers that it was the necessity of securing the Russian 
North against any foreign invader which became the driving force for the young 
Soviet government to turn its attention to the possibilities of a permanent naval 
presence on the Barents Sea and to the military and economic significance of a 
northern sea route.72 Aleksei Tryoshnikov, in his article dedicated to the 50th Jubilee 
of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, briefly discusses the increasing 
scientific/economic, as opposed to military interest in the Russian Arctic. On 4 
March· 1920, an edict of the Economic Council established the Northern 
scientific/economic expedition (Sevexpeditsiya) in Petrograd,73 with branches in 
Moscow, Arkhangelsk and Vologda to which it assigned lOO million roubles.74 
Members of the Council of the scientific committee of Sevexpeditsiya were the 
President of the Russian Academy of Sciences academician A.P. Karpinskiy, 
academician A.E. Fersman, Professors N. M. Knipovich, K. M. Oeryugin; Y. M. 
Shokalskiy and other well known scholars. Sevexpeditsiya was the precursor of the 
Institute for Northern Studies which was founded in 1925 and later reorganised into 
the All-Union Arctic Institute in 1930. The military, economic and scientific 
potential of the Arctic at this time was most pressing, and little, if any, thought was 
given to the remote Antarctic, which had negligible relevance to the needs of the 
young Soviet regime. At the same time, other countries such as Great Britain, 
Argentina, Chile and Norway were very much aware of the economic and strategic 
71 The vulnerability of the Russian north was demonstrated by the Allied intervention in Arkhangelsk 
and Murmansk during the Russian civil war. 
72 Zhukov, Y. 2008. Stalin: Arktichesski Shchit [Stalin: The Arctic Shield}. Moscow: Vagrius, 542. 
73 The cily had different names throughout its history: St Petersburg from 1703-1914, Petrograd from 
August 1914 - 1924, Leningrad from January 1924-1992, St Petersburg from 1992 till the present. 
74 Tryoshnikov, A. 1970. Ordena Lenina Arkticheskomu Nauchno-issledovatelskomu institute 50 let 
[50 th Anniversary of the Arctic Instiiute]. Problemi Arktiki i Antarktiki (Problems of the Arctic and 
Antarctic) 36-37: 7 - 8. 
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potential of the South Polar region, and had already declared their interest. When the 
USSR eventually did turn its attention South, the knowledge and experience acquired 
in the Arctic became invaluable in pursuing its goals in the Antarctic. 
I.S The second International Polar Year 
The idea for a second IPY, which would commemorate the 50th anniversary 
of the first IPY, was the stimulus for a renewed international (as well as Soviet) 
interest in both Polar regions. It was proposed by the German Leonid Breitfuss, a 
representative of the International Society for the Exploration of the Arctic by means 
of Aircraft (which had close ties to the USSR). An official proposal was later made 
to the International Meteorological Organization (IMO) by the German 
representative Vice Admiral Hugo Dominic and approved by the IMO in 1928 and 
by the General Assembly of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics 
(IUGG) in 1930.75 A new international polar commission met in Leningrad in August 
1930, where twenty-six countries agreed to participate in the second IPY planned for 
August 1932 - August 1933.76 
A second conference was held in Innsbruck in September 1931, where one of 
the suggestions put forward by the explorer George Hubert Wilkins (1888 - 1958) 
was to use a submarine to reach the higher southern latitudes. 77 Scientists from the 
All-Union Arctic Institute were also keen to reach the southern latitudes, but using a 
different mode of transport: they knew that in the northern summer of 1931, the 
Kamchatka Stock Company (in the Soviet Far East) was in the process of 
establishing a whaling flotilla, which proposed to commence whaling operations in 
the Southern Ocean.78 The company apparently purchased 'a one-time American ship 
that had been converted in Leningrad', 79 renamed it Aleut, and transitioned it from 
"Summerhayes, C. 2008. International collaboration in Antarctica: The International Polar Years, the 
International Geophysical Year, and the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research. Polar Record 44 
(231):)25. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Belov, M. 1966. Proekt pervoi Sovetskoi ekspeditsii v Antarktiku [Project of the first Soviet 
expedition to the Antarctic]. Informatsionniy Bulleten Sovetskoi Antarkticheskoi Expeditsii 
(Information bulletin of the Soviet Antarctic expedition) 58: 65. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Tonnessen, J. and A. Johnsen. 1982. The history of modern whaling. London: Hurst and Company: 
414. 
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Leningrad to V1adivostok. They believed that 'it would be inexcusable not to utilise 
the expected voyage of the Soviet ships to Antarctic waters for all-round thorough 
research of the Antarctic. This scientific research would in no way conflict with the 
whaling activities of the voyage, but would add a solid scientific base to assist in the 
development of Soviet whaling in this part of the world.'80 
After the conference in Innsbruck, the Soviet Committee of the second IPY 
began preparations for sending an expedition to thc Antarctic. M. l. Belov claims that 
the plans for this expedition, prepared in 1931 by a group of scientists at the AII-
Union Arctic Institute, was found among the papers of the first Director of the Arctic 
Institute and Arctic explorer Rudolf Lazarevich Samoilovich (1881 - 1939).81 The 
proposed leader was to be Samoilovich himself, with A. F. Laktionov and M. M. 
Yermolaev as his assistants. They proposed to conduct research in the region from 
western East Antarctica to the eastern part of the Ross Sea. Among the ~ost 
important research directions were oceanographic (hydrological sections, hydro-
chemical analysis, sea depth, hydro-biological samples) and glaciological, which 
were necessary for navigation; meteorological and atmospheric. Thorough aero 
surveying reconnaissance of the coast from Enderby Land eastward and a station on 
Peter I Island were also planned.82 Another aspect of the ex~edition was to look for 
coal which could be used to fuel the whaling flotilla. Importantly, the possibilities for 
new geographical discoveries would 'add political significance to the expedition,.83 
The concrete political significance would have been 'to air the Soviet claim 
to be considered the "rightful owner" of Peter I Island and other lands discovered in 
80 Belov, M. 1966. Proekt pervoi Sovetskoi ekspeditsii v Antarktiku [Project of the first Soviet 
expedition to the Antarctic] Informatsionniy Bulletin Sovetskoi Antarkticheskoi Expeditsii 
(Information bulletin of the Soviet Antarctic expedition): 58: 66. 
81 Ibid: 64; about Samoilovich see: Koryakin, V. 2007. Rudolf Lazarevich Samoilovich (In Russian). 
Moscow: Nauka, 267 p. 
82 Tryoshnikov, A. 1966. Desyat let Sovetskih issIedovanii v Antarktike [Ten years of Soviet research 
in Antarctica]. Problemi Arktiki i Antarktiki (Problems of the Arctic and Antarctic) 22: 5; 
Later attempts to build a station on the island in 1960 proved impractical due to frequent avalanches. 
See: Dubinin, A. 1962. Ostrov Petra I [Peter I Island). In: USSR 1962. Trudy Sovetskoi 
Antarkticheskoi expeditsii. Tom 20. Chetvertiy i pyatiy reisi die Ob 1958-1960 {Annals of Soviet 
Antarctic expedition. Vol. 20. Fourth and Fifth voyages of the Ob 1958-1960]. Leningrad: Morskoi 
Transport (Marine Transport Press): 245-251. 
83 Belov, M. 1966. Proekt pervoi Sovetskoi ekspeditsii v Antarktiku [Project of the first Soviet 
expedition to the Antarctic] Informatsionniy Bulleten Sovetskoi Antarkticheskoi Expeditsii 
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the region by Russian explorers at the beginning of the nineteenth century. ,84 A 
Soviet base on Peter I Island would have been a compelling response to the first 
landing ever on the island on 2 February 1929 in the course of the voyage of the 
Norvegia, which claimed it for Norway. Unfortunately for Soviet political advantage 
(and science), this expedition was unable to be brought to fruition. Apparently, 'the 
government of the Union of South Africa refused to agree to render the necessary 
assistance to the whaling fleet, including the supply of fuel. ,85 Whatever the reasons 
for the failure to send an expedition to the Antarctic, the USSR was unable to assert 
any legal rights to Peter I Island or other lands discovered by Bellinghausen's 
expedition. Consequently, the USSR did not dispute Norway's claim or 'air a claim' 
as 'rightful owner' after King Haakon of Norway placed the island under Norwegian 
sovereignty on I May 1931.86 In fact, Belov concedes that '[t]he only important 
[Antarctic] expeditions during the period of tlie second IPY were the expeditions of 
Richard Byrd and L. Christensen.87 
Although the USSR was unable to send an expedition to the Antarctic during 
the second IPY, its achievements in the Arctic during the same period were 
impressive. During the second IPY, the vessel Aleksandr Sibiriakov had completed 
the first single season voyage along the whole extent of the Northern Sea Route . 
. Following this success, the. Soviet of Peoples Commissars on 17 December 1932 
established the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route (Glavnoye Upravleniye 
Severnogo Morskogo Puti - Glavsevmorput) with the aim of coordinating safe 
navigation in the Arctic region. 88 As well as managing the Northern Sea Route, it 
was to be the leading institution supporting Soviet Arctic research, assuming 
responsibility for the All-Union Arctic Institute. An English language account of the 
~4 Wolk. S. 1958. The basis of Soviet claims in the Antarctic. Bulletin of the Institutefor the 
Study of the USSR 5: 43 ~ 44. 
" Avsyuk, G. 1984. The Antarctic Commillee Reports. Main results of twenty years' research in the 
Antarctic. Washington: American Publishing Co: 2; The reason for the refusal is unclear. 
" Norway 1931. Royal proclamation placing Peter I Island under Norwegian sovereignty, I May 
1931. In: Bush, W. Antarctica and International Law. A Collection of inter-state and National 
Documents, vol.3. London-Rome-New York: Ocean Publications Inc: 134~ 135. 
87 Belov, M. 1969. Istoriya otkritiya i issledovaniya [History of discovery and exploration). In: 
Tolstikov, E. (Ed). Atlas Antarktiki Tom If [Atlas of Antarctica Vol. /I]. Leningrad: Hydrometeoizdat 
(Hydro meteorological Service Press): 70. 
88 See McCannon, J. 1998. Red Arctic. Polar Exploration and the Myth of the North in the Soviet 
Union, 1932-1939. New York: Oxford University Press, 234 p. 
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history of the foundation of Glavsevmorput can be found in John McCannon's Red 
Arctic. Polar Exploration and the Myth of the North in the Soviet Union, 1932-
1939.89 
1.6 Between the second IPY and World War 11 
The years immediately following the second IPY were marked by a period of 
escalating repressions in the USSR, where the Arctic took on a more sinister role. 
Vast numbers of Soviet citizens were arrested "and disappeared in its icy expanses.90 
After the assassination of Sergei Kirov, the leader of the Leningrad party apparatus 
and member of the Politburo, by a disaffected party member, Stalin decided to 
eliminate any potential opponents of his regime. 'In the spring of 1935 tens of 
thousands of suspect Bolsheviks, Komsomoltsy,91 and their families were deported 
from Leningrad to northern Siberia. Multitudes of "Kirov's assassins", as those 
deportees were called, from other cities, too, filled prisons and concentration 
camps.'92 This was the beginning of the Great Terror. Among those caught up in the 
purges was Samoilovich, who was declared to be an enemy of the people in 1937: he 
was arrested in July 1938 and executed on 4 March 1939. Part of Samoilovich's 
alleged wrongdoing was his 'wasting time' on geology, which had nothing to do with 
the immediate matter in hand - making the sea route navigable for as long a period 
as possible. ,93 His fate echoed, to a large extent, the purge of the study of geology at 
the Arctic Institute. During the time that Samoilovich was being dealt with as an 
'enemy of the people', however, exploration/exploitation of the Arctic was taking on 
a wider scope with the help of these very same 'enemies of the people', who were 
being used as an expendable labour force in developing the economic potential of the 
Soviet north. There was little mention of the Arctic exploits of these hapless 
89 McCannon, J. 1998. Red Arctic. Polar Exploration and the Myth of the North in the Soviet Union. 
1932-1939. New York: Oxford University Press, 234 p. 
90 See Conquest, R. 1979. Kolyma: The Arctic death camps. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 256p; 
Conquest, R. 1974. Bolshoi Terror [The great terror}. Firenze: Edition Aurora, 1064 p; Solzhenitsyn, 
A. 1974. The Gulag Archipelago. Melbourne: Wilke & Co Lld, 660 p. 
91 From: Komsomol- Komitet Sovetskoi Molodyozhy - Committee of Soviet Youth. 
92 Deutscher, I. 1984. Stalin. A political biography. Revised Edition. Singapore: Richard Clay Pte Lld: 
355. 
93 Armstrong, T. 1958. The Russians in the Arctic. Aspects of Soviet exploration and exploitation of 
the Far North. 1937-1957. London: Methuen and Co Lld: 164. 
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'enemies' in the popular press, which dwelt rather on the heroic deeds of the state 
endorsed explorers of the Arctic region. In February 1936, the Soviet government 
approved an expedition on a drifting ice station (using aviation support) to explore 
the North Pole and the central polar basin. This was the famous expedition known as 
Severniy Polus I (SP I) or North Pole I of 1937 - 1938 led by Ivan D. Papanin (1894 
- 1986), who was accompanied by meteorologist/astronomer E K. Federov, 
hydrologistlhydro-biologist P. P. Shirshov and radio operator E. K. Krenkel (Krenkel 
had been the radio operator on the Aleksandr Sibiriakov; Shirshov had been the 
hydrologistlhydro-biologist).94 On 21 May 1937, the USSR became the first nation 
ever to land an aircraft on the North Pole and build a base station on an ice floe.95 
The four members of the expedition drifted 1500 miles over 275 days and, according 
to McCannon, this 'masterful victory over the North Pole' was '[t]he USSR's 
greatest accomplishment in the Arctic. ,96 Success in the Arctic, however, was 
tempered by new Norwegian initiatives in the Antarctic. 
On 14 January 1939 Norway made a move to establish its sovereignty 'over a 
territory in the Antarctic situated between the east boundary of the Falkland area and 
the 45th E' ,97 some one million square miles of Antarctic territory, representing 
twenty per cent of the Antarctic coast. This time, the Soviet government was quick to 
respond: on 27 January 1939 the people's cornmissar for external affairs, Maxim 
Litvinov wrote to the Norwegian ambassador in Moscow informing him 'that the 
Soviet Government finds it necessary to reserve its position on the question of 
sovereignty over this territory, which was discovered by. the Russian navigator 
Bellingshausen during his expedition in the years 1819 - 21. ,98 Soviet international 
lawyers Movchan and Tunkin write that the USSR never.recognised any Antarctic 
94 Burhanov, V. (Ed) 1957. Cherez okean no dreifuyushchikh Idah [Across the ocean on drifting ice 
floes). Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press): 50 - 65. 
" McCannon, 1. 1998. Red Arcti~. Polar Exploration and the Myth of the North in the Soviet Union, 
1932-1939. N.Y.: Oxford University Press: 75. 
96 Ibid, 78. 
97 USSR 1939. Soviet note to Norway reserving the position of the Soviet Government with regard to 
the Norwegian claim in the Antarctic, 27 January 1939. In: Bush, W. 1982. Antarctica and 
International Law. A Collection of inter-state and National Documents, vol 3. London-Rome-New 
York: Ocean Publications Inc.: 152. 
98 Ibid. 
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claims and that the note to Norway underlined the Soviet position.99 Non recognition 
of claims allowed the Soviet government greater flexibility in formulating its 
Antarctic policy as international developments occurred. Boczek claims that' [t]his 
was the early warning signal of the Soviet Union's entry into the diplomatic battles 
over Antarctica.' 100 
The approaching World War II inhibited further large scale Soviet polar 
activities, which were only resumed after the devastated, war-weary country had 
commenced rebuilding. The next North Pole drifting station expedition (SP 2), led by 
Mikhail Somov, was organized' in 1950 - 1952, SP 3 led by Aleksei Tryoshnikov in 
1954 - 1955, and SP 4 led by Pavel Gordienko in 1955 - 1956. All of these Soviet 
initiatives in the Arctic were instrumental in preparing an experienced and well 
equipped force of polar navigators, researchers, aviators and other personnel who 
were available to engage with the Antarctic when international events finally forced 
the USSR to turn its attention to the higher southern latitudes. 
From 1919 on, Great Britain in particular had been conducting a policy the 
object of which was to extend imperial control over the Antarctic while acting 
'without undue ostentation' in order to avoid counter-claims and international 
dispute. 101 Ultimately, this policy resulted in the British Empire claiming two thirds 
of the Antarctic continent, though counter claims and international dispute were not 
avoided in the process. In fact, 'by the beginning of 1948, a significant international 
dispute concerning Antarctica largely involving Britain, Argentina, and Chile, which 
also affected Australia, France Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Soviet Union and 
the United States had evolved.' \02 Hall contends that this dispute had become, in the 
immediate post' World War II period, 'one of a number of international problems 
with the symbolic status of a capital 'P' and that the stage was set for an attempt to 
99 Movchan, A. and G. Tunkin, 1969. Pravovoe polozhenie [Legal status). In: Tolstikov, E. (Ed). 
Atlas Antarktiki Tom /I [Atlas oJ Antarctica Vol. I/j. Leningrad: Hydrometeoizdat (Hydro 
meteorological Service Press): 98. 
100 Boczek, B.1984. Soviet Union and the Antarctic Treaty. American Journal oJ International Law 78 
(4): 836 .. 
101 Hall, R.1994. International regime formation and leadership. The origins of the Antarctic Treaty. 
Thesis. Doctor of Philosophy, University of Tasmania: 47; See also Beck, P. 1986. The international 
politics oJ Antarctica. London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 332 p. 
102 Ibid: 62. 
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'fonn an international regime to govern the actions and relations among the states 
involved in the region.' 103 Victory in World War II had also provided the means for 
the USSR to attain a presence in the South Polar region and to tiuce t~e first steps to 
gaining a foothold in the Antarctic, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
103 Hall, R.1994. International regime formation and leadership. The origins of the Antarctic Treaty. 
Thesis. Doctor of Philosophy, University of Tasmania: 63; The dispute is discussed more fully in 
Chapter 3. 
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'THE FIRST PRACTICAL SOVIET STEPS TOWARDS 
GETTING A FOOTHOLD IN THE ANTARCTIC': 
SOVIET ANTARCTIC WHALING FLOTILLASLAVA \04 
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International circumstances after the conclusion of World War II helped set 
the stage for the USSR to become actively involved in pursuing its Antarctic 
interests. In particular, on 1 December 1945, under the Potsdam Agreernent105, the 
Tripartite Merchant Marine Commission completed the division of the main German 
shipping assets between the USA, UK and the USSR. ID6 One of these assets, the 
German whale oil factory ship Wikinger, together with its flotilla of whale catchers, 
was allocated to the USSR as war reparation. 1D7 The 12,639 ton Wikinger, built in 
Newcastle (England) was one of the first whale oil factory ships, designed as both a 
processing facility and a tanker. Registered in Britain and later Panama, it was 
operated and crewed by Norwegians as the Vikingen. Bought in 1938 by a German 
company and renamed Wikinger, it served in the German Navy from 1939 and was 
seized by the Allies at Kiel in 1945. The British re-christened it the Empire Venture 
and the UK Ministry of Transport operated it in the Antarctic whaling grounds 
during the 1945/1946 season. The post-war distribution of assets meant that the time 
had arrived to transfer the Empire Venture to its new owner, the USSR. 108 
The leader of the USSR, Joseph Stalin (1879 - 1953), was eager to take 
possession of the newly acquired ships: he saw them as the practical means which 
would enable him to pursue the country's political and economic interests· in the 
Antarctic,. since most of the whaling by that time was conducted in Antarctic waters. 
104 Submitted to Polar Record in May 2009. Current status - accepted for publication. 
10' The Potsdam Agreement was an agreement between Great Britain, the US and USSR on policy for 
the occupation and reconstruction of Germany and other nations after fighting in the European Theatre 
of World War II had ended with the German surrender in May 1945. 
106 Bulkeley, R. 2005. Wikinger - Empire Venture - Slava: Chronology 1945-1946. Unpublished 
manuscript (copy in possession of author). 
101 T"nnessen, J. and A. Johnsen. 1982. The history ofmoder~ whaling. London: Hurst and Company: 
515. 
108 Ibid. 
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Stalin dispatched the Deputy People' s Commissar for the Merchant Fleet (from 
August 1942), later chief of the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea route (from 
August 1946) and member of the Tripartite Merchant Marine Commission Aleksandr 
Afanasiev (1903 - 1991) to London, with the instructions ' not to return without the 
whale oil factory ship and its flotilla.' H19 Afanasiev (Fig. I) organized the transfer at 
the official level and, as a precautionary measure, had the flotilla insured for 700 
thousand pounds sterling or 7 million gold roubles. 1 10 
A$lHaCbeB AneKcaHAP AneKcaHAPOBlo14 
Fig. I. Aleksandr Afanasiev (Sovershenno sekrelno April 2008:34) 
He recalls that when he met Stalin after his return from the UK, the Soviet 
leader was extremely suspicious of the whole transaction. With the war time alliance 
rapidly deteriorating, Stalin was sure that the British would not allow the transfer to 
occur without incident. His distrust of his former allies led him to believe that they 
would rather set fire to the ships than turn them over to the USSR. Afanasiev, 
however, managed to relieve Stalin's apprehensions: 'such a conflagration would 
109 Afanasiev, A. 2003 . Na grebne volni i v puchine Stalinizma. Vospominaniya [On the crest of a 
wave and in the trough of Stalinism. Memoirs). Moscow: Ros Konsult: 253. 
110 Ibid, 259. 
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cost them 7 million roubles' he said, as he handed Stalin the insurance policy. 11 I 
Also present at the meeting was Anastas Mikoyan (1 895 - 1978), the Deputy 
President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Trade (from 19 March 
1946), and the Minister responsible for the whaling industry (Fig. 2)."2 
Fig. 2. Anastas Mikoyan 
(http://wwii-soldat.narod.ruiNARKOMY/ARTICLES/001-mikoyan.htm ) 
In the course of the conversation, Mikoyan put forward a name for the newly 
acquired Soviet acquisition, which Stalin approved: it was to be known as the Slava 
(,Glory' in Russian). Thus was born the Soviet Antarctic Whaling Flotilla (A WF) 
Slava, known in Russian as Antarkticheskaya Kitoboinaya Flotiliya (AKF) Slava. 
2.1 The Antarctic Whaling Flotilla Slava 
The British transfer of the Empire Venture and its whale catchers to the 
Soviets took place on 26 September 1946. A1eksei Solyanik (1912 - 1979?), a well 
known Captain-Director of the Far Eastern crab catching flotilla named Anas/as 
Mikoyan and previous master of an icebreaker, together with crew, was sent to the 
UK to take receipt of the flotilla from the British. Solyanik, however, ran into 
problems, since it appears that Stalin's distrust of his former allies was not entirely 
without foundation. Apparently, the flotilla had been left derelict for several months. 
111 Afanasiev, A. 2003 . Na grebne volni i v puchine Stalinizma. Vospominaniya [On the crest 0/ a 
wave and in the trough o/Stalinism. Memoirs]. Moscow: Ros Konsult: 260. 
11 2 Solyanik, A. 1952. Pyatiy reis v Antarktilcu {rhefifth voyage to Antarctica]. Moscow: Znanie: 5. 
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All GermanlNorwegian and British (if any) equipment which had previously been 
fitted to the ship had been removed for use elsewhere in the British whaling fleet. 1 13 
This was a cause for mutual recriminations between the new anq previous owners. 
Bulkeley confirms the fact that the 'USSR [paid] for a general refit to the Slava 
flotilla in Britain.' 114 Solyanik and his crew immediately set to work on repairs to the 
'derelict' ships.,\IS Repairs to the factory ship and the whale catchers were hastily 
completed in time for the flotilla to leave the UK for the 'next, 1946--1947, whaling 
season. The factory ship sailed on 22 December 1946, and the catchers sailed soon 
after. 116 
So it was that victory in the World War 11 and the consequent acquisition of a 
flotilla specially equipped for whaling operations in the Antarctic had presented a 
practical opportunity for realizing the plans of Soviet political leaders and scientists 
for a presence in the South Polar region. As mentioned previously, the plans with the 
Aleut whaling flotilla had never eventuated. Thus, after a hiatus of some 127 years, 
the USSR, which considered itself to be the legal heir to the geographical discoveries 
of the Russian Empire, was able to once again show its colours in the Antarctic. It 
had now acquired an unquestionable economic interest in that part of the globe. In 
order to emphasize and legitimate this interest with the international community, the 
USSR took the step of joining the governments of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Denmark, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, and 
the USA in becoming a signatory to the 1946 International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling, which A. Bogdanov and E. Nikishin signed on its behalf. 1 17 
By becoming a signatory to an international convention, the USSR gained a voice in 
determining policy relating to activities in the Antarctic. Although the policy was 
113 Bulkeley, R. 2005. Wikinger - Empire Venture - Slava: Chronology 1945-1946. Unpublished 
manuscript (copy in possession of author). 
114 Ibid. 
liS Katkevich, V. 2006. Zhir strane, atrestat zhene [Oil for the country and a diploma for your wife]. 
(On line article based on Archival documents) 
htrp://www.odessitclub.org/readingroomlkatkevich/slava.htm: 2. 
116 Ibid. 
117 A study entitled Materialy po promyslovoi deyatelnosti Sovetskih Antarkticheskih kitoboinih jlotiliy 
(J947-1972) [Soviet Antarctic Whaling Data (1947 -1972]). published in Moscow by the Centre for 
Russian Environmental Policy in 1995, details to what extent the Soviets actually adhered to the 
whaling convention. In one of ihe articles contained in the publication, Golovlev, the former Chief 
State Inspector on Whaling in the Antarctic, outlines how 'the USSR had falsified data on actual 
catches by Soviet whaling fleets in the Antarctic from 1948 till 1972'. 
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obviously limited to whaling, Wolk surmised that this was one of 'the first practical 
Soviet steps towards getting a foothold in the Antarctic.' 118 
Stalin could not have but recognized the political and economic ramifications 
of 'getting a foothold in the Antarctic'. Successful whaling operations would lead not 
only to economic benefits for his war ravaged country, but a physical presence in the 
region would add a greater weight to Soviet attempts to participate in any future 
negotiations in settling territorial claims and/or any arrangements for an international 
regime for the Antarctic. These actions were in keeping with the course that Peter 
Toma believes the Soviet government had already mapped out and iterated in its 
Memorandum of 7 June 1950. The Memorandum stated that 'insofar as the fate of 
the Antarctic is of interest to many countries now, it would be expedient to discuss 
the question of the Antarctic regime internationally in order to reach an agreement in 
accordance with the lawful interests of all states concerned' .119 The USSR was intent 
on projecting its post war 'superpower' status as far as possible, even to the 
antipodes. Short of outer space, Antarctica was as distant as the USSR could expect 
to project its interests. The mission was difficult, but the Soviets believed that the 
stakes were well worth the effort. 
Itombs/voronin.html). 
To ensure success of the new venture, Stalin 
considered it vital that the director of the new whaling 
operations in the Antarctic have a history of 
exceptional achievement in analogous conditions. To 
his mind, the logical candidate for the undertaking 
was Vladimir Voronin (\ 890 - 1952), who had led the 
first expedition to sail the Northern Sea Route in one 
season during the second International Polar Year of 
1932 (Fig. 3. Vladimir Voronin 
(http://funeralspb.narod.rulnecropolslshuvalovskoe 
"' Wolk, S. 1958. The basis of Soviet claims in the Antarctic. Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of 
the USSR 5: 44. 
119 Toma, P. 1956. Soviet attitude towards the acquisition of territorial sovereignty in the Antarctic. 
The American Journal of International Law I: 612. 
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Stalin personally instructed that Voronin be appointed Captain-Director of the 
flotilla,120 although Afanasiev most likely had another contender in mind for this 
role. Afanasiev's candidate, Solyanik, had taken possession of the flotilla and 
brought it to Gibraltar for bunkering before sailing on to the Antarctic. But it was 
Voronin who was to take over command in Gibraltar, where he arrived on the tanker 
Pamir, which was sent to refuel the ships (Fig. 4).1 21 
Fig. 4. Slava Chttp://www.odessitclub.orglreadingroomlkatkevichlslava.htm) 
During its first 1946/ 1947 season, the A WF Slava was one of 15 fleets from 
different countries taking part in whaling activities in the Antarctic. According to 
Voronin it consisted of the factory ship (crew approx 370)122 and eight catchers, I2J 
(crew 20 - 25),124 while according to Bulkeley, the factory ship and seven catchers 
left the UK for Antarctica. 125 
120 Afanasiev, A. 2003. Na grebne volni i v puchine Stalinizma. Vospominaniya [On the crest of a 
wave and in the trough of Stalinism. Memoirs]. Moscow: Ros Konsult: 260. 
121 Voronin, V. 1948. Pervyi pokhod Sovetskoi notilii Slava za kitami v Antarktiku [The first voyage 
of the Soviet whaling notilla Slava to the Antarctic] . Izvestiya Vsesoyuznogo Geograficheskogo 
ObscheslVa (News of the All Union Geographical Society) 80 (3): 213-222. 
122 Solyanik, A. 1954. Slava v An/arktike [Slava in the Antarctic]. Moscow: Profizdat: 5. 
123 Ibid, 215 . 
124 Solyanik, A. 1954. Slava v Antarktike [Slava in the An/arctic]. Moscow: Profizdat: 5. 
125 Bulkeley, R. 2005. Wikinger - Empire Venture - Slava: Chronology 1945-1946. Unpublished 
manuscript (copy in possession of author); The reason for the discrepancy in the quoted numbers of 
whale catchers has not been able to be resolved, although an as yet unaccessed 1947 documentary film 
KirTO IIHIII! 
.. - -.-., - ... -
- - --. -. 
Fig. 5. AleUl. Drawing by N. Kondakov (Zenkovich 1954: 16). 
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The task of manning the first Soviet A WF Sluva with experienced polar 
mariners was not a difficult one. As indicated by Voronin, the Arctic and the Main 
Directorate of the Northern Sea Route was a reliable source of qualified personnel. 
The task of finding experienced whalers, however, was more of a problem. Although 
the Soviets operated the much smaller Aleut whaling flotilla (a factory ship and three 
catchers) in the Far East, the AleUl compared to the Slava, was a ' makeshift affair' 
(Fig. 5).126 The Aleut could provide some, but by no means all, of the necessary 
manpower for the Slava, compelling the USSR to look beyond its own borders for 
instructors who could train the Soviet whalers. 
Which country would be able to provide instructors for the Soviet whalers? 
The answer was patently obvious. During its time as the Vikingen, the A WF Slava 
was operated by a Norwegian crew; the country with arguably the most prodigious 
entitled Za Icitami v Antarklidu [Chasing after whales in Antarctica] held in the Archive of Film and 
Photo documents in Krasnogorsk, Russia, may shed more light on the subject. 
" 6 Katkevich, V. 2006. Zhir strane, attestat zhene [Oil for the country and a diploma for your wife]. 
(On line article based on Archival documents) 
http;//www.odessitclub.org/readingroomlkatkevichlslava.htm; 3. 
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whaling experience was Norway. Consequently, it was to Norway that the Soviets 
looked for assistance in training its whalers and operating its new flotilla. On 29 
November 1946, the Norwegian government waived the December 1945 'ship law' 
and allowed the USSR to employ thirty Norwegian specialists127 'supervised by a 
Norwegian captain Mr Nielsen,128 to assist in whaling operations on the Slava. 
Veterans of the Aleut whaling operations in the Far East were also employed. 129 'The 
Norwegian whalers taught us how to hunt whales in the Antarctic', 130 recalled 
Solyanik, although they 'were not in a hurry to impart the secrets of their 
craftsmanship, on the grounds that any increases in knowledge would accrue only 
over a period of decades.'131 A period of decades, however, was not the time frame 
envisaged by Solyanik: he advised the Minister of Foreign Trade Mikoyan that 
'hunting success with the Norwegians often depends on omens, and dictated by 
sup~rstitions.' 132 He was sure that the Soviets had learnt enough of the basics of 
whaling without delving into its more esoteric aspects and that the Soviet whalers 
were quite capable of continuing without further instruction. Mikoyan took note of 
Solyanik's advice, with the result that in 1948, Nielsen was presented with a Pobeda 
(Victory) automobile in appreciation of his service to the USSR, and further 
Norwegian assistance to the A WF Slava was terminated. After the first two whaling 
seasons, the Soviets whalers were left to their own devices, although Nielsen 
continued to doubt the 'success of Russian self-sufficiency' in their conduct of 
whaling ~perations:133 
127 Bulkeley, R. 2005. Wikinger - Empire Venture - Slava: Chronology 1945-1946. Unpublished 
manuscript (copy in possession of author). 
12. Golovlev, I. 1995. Eho 'Misterii 0 kitah' [Echo of the 'mystery of whales'). In: Materialy po 
promyslovoi deyatelnosti Sovetskih Antarklicheskih kitoboinihjlotilii (1947-1972) [Soviet Antarctic 
whaling data (1947-1972)]. 1995. Moscow: Tsentr Ekologicheskoy Politiki Rossii (Centre for 
Russian Environmental Policy): 14. 
129 Shlyamin, B. 1953. Plavanie v Antarktiku. Zapiski uchastnika reida kiloboinoijlotilii Slava /959-
/950 [A voyage to Antarctica. Notes ofa participant of the whalingjlotilla Slava /959-/950j. 
Leningrad: Hydrometeoizdat (Hydro meteorological Service Press): 51. 
130 Solyanik, A. 1960. Antarctic letter. New Times 9: 15. 
131 Katkevich, V. 2006. Zhir strane, attestat zhene [oil for the country and a diploma for your wife]. 
(Online article based on Archival documents) 
http://www.odessitclub.org/readingroomlkatkevich/slava.htm: 8. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid, 9. 
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Whether Nielsen's doubts as to 'Russian self-sufficiency' were accurate was 
a moot point. The published whaling data suggests that the Soviets had no problem 
with hunting whales, to the degree that they took many more of them than allowed 
by the whaling convention. 134 According to the former Chief State Inspector on 
Whaling in the Antarctic, I. Golovlev, 'starting from the third cruise (1948/49) 
without Norwegian specialists the Slava totally ignored the whaling regulations.' 135 
The absence of the Norwegians allowed the Soviets to ignore the whaling quotas 
imposed by the International Whaling Commission, and 'an unprecedented poaching 
campaign began which can be characterized as a literal extermination of whales. It 
lasted until 1972 when international observers appeared on whaling fleets.' 136 
While providing the USSR with whale oil, meat and other products of the 
whaling industry, the Soviet whaling flotilla was at times used to remind other 
nations engaged in the exploitation of the Antarctic about its country's long standing 
link with that region of the globe. For example, Voronin recalls that 'at the end of 
February [1947] the Slava was at a distance of about 1200 miles from South Georgia 
Island. At that time it became necessary to send one of the catchers [Slava J] to South 
Georgia.' 137 He goes on to point out that the island was discovered in 1502. It was 
visited in 1775 by Captain James Cook and by the Russian expedition vessels Vostok 
and Mirny under the leadership of Captain Bellingshausen on 27 December 1819. 138 
Bellingshausen's expedition had sailed along the southern shore of the island and had 
first named various geographical features such as Paryadin, Demidov, Kupriyanov 
134 Materialy po promyslovoi deyatelnosti Sovetskih Antarkticheskih kitoboinihflotiliy 
(1947-1972) [Soviet Antarctic whaling data (1947-1972)]. 1995. Moscow: Tsentr Ekologicheskoy 
Politiki Rossii (Centre for Russian Environmental Policy). 
13' Golovlev, 1. 1995. Eho 'Misterii 0 kitah' [Echo of the 'mystery of whales']. In: Materialy po 
promyslovoi deyatelnosti Sovetskih Antarkticheskih kitoboinihflotilii (1947-1972) [Soviet Antarctic 
whaling data (1947-1972)]. 1995. Moscow: Tsentr Ekologicheskoy Politiki Rossii (Centre for 
Russian Environmental Policy): 14. 
136 Ibid, 12. 
137 Voronin, V. '1948. Pervyi pokhod Sovetskoi flotilii Slava za kitami v Antarktiku [The first voyage 
of the Soviet whaling flotilla Slava to the Antarctic]. /zvestiya Vsesoyuznogo Geograficheskogo 
Obshchestva (News of the All Union Geographical Society) 80 (3): 218. 
138 Ibid. 
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Capes; Novosilskiy Bay and Annenkov Island. 139 Voronin does not explain the 
reason for the necessity of calling in to Grytviken on South Georgia, although 
Ukrainian journalist and former seafarer Vladimir Katkevich, in an article marking 
the 60'h jubilee of the commencement of whaling operations in the Antarctic, 
provides a clue: 'The press immediately reported that for the first time since 
Bellingshausen's expedition, Russians had set foot on the island. The visit to South 
Georgia had a largely political significance and was planned in Moscow.' 140 
After completing her inaugural voyage, the Slava arrived in its home port of 
Odessa on 6 July 1947,'41 where Voronin informed the Soviet public that '[t]he 
Soviet whaling industry has a great future. I am sure that the time is not far off when. 
not one, but several expeditions equipped with first class technology will leave our 
shores for the severe Antarctic coast. The people steering these ships through the 
unexplored seas of the southern latitudes will be the same ones who tamed and 
conquered the Arctic.' 142 Voronin, one of the more renowned men who had 'tamed 
and conquered the Arctic', had vindicated the trust that Stalin had placed in him. 
Having successfully fulfilled his mission, he returned to his work at 
Glavsevmorput. 143 His hopes for 'several expeditions equipped with first class 
technology' and the future of the Soviet whaling industry were left for others to 
realize. And realize them they did. 
One of the outstanding personalities associated with the expansIon of the 
Soviet Antarctic whaling industry was Afanasiev's original candidate, Solyanik, who 
was appointed Captain - Director of the AWF Slava from the next 1947 - 1948 
139 Shvede, E. 1949. Podvig russkih moreplavatelei. K 130-letiyu so dnia otkritiya Antarktidi [The 
heroic deed of the Russian seafarers. 130 Anniversary of the discovery of Antarctica). Vecherniy 
Leningrad 15 July. 
140 Katkevich, V. 2006. Zhir strane, atteslat zhene [Oil for the country and a diploma for your wife). 
(Online article based on Archival documents) 
http://www.odessitclub.org/readingroomlkatkevich/slava.htm: 7. 
,., Voronin, V. 1948. Pervyi pokhod Sovetskoi flotilii Slava za kitami v Antarktiku [The first voyage 
of the Soviet whaling flotilla Slava to the Antarctic). lzvestiya Vsesoyuznogo Geograficheskogo 
Obshchestva (News of the All Union Geographical Society) 80 (3): 222. 
142 Quoted in Konichev, K. 1949. Ludi bolshih del [Men of great deeds}. Arkbangelsk: lzdatelstvo 
tipografii imeni Sklepina (Sklepin publishing Press): 115. 
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season. Solyanik occupied this position till the end of 1959, when he was transferred 
to the newly established Sovetskaya Ukraina Antarctic Whaling Flotilla (built in 
Nikolaev and based, like the Slava, in Odessa) (Fig. 6, 7) . 
Fig. 6. Sovetskaya Ukraina (Arctic and Antarctic Museum, St Petersburg) 
Fig. 7. Aleksei Solyanik (Arctic and Antarctic Museum, St Petersburg) 
Solyanik became Captain-Director of the new flotilla, which operated in the 
Antarctic in addition to the Slava. A third flotilla, the Yuri Dolgorukiy (based in 
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Kaliningrad) was established in 1960 and a fourth, the Sovetskaya Rossiya, (built in 
Nikolaev, Ukraine, and based in Vladivostok) in 1961. 
2.2 Whaling, science and the inevitable politics 
The operations of the Soviet whaling fleet were not limited to whaling and 
politics. Its objectives were somewhat broader: another of its aims 'was to conduct 
scientific research in the region.' 144 A member of several Soviet Arctic and Antarctic 
expeditions, geographer V. Averianov, and glaciologist Y. Koblenz affirm that, since 
1946, 'scientific observations and research had been carried on all Soviet whaling 
flotillas operating in Antarctic waters.'145 One of the flotilla's ships was always given 
over to a scientific group, with scientists from the All-Union Research Institute of 
Fishery and Oceanography and the State Oceanographic Institute on board 
conducting systematic research 146 of the climate, flora, fauna, hydrology and ice!47 
'[T]he scientists on the fleet occupy themselves in studying the Antarctic. We 
conduct orderly hydro-meteorological observations, and in this, as with many other 
things, we are greatly assisted by the navigators and captains of the whaling ships. 
Our observations of the climate; air and ocean currents; causes, force and duration of 
storms in different Antarctic regions have a strong practical and scientific 
significance',148 wrote one of the participating scientists. The practical aspects were 
to 'actively assist the whalers in increasing their catch, [by] thoroughly studying the 
whales and their movements in the boundless oceans, thus simplifying their search 
for whale pods.' 149 
144 Golubev, D. 1949. Russkie v Antarktike [Russians in Antarctica}. Moscow: Goskultprosvet: 68. 
14S Averianov, V. and Y. Koblenz 1970. 150-letie otkrytiya Antarktidi i Sovetskie issledovaniya v 
Antarktike [150th anniversary of discovery of Antarctica and Soviet research in the Antarctic]. 
lriformatsionniy Bulleten Sovetskoi Antarkticheskoi expedi/sii (Iriformation bulletin of the Soviet 
Antarctic expedition) 77: 14. 
146 Gusev, A. 1961. V snegah Antarktidi [In the snows of Antarctica]. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Academii 
nauk (Academy of Sciences Pres): 26. 
147 Kirillov, I. and A. Rybnikov 1962. Pervoe krugosvetnoe plavanie Sovetskoi kitoboinoi flotilii 
Slava [The first circumnavigation of the world by the Soviet whaling flotilla Slava]. In: Sovetskie 
expedi/sii [Soviet expeditions]. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press): 22. 
148 Slava. Zapiski Sovetskih kitoboev. 1955 [Slava. Notes of the Soviet whalers]. Odessa: Odesskoe 
oblastnoe izdatelstvo (Odessa regional press): 273. 
149 Ibid. 
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The S/ava voyages were the first to conduct scientific observations which 
were continued on later Soviet whaling expeditions. ISO The escalation of Soviet 
whaling operations and the associated scientific research was cause for a heightened 
sense of anxiety on the part of Western governments. For example, at the conclusion 
of the IOY, a secret inward cablegram dated 25 April 1959 from the Australian 
Embassy in Washington reported that' Soviet operations in the 1958 - 59 Antarctic 
season have included not only the fulfilment of publicised plans to expand into 
another part of the Antarctic - Queen Maud Land - but an unusual employment of the 
USSR' s whaling fleet - headed by the whale factory ship Slava - for scientific and 
political purposes in the South Pacific Antarctic waters.'ISI One of these 'political 
purposes' was the Slava visit to Wellington in May 1958, a date which coincided 
with the Soviet 9 May Victory Day celebrations (Fig. 8). 
Fig. 8. Aleksei Solyanik and NZ Prime Minister Waiter Nash (Flight 9 May 1958) 
Its captain, Solyanik, met the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr Waiter 
Nash, and 'played host to the famous Polar explorers Sir Vivian Fuchs and Sir 
Edmund Hillary' who 'spoke with admiration of the courage and valour of the Soviet 
scientists, flyers and seamen who took part in research work on the sixth 
''0 Averianov, V. and Y. Koblenz 1970. 150-letie otkrytiya Antarktidi i Sovetskie issledovaniya v 
Antarktike [150th Anniversary of discovery of Antarctica and Soviet research in the Antarctic] . 
Informatsionniy Bulleten Sovetskoi Antar/cJicheskoi expeditsii (Information bulletin of the Soviet 
Antarctic expedition) 77: 14. 
'51 Department of External Affairs. 1959. Inward cablegram. From Australian Embassy, Washington, 
25 April 1959. Soviet whaling Fleet's Activities in Antarctica broadened. Canberra, Australia: 
National Archives of Australia A 1838, 1495/ 13/ 1 part 2. 
33 
continent. d52 The good will visit was a follow up to the previous visits of the Soviet 
Antarctic expedition to Wellington in 1956153 and for the international Antarctic 
symposium of 18 - 22 February 1958:54 'Peace and friendship' and a 'deepening of 
understanding between 'the people of New Zealand and our countryd55 was the 
proclaimed object of these visits. Solyanik also took the opportunity of spreading the 
word about the then Soviet leader 'Nikita Khruschev's new peace initiative: 
'[h]umanity is impatiently waiting for the day when Khrushchov's (sic) proposal for 
general and complete disarmament becomes a reality and the horrible menace of 
destructive nuclear wars disappears. That is why the eyes of the world are turned to 
Washington, London and Paris. The next step is up to them.' 156 
The writers of the cablegram from the Australian Embassy in Washington, 
however, were not convinced by either Khrushchev's or the leader of the whaling 
expedition's peace loving rhetoric. They make the observation that, aside from 
politics, '[t]his unusual use of whaling vessels maintains continuity of scientific 
observations in the Bellingshausen Sea area started by the Research vessel Ob in the 
1957 - 58 season'. They also suggest that 'the continued interest in the area of the 
unclaimed sector, where American interests are strongest may also have significant 
political implications.' Furthermore, they sound a warning about the increasing role 
of the USSR in Antarctic whaling: '[i]n addition to boosting Soviet prestige and 
economic interests in the Antarctic Area, enlarged whaling operations will provide 
increased support to scientific efforts there. The oceanographic observations on 
density, salinity and temperatures would have additional military significance for 
submarine navigation and underwater sound propagation studies.' 157 
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2.3 Conclusion 
The first practical Soviet step to getting a foothold in the Antarctic had resulted 
in the growth from one to a total of four Antarctic whaling flotillas which 'combined 
whaling with significant scientific work, directed towards extending knowledge of 
the region. Scientific work on the whaling flotillas [became] a part of the overall 
programme of Soviet Antarctic research.' 158 The greatly increased presence of Soviet 
ships in the Southern Ocean, their ability to traverse large areas, make high profile 
visits to foreign ports and display their advanced technology and scientific research 
demonstrated the seriousness of Soviet intentions to other nations. In this way, the 
USSR had 'skilfully insinuat[ed] its presence in Antarctica.'159 It had also resulted in 
an added irritant to the already mounting unease of the Australian government at the 
Soviet presence in the South Polar region. 
The heightened awareness of Soviet Antarctic operations shown by Western 
governments indicated that the USSR was indeed on the way to achieving its goal of 
becoming a major player in the Antarctic arena. By the time the nations with interests 
in the South Polar region were ready to decide on an international regime for the 
Antarctic in the late 1950s, the 'first practical Soviet steps towards getting a foothold 
in the Antarctic' had led to the USSR firmly entrenching itself in that part of the 
world. The occasion to further insinuate its presence by expanding scientific work on 
the icy continent itself and securing an even more wide-ranging presence in the 
Antarctic arose with the proposal for collaborative international research during the 
IGY, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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THE SOVIET PREPARATION FOR THE IGY ANTARCTIC 
PROGRAM AND THE AUSTRALIAN RESPONSE: 
POLITICS AND SCIENCE I60 
3.1 Conflicting Antarctic territorial claims and a proposed solution 
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After the end of World War II and the Allied victory over Nazi Germany in 
May 1945, the Soviet Union, although devastated by the war effort, found itself in an 
extremely powerful political position. The meeting between Stalin, Roosevelt and 
Churchill, the heads of the governments of the USSR, USA and the United Kingdom, 
in the Crimean city of Yalta in February 1945 virtually decided the future political 
landscape of Europe and Asia. The USSR, as one of the two emerging world 
superpowers (the UK having been weakened by the war), used the conference to 
greatly extend its sphere of influence not only in Europe, but also in the Far East by 
agreeing to declare war on an almost defeated Japan. 
, 
Stalin's post-bellum attempts to consolidate and expand his control in Eastern 
Europe, Iran, Turkey and Greece were perceived by both the US and the UK as a 
violation of the Yalta agreements. In order to prevent this perceived expansion of 
Soviet influence and preserve a 'balance of power' between the superpowers, Harry 
Truman, who became the new American President after the death of Roosevelt, was 
determined to use all the means at his disposal: military, economic and political in 
his 'Policy of Containment' of Soviet ambitions. 161 
160 This chapter is based on a paper presented to the second SCAR Workshop on the history of 
Antarctic Research entitled 'Multidimensional exploration of Antarctica around the 1950s', Ministry 
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It was against this background that in August 1948, the United States 
government proposed a solution to a situation concerning Antarctica that had 
developed by the late 1940s and became known as the' Antarctic Problem'. Seven 
countries - Britain, New Zealand, France, Australia, Norway, Chile and Argentina 
had asserted sovereignty claims to Antarctic territory. The claims of Britain, 
Argentina and Chile overlapped, leading to tensions between these countries, and to 
a degree, involved Australia and New Zealand, who after all were members of the 
British Commonwealth. Although Christie, a former British Embassy staff member 
in Argentina, considered that British and American strategic interests in Antarctica 
were identical 162, Templeton points out that the British Foreign Office was alarmed 
about the effects of American explorations on the New Zealand cl<iim l63 and felt that 
Australia and New Zealand would be well advised to take steps to strengthen their 
claims. The US found itself placed in the middle of a conflict between its major ally, 
Great Britain and its fellow signatories of the Pan-American Treaty (Argentina and 
Chile) which provided for the security of the Western Hemisphere. 
The US position was complicated by the contradictory attitudes in the internal 
American debate about its own possible Antarctic territorial claims in the 
Antarctic. l64 The debate revolved around the adherence or non-adherence of 
interested parties to the Hughes Doctrine (after Secretary of State Charles. Evan 
Hughes) of 1924, 'which required that that sovereignty claims be based on occupation 
rather than exploration. 165 In his opus entitled The Antarctic Problem, Christie 
suggests that the initiative in reaching a solution to the problem could only be taken 
by those nations which created it (i.e. Argentina, Chile and Great Britain) by having 
the matter settled by the International Court of Justice. 166 These nations, however, 
have never been able to agree to have the matter adjudicated by the International 
162 Christie, H. 1951. The Antarctic Problem. An Historical and Political Study. London: George and 
Unwin Lld: 295. 
163 Templeton, M. 2000. A wise adventure. NZ and Antarctica /920-/960. Wellington: Victoria' 
University, 328p. 
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Court and consequently, no international solution to the problem has been reached. 
Notwithstanding the fact that all territorial disputes have been frozen .by the Antarctic 
Treaty, which was signed by the parties in 1959 and ratified in 1961, Dodds notes 
that in light of the dispute between Argentina and Britain over the Falkland Island 
Dependencies in 1982, the territorial dispute remains unresolved to this day.167 
The difficult position in which the US found itself politically in relation to the 
Antarctic Problem led it to adopt a stance that would allow it complete freedom of 
action: it refused to recognize the territorial claims of any of the protagonists, while 
reserving its own rights in the region. To safeguard its freedom of action, the US 
Secretary of Defence argued that it was 'imperative that sovereignty or active 
participation in control of the Antarctic, under trusteeship arrangements or otherwise, 
should be denied groups of nations which include our most probable enemies.' 168 
The 'probable enemy' was obviously the Soviet Union, and according to the US 
policy of containment, 'the entire Antarctic continent and its off-lying islands should 
be either under American control or that of potentially friendly powers.' 169 To 
achieve this outcome, the US and UK considered various options. Finally, in 1948, 
the US circulated a 'proposal for an eight-power condominium of the claimant 
countries and itself as a solution to the conflicting. claims over the Antarctic continent 
to the governments of Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway 
and the United Kingdom, while deliberately excluding the USSR. 
3.2 The Soviet reaction to the proposal 
At the time of the US proposal, the USSR had already begun to display an 
interest in the Antarctic by conducting whaling operations in the Southern Ocean, 
although, without doubt, the main thrust of Soviet Polar interest during the previous 
25 years was the development of the Northern Sea Route and the Soviet North.l70 
This interest intensified after World War II when the USA, Canada and Great 
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Britain, who had realised the significant strategic and economic role of the Arctic in 
war-time operations, devoted greater resources to the North Polar region. The Soviet 
Union regarded increased Anglo-American and Canadian activity in the Arctic as a 
threat to its own leadership in Arctic exploration and research. The Deputy Director 
of the Arctic Research Institute considered it essential to obtain comprehensive 
information about Western Polar programs and sought allocation of more resources 
to broaden the scope of research of the Arctic as a whole. l7l In 1946, the Director of 
the Institute, Victor Buinitskiy, had attempted to broaden the scope of research to the 
South Polar region, but his plans for investigating the Antarctic were ahead of 
political developments. 172 A closed meeting of Communist Party members at the 
Institute accused him and several of his colleagues of ignoring the North Sea Route 
in favour of a 'fanciful' expedition to the Antarctic. 173 Antarctica was definitely not 
yet a priority. However, the American proposal galvanized the USSR to reassess its 
priorities: the reaction to the attempt to exclude it from a vast continent that had 
potential economic, strategic and global political significance ensued fairly quickly. 
The Directorate of the Northern Sea Route outlined the official Soviet view 
of the American initiative in its journal, The Northern Chronicle in an article entitled 
'The Struggle for Antarctica'. The author, Afonin, (1949) describes the 'charade' in 
which the US and 'other imperialist countries' had embroiled themselves in their 
attempts to establish an international regime for the Antarctic without the 
participation of the USSR. He soberly assesses the geo-strategic significance of the 
Antarctic for the US and its allies in ensuring security of the Western hemisphere, as 
well as condemning the 'colonial anachronism' implicit in territorial claims. In 
pursuing their ill-conceived ambitions, he continues, the' American expansionists' 
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had completely ignored the Soviet Union's rights of prior discovery of the Antarctic 
continent and several sub-Antarctic islands by the Russian Antarctic expedition of 
1819 - 21 . The author comes to the alarming conclusion that the sole aim of 
'aggressive circles' in the US is to justify American expansion into the South Polar 
region in order to incorporate it into a worldwide network of bases in preparation for 
another world war. 174 
Afonin had thus outlined the magnitude of the threat that the American 
inspired settlement of the Antarctic Problem held for the Soviet Union if the latter 
did not take a firm stand and insist on being part of the solution. It was incumbent on 
the Geographical Society of the USSR to delineate the Soviet interest in the Antarctic 
and build a robust juridical case for Soviet participation. The Society convened a 
meeting in Leningrad on 10 February 1949 which was attended by 400 scientists. 
Fig. 9. Lev Berg (personal collection of Sergei Lukianov) 
174 Afonin, M. 1949. Borba vokrug Antarktiki [The Struggle for Antarctica]. Lelopis Severa (North 
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The President of the Geographical Society, academician Lev Berg (1876 -
1950) (Fig. 9) delivered the main address entitled 'Russian Discoveries in the 
Antarctic and Present-day interest in that Area'. He pointed out that 'historically 
Russia, and by succession the USSR has the right of priority of discovering a number 
of Antarctic lands' 175 by the First Russian Antarctic expedition of 1819 - 1821 led by 
Captain Thaddeus Bellingshausen. Priority in discoveries was seen as an extremely 
important factor in establishing territorial claims because 'rights are said to accrue 
from it.' 176 Mention was also made of the Soviet Slava whaling flotilla which began 
its activities in 1946, as well as the potential discov~ry of mineral and marine 
resources, the advantageous flight routes, the sub-Antarctic islands, and the fact that 
neither Russia nor the USSR had ever relinquished the Russian discoveries of 
Antarctic islands. The meeting adopted a resolution urging the Soviet Government to 
participate in any international settlement concerning the Antarctic. It considered that 
'no solution of the problem of a regime for the Antarctic without the participation of 
the Soviet Union can have legal force, and the USSR has every reason not to 
recogmze any such solution.' 177 Newspapers; journals; radio and 
newsreels/documentary films reported widely on the deliberations of the Society in 
particular and on Antarctica in general, thus stimulating a wide public appreciation of 
the significance of the Antarctic for the USSR. 178 
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The UK and the US were of the view that the resolution of the Geographical 
Society had no official standing and that no official notice should be taken of it.179 
However, they could no longer ignore the issue, when on 7 June 1950, a 
Memorandum based on the deliberations of the Society was delivered by the Soviet 
government to the governments of Argentina, Australia, France, New Zealand, 
Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States (but not to Chile, with which it 
did not have diplomatic relations). The Memorandum stated that 'all countries 
concerned should be invited to take part in discussing the regime of an):' sphere of 
international importance and that the Soviet government cannot recognize as lawful . 
any decision on the Antarctic regime taken without its participation.' 180 The Soviet 
Union was determined to broaden international participation in achieving a solution 
to the Antarctic Problem by proposing that 'many other states' to whom the 
'Antarctic continent is of importance' participate in negotiations. I8I 
The reaction in the UK and the US to the official Soviet Memorandum was 
typical of the prevailing Cold War tensions of the time. L. Kirwan, the Director of 
the British Royal Geographical Society in an article in Spectator magazine described 
the Memorandum as 'a new and curious development in the Cold War' saying that 
the Soviet Union 'has found a new and admirable field for her talent for political 
warfare and for diversionary and dividing tactics'. He feared that the Soviets had 
sufficient material to cause embarrassment to the Antarctic powers in view of the 
'complicated evidence on wh,ich claims to national sovereignty in the Antarctic are 
based and the formidable problems of international law to which they give rise.' 182 
Analysing the Soviet position, Toma in The American Journal of International Law 
claimed that the Soviets viewed international law as an inter-class law aimed at 
furthering the interests of the proletariat in its struggle for world supremacy. He 
concluded that the solution envisaged by the Soviet Union for the Antarctic would 
179 See footnotes in Bush, W. 1982. Antarctica and International Law. A collection of inner-state and 
National Documents, vol3. London-Rome-New York: Ocean Publications Inc.: 207. 
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'optimaliy aim at converting such an international agency into an instrument of 
Soviet policy.' 183 Although the US chose not to respond to the Memorandum, its 
hope to exclude the USSR from the Antarctic proved to be 'rather naive.' 184 
3.3 An opportunity for action 
Meanwhile, an avowedly apolitical proposal put forward by scientists 
provided an opportunity for the USSR to further demonstrate an interest and secure a 
foothold in the Antarctic. The American scientist, Or L10yd Berkner suggested in 
April 1950 that a third International Polar Year (lPY) be held in 1957,185 'twenty five 
years after the previous Polar Year (as opposed to fifty years between the first 
twO).'186 Berkner's suggestion was accepted by the International Council of 
Scientific Unions (ICSU) in 1951, which in 1953 expanded the scope of research 
from polar to global, renaming it the International Geophysical Year (IGY); it ran 
from I July 1957 tQ 31 December 1958. The ICSU set up a committee [the Comite 
Special de I' Annee Geophysique Internationale (CSAGI)] to plan a scientific 
program and invite participation of interested scientific bodies. 187 The first meeting 
of CSAGI held in Brussels from 30' June to 3 July 1953 formulated the international 
IGY program and, because the Soviet Union was not at that time a member of the 
ICSU, decided to invite the Soviets to renew the cooperation that had marked their 
participation in the first two International Polar Years. 188 Two member organizations 
of the ICSU, the International Astronomical Union and the World Meteorological 
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Organization to which the Soviet Union belonged were asked to 'try to induce the 
USSR to collaborate in the IGy.'189 
These measures were proposed to a new Soviet leadership following Stalin's 
death in March 1953. The Stalinist period was a difficult one for many sections of 
the population of the Soviet Union, including scientists, who had little opportunity to 
participate in international meetings. After the end of World War n, Stalin had 
instigated a cleansing in the ranks of 'backward Soviet intelligentsia' who had fallen 
victim to 'capitalist propaganda' and 'kow-towed to all things foreign' while being 
blind to the 'superiority of our economy, culture and science over the decaying 
capitalist culture.'.190 Stalin's death brought an easing of restrictions, and scientists 
acquired a greater freedom to collaborate in international scientific organizations. 
The new found freedom and consequent realignment of Antarctic policy encouraged 
a group of scientists from the Department of Marine Expeditions of the Academy of 
Sciences of the USSR to meet in Moscow in 1954 and take the initiative in ensuring 
Soviet participation in the IGY. Dr. lvan Dimitrievitch Papanin, head of the 
Department and former leader of the first Soviet Arctic drifting station named 
Severniy Po/us I (North Pole I) in 1937, chaired the group's meetings. They 
prepared a research program, an aviation plan and formulated recommendations 
which were submitted by the Academy of Sciences to the Council of Ministers of the 
USSR as a basis on which to draft any future legislation related to its participation in 
the IGY. On 19 July 1954,191 the USSR government established an Interdepartmental 
Committee of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR consisting of representatives 
from the various institutes making up the Academy. 
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The committee chaired by academician 1. P. Bardin and aided by Vice-
chairmen Professor V. V. Belousov, Dr. Yu. D. Boulanger and N. V. Pushkov, was 
to be responsible for preparing and conducting the IGY research program, processing 
the research data and publishing the results. Although the Academy of Sciences 
missed the May 1954 deadline for submitting its national program, a delegation led 
by Belousov attended the second meeting of the CSAGI held in Rome from 30 
September to 4 October 1954, where he announced that the Academy of Sciences of 
the USSR had established a national committee for the IGY. In keeping with the 
Soviet's adherence to the principle of including a wider representation of nations in 
deliberations regarding the Antarctic, Belousov suggested 'that countries of vast area 
(China, India and the USSR) should be represented in CSAGI.' 192 However, the 
President of the meeting, British geophysicist Sydney Chapman pointed out that 
members of CSAGI were chosen on a functional rather that national basis - 'they 
represent international bodies concerned with particular branches of science, and not 
the nations of which they are members. ')93 Belousov did not press the point. 
Apparently he concurred with Chapman's assertion that the key to fruitful 
cooperation was a 'single-minded devotion to science.')94 
It was with this 'single-minded devotion to science' that Belousov attended 
CSAGI's First Antarctic conference which was held in Paris on 6 - 10 July 1955. He 
arrived at the conference one day after it opened to report on the Antarctic scientific 
program proposed by the USSR Academy of Sciences. The conference president, M. 
G. Laclavere, asked him to indicate the position of the Soviet bases on the Antarctic 
map. Belousov indicated a site on the Knox coast, and another in the vicinity of the 
geographic South Pole, but was told that the site at the geographic South Pole was 
already taken by the US. The conference recommended that the USSR consider an 
alternative site towards the centre of the continent (at the Pole of Inaccessibility) 
where no station had yet been proposed, and an intermediate station in the vicinity of 
the South Geomagnetic Pole. Belousov's consent to the recommendation, and his 
further proposal for an exchange of scientific and technical information on the 
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organization of bases, which was accepted by the president,195 was indicative of the 
Soviet scientists' desire to be as co-operative as possible in their efforts at 
international collaboration. They also believed that their own science would benefit 
from the exposure to a wider international scientific community and a collaborative 
approach. 
3.4 Soviet Antarctic intentions 
The lGY program, which included research programs in the upper 
atmosphere, outer space 'and the Polar regions, had much wider ramifications than 
benefitting Soviet science: successful participation in the JGY would bolster national 
prestige and reinforce Soviet demands for a voice in formulating a regime for the 
Antarctic. The USSR considered its participation in the JGY a matter of national 
significance, and the associated space program and Antarctic research were major 
commitments. The Antarctic commitment was confirmed by a decree of the Council 
of Ministers issued on 13 July 1955 establishing the first composite Soviet Antarctic 
expedition (SAE), which was to consist of two parts: a continental expedition and a 
marine expedition. The first was to operate on the continent year round, whereas the 
second was to conduct research using expedition ships in coastal Antarctic waters 
and in the open sea. 196 The First vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers and 
member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Anastas Jvanovich 
Mikoyan 197 was assigned overall Party and Government responsibility for the first 
SAE. The Academy of Sciences; the Minister of the Merchant Fleet (V. Bakayev); 
the Head of the Merchant Fleet Ministry's Directorate of the Northern Sea Route CV. 
Burhanov); the Central Bureau of Hydrometeorological Services and other Ministries 
and Departments were charged with the responsibility of organizing the expedition, 
implementing the research program and providing technical and logistic support. 198 
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The primary task of the first SAE of 1955 - 1957 was to commence 
preparations for the requirements of the Soviet IGY Antarctic program, including 
building a main coastal base named Mirny (peaceful) after one of the two sloops 
which took part in Bellingshausen's expedition under the command of Lieutenant M. 
P. Lazarev. The naming of the main base was an astute political move by the Soviets: 
it emphasized both the claim to Bellingshausen's prior discovery of the Antarctic 
continent and the peaceful scientific purpose of the Soviet expedition. It thus 
highlighted the contrast between the explicitly non-aggressive nature of the Soviet 
Antarctic expedition and the ambiguous nature of the US expedition which was 
under the military command of the US Navy. The implication of the naming was not 
lost on the Australian Department of External Affai~s: the Assistant Secretary of the 
Department, J C Kevin, suggested to one of his officers in London to avoid wherever 
possible using the name Mirny in any official statements. It was to be described as 
'the Russian scientific camp on the coast of Queen Mary Land near Haswell Islet in 
the Australian Antarctic Territory.' 199 
Additional tasks of the expedition included preparatory work in selecting 
sites for the inner continental polar stations which had been suggested by the CSAGI 
First Antarctic conference: Vostok (named after Captain Th. Bellingshausen's sloop 
and once again underscoring prior discovery) at the South Geomagnetic Pole and 
Sovetskaya ('belonging to the Soviets') at the Pole of Inaccessibility. All these sites 
for the proposed Soviet stations were located on territory claimed by Australia in the 
sector comprising forty-two per cent of the Antarctic continent and proclaimed by an 
Act of the Australian Parliament on 13 June 1933 as the Australian Antarctic 
Territory (AA T). In 1954, Australia had acted to cement its claim and built an 
outpost named Mawson (after the Antarctic explorer, Sir Douglas Mawson who had 
taken possession of the Territory for the British Empire) as a formal act of 'settling' 
its new colony. Collis sees the intention to build a Soviet base on the AA T as 
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intrinsically 'anti-colonial' and designed to reject Australia's c1aim,2oo since the 
USSR had adopted much the same position of withholding recognition of Antarctic 
claims and reserving its own rights as the US had done. 
3.5 Australian reactions 
Being a member of the British Empire and an ally of the US, Australia in the 
political sense stood firmly in the Western camp, but was isolated from it 
geographically. The geographical isolation gave rise to a certain feeling of insecurity 
in this apparently vulnerable, sparsely-populated country and led the Australian 
government to place great reliance on its membership of the British Commonwealth 
and closer post-war ties with the US in formulating foreign policy. The political 
confrontations with the USSR in Europe were exacerbated by growing anti-colonial 
nationalist/communist sentiments in South East Asia and China. In 1946, the 
Australian Labor Government Minister for External Affairs, Dr Herbert Vere Evatt, 
tended to support the United Nations and its internationalist approach to solving 
world problems, rather than the overtly anti-communist Anglo-American approach. 
He held a cautiously optimistic view of perceived Soviet post-war expansionism and 
was of the opinion that the USSR pursued such a policy for defensive, rather than 
offensive reasons. After the elections in 1949, the new Liberal Prime Minister, 
Robert Gordon Menzies, adopted a more staunchly anti-communist stance, which 
was hardened by the communist incursion into South Korea in 1950 and the resultant 
Korean War. He saw the communists as being 'ideologically driven, remorseless, 
ruthless, patient and cunning in the extreme in their long-term quest to impose 
communism on the rest of the world'. In 1951, Menzies suggested that Australia had 
no more than three years to prepare itself for a war with 'Imperialist Communist' 
forces. 201 The external communist menace was compounded by communist threats 
from inside Australia itself - the communist dominated trade unions had initiated a 
series of strikes which crippled the country, and Menzies attempted to ban the 
Communist Party of Australia.202 
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While the necessities of cooperation during World War II had facilitated the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between Australia and the USSR at legation 
level on 10 October 1942,203 they eventually deteriorated and came to an abrupt end 
in April 1954. The occasion for the rupture was the defection in April 1954 of the 
Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, Vladimir Petrov (1907 - 1991), 
who, with the assistance of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), 
had made a decision to seek political asylum in Australia. His wife Evdokia (1914 -
2002) sought asylum several days later at Darwin airport while being escorted back 
to Moscow by Soviet diplomatic couriers. Petrov, who had the rank of Colonel in the 
Soviet intelligence service, and his wife, who had the rank of Captain, provided 
details of an alleged communist spy network in Australia to a Royal Commission on 
Espionage specially appointed to investigate their c1aims.z°4 As a protest at the role 
played by the Australian government in the Petrov's defection, the USSR closed its 
Embassy in Clinberra on 29 April 1954 and expelled the Australian Legation from 
Moscow.205 Relations between the Soviet Union and Australia ended and remained 
suspended for a period of five years resuming only on 2 June 1959. Thus, during the 
period of the I G Y, when international scientific cooperation was supposed to be most 
intense, Australia and the USSR had no official channels of communication. Any 
necessary communication had to be conducted through a third party, usually the 
British Foreign Office. 
Australian External Affairs Minister Richard Gardiner Casey's view of the 
communists matched those of his Prime Minister. Casey compared the communist 
threat to Australia to an octopus with its head in Moscow or Peking and tentacles 
reaching out to southern Asia and Australia.206 With a Soviet presence in the 
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Antarctic 'from which they could drop missiles on Melbourne or Sydney' ,207 the 
tentacles would have Australia completely in their grasp. Clearly, the presence of a 
potentially inimical power on the southern continent that had the ability to control 
southern sea routes and enCircle Australia with military bases and gain intelligence as 
to defence installations by flying over Australian territory was not a desirable 
eventuality. The Australian government would have preferred to prevent the USSR 
from having any involvement in the Antarctic whatsoever, so as to eliminate any 
possible detrimental effect on Australia's territorial and strategic interests. 
The main reason that held the Australian government back from pursuing 
such a course of action was the probability of incurring international odium by being 
obstructionist of the Soviet IGY plans. Casey, who was responsible for Antarctic 
matters, told the Australian Cabinet of Ministers that there were no effective means 
of preventing Russian activity in the Australian Antarctic Territory and that no 
means whereby they could be prevented had been suggested from any quarter. The 
most that Australia could do would be to refuse any facilities they may request, 
although it would be unusual in international practice to refuse transit rights and 
servicing facilities to a state ship and a state aircraft. Instead, Cabinet agreed that 
Casey should make a public statement welcoming the Soviets to the Australian 
Antarctic Territory to make their scientific observations.208 By welcoming the 
Soviets, Australia would remind them that they were indeed entering Australian 
Antarctic Territory. 
However, before issuing a public welcome, a meetin~ of the Defence 
Committee held on 25 August 1955 attended by the SecretarY' of the Defence 
Department Sir Frederick Shedden, Chief of Air Staff Air Marshal Sir John 
McCauley, Chief of Naval Staff Vice Admiral R. R. Dowling and Major General 
H.G. Edgar, representing Chief of the General Staff, assessed the defence 
implications of Soviet participation in the IGY. The meeting came to the conclusion 
that during theIGY it would be of value to observe the extent of Soviet activities and 
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that 'at the present time when world tension is relaxing,209 there would be no 
justifiable defence objection to the use of airports and harbours in Australia by the 
Soviet expedition. Should world tension increase, however, the possibility of the 
. clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into Australian ports from ships and 
aircraft would have to be borne in mind.21D It was considered unlikely for the USSR 
to attack Australia from the Antarctic, but if, at the conclusion of the IGY, the 
Soviets gave indications of retaining their bases in Antarctica, consideration might be 
given to depriving them of the use of support bases on the Australian mainland.211 
The meeting recommended further discussions between the Departments of Trade 
and Customs, External Affairs and Air to determine methods of preventing Russian 
aircraft from photographing Australian areas of defence importance. The 
Departments of Civil Aviation, Shipping, and Transport were asked to prepare 
information concerning ports and civil airports for use by the IGY expeditions in 
Australia. 
Because the Australian government was unable to communicate directly with 
the USSR Government due to the rupture in diplomatic relations, communication 
was conducted through the British Embassy in Moscow, which on 29 August 1955 
delivered a message from the Australian government to the government of the USSR 
stating that it welcomed the interest of other countries in the International 
Geophysical Year and would be happy to consider what facilities it could provide to 
any expeditions seeking to increase scientific knowledge of the Antarctic.212 The 
wording of the note was an attempt by Australia to gain acknowledgement of its 
Antarctic claim from the recipients, as well as to place itself in a strong bargaining 
position regarding the terms for granting the required facilities. It hoped to make 
easier the government's supervision of any foreign ships and aircraft and provide the 
ability to hamper Soviet activity after the IGY if their expedition became dependent 
on Australia for logistic support. It was decided that if the Soviets were to utilize 
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Australian harbours, it would be an 'excellent opportunity to find what they are up to 
as well as some degree of control over their lines of supply.'213 
Australia heard nothing further about Soviet preparations for an Antarctic 
expedition until early September, when the Department of External Affairs received 
a translation of an Izvesliya article from a Russian emigre living in Brisbane. The 
article reported that a 'Soviet expedition will leave in November 1955 in the 
specially equipped ship Ob (12,600 tons), which is able to travel among polar ice, 
and an auxiliary vessel.'214 Six days later, on 8 September, the Australian Embassy in 
Paris reported a comment of the Paris edition of the New York Herald Tribune in a 
memo addressed to the secretary of the Department of External Affairs. The 
comment noted that 'Moscow radio said today a Soviet scientific expedition with 
two ships and a "special air fleet" will leave in November for a two-year stay in the 
Antarctic.'215 
The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (again via the British Embassy) sent 
an official note to the Australian government on 2 November, omitting any reference 
to the AA T. It stated that the Australian government would help the work of the 
Soviet expedition in the Antarctic appreciably by permitting the flight over 
Australian territory and the servicing at Freemantle (sic) Airport of one of the 
expedition's transport aircraft. This would allow maintaining an air link between the 
shore base of the Soviet Antarctic Expedition of the Academy of Sciences of the 
USSR and Moscow. It concluded by saying that the work of the expedition would be 
considerably lightened if the Soviet Antarctic expedition ship were provided with the 
necessary servicing in the event of its calling at one of the ports of Australia or 
Tasmania (sic), but provided no specific details regarding dates and ports of cal1. 216 
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Before acknowledging the Soviet note, the Assistant Secretary of the 
Department of External Affairs J. C. G. Kevin contacted the British Embassy in 
Moscow on 14 December to clarify the Soviet intentions and check on progress of 
their expedition. He asked to be advised if the Soviet ships Ob (already en route to 
Antarctica) and Lena (due to sail) or any Soviet expedition aircraft proposed to call 
at an Australian port, explaining that the . Australians would not wish to be 
embarrassed by any such call in advance of their reply. The Defence Committee had 
suggested that a tab of Soviet activity be kept not only during the IGY, but also in 
advance of it, and Kevin had started gathering information. He conveyed the 
Mil1ister's view that any facilities granted would be only during the IGY, adding that 
the Americans also wanted to ensure that the main Soviet interest is 'connected with 
the IGY and is limited in its duration.'217 Kevin received no clarification of Soviet 
intentions or advice as to the timetable of any proposed visits and apparently did not 
provide an official answer to the Soviet note. While Australia had agreed in principle 
to a possible visit by the Soviet Antarctic expedition, it had very little knowledge of 
the entity with which it would be dealing. 
3.6 The Soviet Antarctic expedition 
The final plans and research program for the first composite Soviet Antarctic 
expedition (SAE) were ratified by the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences on 18 
November 1955 in Decree No 600.218 The Deputy Director of the Arctic Institute, 
Dr. Mikhail Mikhailovich Somov, who was a prominent Arctic researcher and leader 
of the Severny Po/us 2 (North Pole 2) drifting station, was appointed leader both of 
the overall 1955 - 1957 SAE and its continental expedition component. The second 
in charge of the SAE and Head of the Marine Expedition was the Director of the 
Institute of Oceanography, Prof Vladimir Georgievich Kort,z19 Many of the USSR's 
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. highly qualified scientists, most experienced polar pilots, navigators and Arctic men 
were diverted from their work in the North Polar region to apply-their skills and 
knowledge in pioneering studies and infrastructure development in the South. Four 
hundred and twenty nine people participated in the first SAE, including the ships' 
crew and the' building brigade. Although the USSR had limited experience in 
conducting research in the Antarctic before 1956, (except that carried out by Russia 
during Bellingshausen's expedition and on the Soviet Slava whaling fleet) it believed 
that it had the capacity in terms of human and logistic resources to fulfil its Antarctic 
program. 
Two of the USSR's most modem icebreakers and a support vessel were fitted 
out especially for the expedition: the 12,600-ton high deck sister ships Ob (Captain I. 
A. Man) and Lena (Captain A. I. Vetrov) which were both built in Holland 
specifically for conducting research in Polar regions,220 and the support vessel 
Refrigerator 7 (Captain M. A. Tsigankov) which had recently returned from 
'mothering' an ocean-going submarine on a secret 24,000. mile round trip from 
Murmansk in the Soviet Arctic to the Antarctic.m The Directorate of the Northern 
Sea Route had serious plans of extensively utilizing long-range submarine transport 
in the Soviet Arctic,222 and the Australian observers feared that if the Soviets were 
playing a double game in the Antarctic, they could readily turn their station Mirny 
into a submarine base for the delivery of atomic weapons. 223 
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When the Ob reached its destination at the Antarctic continent on 5 January 
1956, the first impression was far from favourable. Or. G. A. Avsiuk, a geographer, 
reported that 'the sector which we were allotted (Farr Bay, 66° 28'S, 94° 43'E) was 
not to our liking as there was no place to go ashore, but we liked the area to the west 
where the Australians were planning their operations. We even sent a telegram 
thinking that there must have been some mistake and asked whether it was possible 
to land there.'224 
After finding a less difficult place to land, the ships could finally be unloaded 
and building work could begin. In their progress report, the president of the Academy 
of Sciences, N: Nesmeyanov, and the Minister of the Merchant Fleet, V. Bakayev, 
wrote that on the 13 February 1956 the flag of the USSR was raised at the first Soviet 
geophysical observatory Mirny (66° 33' S, 93° 00' E). It is most significant that a 
box containing earth from the city of Stalingrad (the battle for which was a turning 
point in defending the USSR from the Nazi invasion) was buried under the flagpole. 
By mixing the bloodstained Stalingrad soil with the soil of the Antarctic continent, 
the Soviets were in effect forming an intimate connection between their motherland 
and the icy southern land, much the same as the symbolic mixing of blood by friends 
who create ties of quasi-kinship by becoming 'blood brothers'. The flag of the USSR 
was to be planted in its own soil. Glaciologist Leonid Oolgushin, who was present at 
the flag-raising, saw this as indicating that the Soviet Union's intentions in 
Antarctica were 'serious and long-lasting,.225 By the end of the year, a substantial 
base for conducting scientific research was created in Eastern Antarctica. Magnetic, 
seismic, ionospheric, aerological, geological and glaciological pavilions were built 
and equipped; and gravimagnetic, aerophotogrametic and photographic laboratories 
were fitted out at the Mirny observatory. 
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With the aid of aircraft, the expedition surveyed over 2,000 kilometres of 
coastline, took aerial photographs over an area of 60,000 square kilometres, 
undertook a comprehensive study of the Eastern Antarctic oases, studied the geology 
of exposed rock in areas around Mirny, made aeromagnetic surveys of the oases and 
large areas of coastline as well as gravimetric observations?26 Air reconnaissance 
flights to the South Oeomagnetic Pole and in the direction of the Pole of 
Inaccessibility were also undertaken. For the first time in the history of Antarctic 
exploration in the autumn/winter season of 1956, the expedition undertook a tractor-
sledge traverse into the interior of the continent which resulted in the establishment 
of the research station Pionerskaya (690 44'S, 95 0 30' E) on 27 May 1956 at a site 
located 375 kilometres from the coast at an altitude of 2,700 metres above sea level. 
The research station Oasis (660 16'S, 1000 44' E) was established 360 kilometres to 
the east of Mirny earlier than planned and was officially opened on 15 October 1956. 
During its stay in Antarctica, the expedition established close and friendly contacts 
with foreign Antarctic expeditions: the Soviet observatory Mirny regularly 
exchanged scientific information with the French, Australian, US and British 
stations.227 
3.7 Contacts with Australian scientists 
Contact with Australian scientists was initiated by the leader of the composite 
Soviet Antarctic expedition, Dr. Somov around lunchtime on 25 January 1956.228 In 
a radiogram to the Australian Mawson station, Somov greeted the Officer-in-Charge 
John M. Bechervaise, wished the Australians success in their JOY work and 
suggested the 'mutual exchange of meteorological information.'229 Bechervaise 
radioed a return greeting, replying that he would be happy to exchange data. The 
Soviets knew and respected the Australians' prior experience in the Antarctic: 
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Douglas Mawson' s The Home of the Blizzard was translated and first published in 
Russian by Glavsevmorput in 1935; his descriptions and charts had assisted them in 
their search for a suitable site for a coastal base. 
On the same day, the Australian supply ship Kista Dan was passing the Knox 
Coast on its way to Mawson station. On board was Phillip G Law, the Director of 
the Antarctic Division of the Department of External Affairs, and Voyage Leader. 
Law sent his greetings to Somov, expressing his desire of exchanging information 
and intention of visiting the site of the Soviet base, weather and ice permitting. The 
next day, Somov replied that he would be happy to see Law on board the Ob. 
Radiograms were exchanged over the next several days until 29 January when the 
Kista Dan found itself near. Mirny in heavy ice conditions. The veteran Arctic pilot 
and head of the Soviet air support group Ivan Ivanovich Cherevichniy (1909 - 1971) 
flew an IL-2 aircraft one hundred miles from shore to meet the Kista Dan at night.23o 
In the early morning of 30 January, the Kista Dan dropped anchor off Mirny and a 
, Soviet launch transferred Law and his assistant Dick Thompson to the Ob, where 
they met Dr. Somov, Prof. Kort and Captain Man, who acted as interpreter. They 
held lengthy discussions about their scientific programs: Antarctic weather; 
techniques oflanding and building stations. 
On the night of 31 January - I February the Kista Dan set out from Mirny for 
Mawson station, but at 15.30 hours on' 1 February, it ran into pack ice and bad 
weather, leaving it cut off from open water and beset in ice for ten days. On 7 
February 1956, Law received a radiogram from the Lena, which was in a position 
norih-west of the Kista Dan, offering to help them out of the ice. Law thanked 
Lena's captain, but declined the offer: he was sure that the Australians could manage 
without assistance once the storm. abated.23I However, the Kista Dan reached open 
water only on 11 February; and on 2 March, (when they were already at Mawson, 
where they arrived on 17 February) Law received an offer of help from Mirny since 
the Russians believed that the Australians were still trapped in ice. They supposed 
that the Australians had refused the earlier offer because there would be a cost 
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involved and pointed out that 'the help will be free of charge in sign of friendship 
between our expeditions (sic).'232 The spirit of cooperation and the 'single-minded 
devotion to science' promoted by the IOY committee looked as if it were bearing 
fruit, with scientists from both sides of the iron curtain freely interacting and sharing 
information. 
The spirit of cooperation of the Australian government, however, was 
somewhat lacklustre: it had not yet replied to the request for facilities on the 
Australian mainland as outlined in the Soviet note of 2 November. This was a source 
of frustration for the Soviet expeditioners. In their discussions with Law, they 
expressed concern at the delay in obtaining approval for one of their long-range 
aircraft needed to assist with the establishment of the inland stations to use the 
airfield facilities at Perth for the proposed. Perth - Mirny flight, and asked him 
whether any reply had been sent. Law told them that he knew that a request had been 
received, but did not know if a reply had been sent. In fact, the Australian 
government had intentionally not sent a reply: it sought to discourage any Soviet 
visits which could allow the visitors to obtain strategic intelligence. It was also. 
showing its displeasure at not being provided with specific details as to when and 
where the Soviet vessels intended to call. While Australia could not completely deny 
normal servicing facilities to a country with which it was still technically in a 
relationship, it intended to provide no more than the assistance that fell within the 
limits of the Australian government's replies to the Soviet note of granting strictly 
'necessary facilities' to their vessels. 
The Australian government was also interested in whether the Soviet 
Antarctic base was built for purely scientific purposes or whether it showed any signs 
of military related activity. The Department of External Affairs presented Law with 
'four foolscap pages of questions' that they wanted answered about Mirny station?33 
Law furnished a detailed report of his visit, describing the station's site, huts, 
transport, scientific program and Russian policy in Antarctica. He felt that the Soviet 
scientific personnel were of high calibre and the scientific program comprehensive, 
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thoroughly planned and backed by adequate resources. He believed that the 
expedition will 'gain international prestige and provide valuable propaganda to 
substantiate Russia's claim to be in the forefront of world science. ,234 As for any 
signs of military activity, he noted that while the expedition appeared to be civilian 
and non-military, pure (as opposed to applied) scientific research conducted by the 
Soviets in areas such as oceanography could enable naval experts to extract 
information whether a submarine base in Antarctica would be a feasible 
proposition.23S 
Feasible or not, the Soviet position expressed in its note of 2 June 1958 that 
'[t]he Antarctic should be used by all countries' exclusively for peaceful purposes; 
this implies ... that no military bases should be set up in the Antarctic ... 
confirmed that the USSR was interested in upholding the principle of the non 
military use of Antarctica as an essential prerequisite for any international regime. 
3.8 Conclusion 
So far as the spirit of the IOY was concerned, the Soviets appeared sincere in 
their efforts at cooperation, although the lack of diplomatic relations and Cold War 
. tensions hindered effective communication between the Soviet and Australian 
governments and exacerbated suspicions of Soviet motives. It would be naive to 
assert that science was the sole driving force for the Soviet efforts in preparing for 
the IOY. Hall observes that science was actually the means for attaining a political 
end, that of establishing a workable regime for the Antarctic. 237 However, the role of 
scientists in overcoming their political differences in their efforts at international 
collaboration to achieve the scientific objectives of the IOY was significant in 
building good will and friendly relations. The resources in manpower and technology 
234 Law, P. 1956. Report on visit to USSR base at Mirny. Australia, Kingston: Australian Antarctic 
Division. Library Special Collection: 8. 
'" Ibid. 
236 USSR 1958. Soviet note of2 June 1958 to the United States accepting the United States 
invitation to attend an international conference on Antarctica. In: Bush, W. 1982. Antarctica and 
International Law. A Collection of inter -state and National Documents, vol 3. London-
Rome-New York: Ocean Publications Inc.: 212-214. 
2J7 Hall, R. 1994. International regime formation and leadership. The origins of the Antarctic Treaty, 
Ph.D. thesis, University of Tasmania: 156. 
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that the Soviets expended gave an indication of their commitment to a substantial 
presence in Antarctica, making it impossible to find a satisfactory political solution 
for a workable Antarctic regime without significant Soviet input. This end was 
eventually achieved. Although science may have been the means for gaining a 
political foothold on the Antarctic continent, it would seem that, from a 
contemporary perspective, the Soviet presence had not been detrimental to arriving at 
a greater level of international cooperation than was possible by keeping them out. 
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4 
THE RELUCTANT HOSTS 
SOVIET ANTARCTIC EXPEDITION SHIPS VISIT AUSTRALIA 
AND NEW ZEALAND IN 1956238 
The purpose of this chapter is to follow the ships of the first composite Soviet 
Antarctic expedition of 1955 - 1957 on their voyage from the USSR to the Antarctic 
continent and on their return journey via Macquarie Island, New Zealand and 
Australia in order to highlight the contacts that the Soviet expedition staff 
encountered during the visits. These contacts occurred at the beginning of intensive 
Soviet activity in Antarctica in a period of cold war tension and unresolved Antarctic' 
territorial claims and were the forerunners of future efforts to lay the foundation for 
an international regime for the South Polar region in which the USSR was a major 
participant. 
At the time, the Anglo~American world, which obviously included Australia 
and New Zealand, was gripped by suspicion and fear of the Soviet communist 
menace and adhered to a policy of containing perceived Soviet expansionism. 
Attempts by the Soviet Union to forge cordial international relations were seen as 
having a sinister purpose, in the words of the Australian Prime Minister Robert 
Menzies 'to make more swift and certain the defeat of the democracies.'239 While the 
Soviet scientists appeared serious in their overtures to create cordial relations in 
keeping with the non-political scientific purposes of the IGY, fear of possible ulterior 
motives and of their intention to establish bases in the sector of the Antarctic 
continent claimed by Australia led to a reluctance on the part of thc Australian 
government to develop closer links with the Soviet expedition. This chapter devotes 
particular attention to the unenthusiastic attitude of the Australian and New Zealand 
. governments to visits by the Soviet ships to their ports. The attitude of both 
governments was strikingly similar for several obvious reasons. They were close 
238 This chapter is based on a paper which was published in Polar Record 45 (232): 37-50 (2009). 
2J9 Quoted in Meaney, N. 1985. Australia and the world A documentary history from the 1870s to the 
1970s. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire: 600. 
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neighbours, with a common British heritage; they were both members of the 
Commonwealth and they were both claimants to Antarctic territory; they shared 
similar geo-strategic interests and were fellow signatories together with the United 
States of the Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) treaty; and they 
shared the same cold war concerns about the Soviet threat. This chapter further 
examines the differing attitudes of the two governments and their respective 
scientific communities to the Soviet expedition and emphasises the interest in" the 
work of the expedition shown by Australia's most eminent Antarctic scientist and 
explorer, Sir Douglas Mawson. 
Information was obtained from the diaries and monographs published in 
Russian by the prolific scientific secretary of the Marine Expedition (E. Suzywnov, 
1908 - 1998), the leader of the Marine Expedition (Professor V. Kort, 1913 - 1994) 
and the captain of the flagship and main oceanographic research vessel Ob (I. Man, 
1903 - 1982). These papers are found in an anthology edited by I. Bardin entitled 
Opisanie expeditsii na die 'Ob' 1955-1956 {An account of the expedition on the 
diesel/electric ship 'Ob' 1955-1956l40 and in Suzyurnov's book K shestomu 
materiku [To the sixth continentj.24 I Russian language archival material comes 
largely from the Northern Sea Directorate (Glavsevmorput) section in the State 
Economic Archives in Moscow and from expedition reports in the Arctic and 
Antarctic Research Institute in St Petersburg. The Australian perspective on the 
expedition was gleaned from the correspondence files in the National Archives of 
Australia (NAA) in Canberra; the Australian Antarctic Division (AAD) Library 
special collection in Kingston, Tasmania, and the South Australian Museum Mawson 
Antarctic Collection in Adelaide, South Australia. These files also contain 
correspondence between the Australian and New Zealand High Commissions that 
shed light on New Zealand attitudes. 
240 Bardin. I. (Ed). 1958. Opisanie expeditsii na dizel-electrohode Ob 1955-1956 {An account of the 
expedition on the diesellelectric ship 'Ob' 1955-1956}. Moscow: [zdatelstvo Akademii Nauk 
(Academy of Sciences Press), 238 p. 
241 Suzyumov, E. 1958. K shestomu materiku {To the sixth continent}. Moscow: Geografizdat 
(Geographical Literature Press), 348p. 
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4.1 The first composite Soviet Antarctic expedition 
The first composite Soviet Antarctic expedition was established by a decree 
of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on 13 July 1955 and comprised a 
continental and a marine component. It was headed by the Deputy Director of the 
USSR Arctic Research Institute, Dr. M. Somov (1908 - 1973) who was also leader of 
the continental component (Fig. 10). 
Fig.IO. Left to right: the head of the Soviet Antarctic expedition M. Somov and 
captain of Ob, I. Man. Photo by A. Less (Archives of Film and Photo Documents, 
Krasnogorsk, Russia). 
The leader of the marine component and second in command of the whole 
expedition was Professor V. Kort. The expedition was assigned three vessels: the 
icebreaker sister ships Ob (captained by I. Man), Lena (captained by A. Vetrov) and 
the support vessel Refrigerator 7 (captained by M. Tsigankov). 
The flagship and main oceanographic research vessel was Ob, which on 20 
August 1955 entered the Riga plant of the Ministry of the Merchant Fleet of the 
USSR, headed by O. Zadorozhniy, to spend three months undergoing a major refit as 
an oceanographic research vessel. This included the installation of navigation and 
communication systems, winches, and the construction of passenger cabins and 
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laboratories.z42 According to a decree of the chief of Glavsevmorput, V. Burhanov 
(1908 - 1982), issued on II November 1955, the expedition was to load at 
Kaliningrad and to depart from that port on 30 November 1955.243 
However, due to the scope of the proposed work, three months was 
insufficient for it to be completed, and construction continued en route to the 
Antarctic.244 Ob arrived in Kaliningrad from Riga on 22 November, five days later 
than was planned,245 consequently reducing the time for loading from fourteen days 
to nine. Space on both the vessels was at a premium: 'each place on the' Ob and Lena 
was worth its weight in gold - all the cabins were filled to the brim: there were about 
three times too many people on board', recalled V. Hodirev, the fourth 
officer/electric radio navigator on Lena and future mayor of Leningrad.246 Besides. 
the crew, Ob carried the main contingent of the marine expedition, some personnel of 
the continental expedition and the building brigade as well as journalists and 
filmmakers who were to report on the expedition. Most of the participants were 
Communist Party members, some of whom were entrusted with the task of ensuring 
that all voyagers adhered to party discipline at all times. There was at least one of 
these highly influential political officers on each vessel. A crowded pre-departure 
meeting was held on the wharf at Kaliningrad, at which Burhanov delivered a 
farewell address. 
242 Kort, V.1958. Tseli ezpeditsii i ee podgotovka [Aims of the expedition and its preparation]. In 
Bardin, I. (Ed). Opisanie expeditsii na dizellelektohode Ob 1955-1956 [Description of the expedition 
on board the diesel/electric ship Ob 1955-195]. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk (Academy of 
Sciences Press): 9. 
243 Burhanov, V. 1955. Prikaz nachalnika Glavnogo Upravleniya SMP MMF SSSR No 223 ot II 
Noyabria 1955 0 vyhode v reis KAE [Decree of the Head of the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea 
Route of the USSR Merchant Navy Ministry in reference to the departure of the CAE]. Moscow: 
Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Economiki (Russian State Economics Archives) RGAE, File 
9570, op 2 ed hr 2579(3). 
244 Glavsevmorput 1956. Stenogramma soveshchaniya u nachalnika GSMP Burhanova, 10 Aprelya 
1956. Informatsiya pribivshih iz Antarktiki tOY. Avsyuk, Shumskiy i Markov [Transcript of the 
meeting with Burhanov, Head of the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route. Information 
provided by Avsyuk, Shumskiy and Markov, 10 April 1956]. Moscow: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy. 
Archiv Economiki (Russian State Economics Archives) RGAE, File 9570, op 2, ed hr 2583: 146. 
245 Burhanov, V. 1955. Prikaz nachalnika Glavnogo Upravleniya SMP MMF SSSR No 223 ot 11 
Noyabria 1955 0 vyhode v reis KAE [Decree of the Head of the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea 
Route of the USSR Naval Ministry in reference to the departure of the CAE, II November]. Moscow: 
Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Economiki (Russian State Economics Archives) RGAE, File 
9570, op 2 ed hr 2579(3). 
246 Strugatskiy, V. 2006. Polusa Vladimira Hodireva [The Poles of Vladimir Hodirev]. Smena, St 
Petersburg, 20 February: 10. 
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The departure was extensively covered m the media with magazme and 
newspaper articles and newsreels which were shown in cinemas; a short 1955 
documentary film by G. Zakharova and A. Istomin The Soviet Antarctic expedition 
departs for Antarctica 247 briefly outlining the Soviet plans and preparations for 
departure was widely distributed. According to the captain, Ob finally departed at 
18.00 hours on I December 1955,248 although a departure date of 30 November has 
been repeated many times in both Russian and English language expedition 
literature.249 
After Ob's departure, intensive preparations for Lena's voyage south 
commenced under the direction of the deputy chief of G1avsevmorput, E. Tolstikov 
(1913 - 1987) (who later headed the third Soviet Antarctic expedition in 1957 - 1959) 
and were completed by Burhanov.250 Lena was intended to conduct some of the 
scientific observations 251 and to carry out subsidiary research work. Her cargo and 
personnel started arriving in Kaliningrad while she was still in Riga, at which port 
she arrived on the 7 December 252 instead of 1 December, as was planned.253 'There 
247 Sovetskaya expeditsia otpravlyaetsia v Antarktiku 1955 [The Soviet Antarctic Expedition Departs 
for Antarctica]. Documentary film by G. Zakharova and A. Istomin. Krasnogorsk, Moscow region, 
Russia: Russian State Archives of Film and Photo Document [RGAKFD] . 
• 248 Man, I. 1958. Plavanie expeditsii, raboly po organizatsii observatorii Mirny i harakteristika usloviy 
pogody [The expedition voyage, construction of Mirny and weather observations] In Bardin, I. (Ed). 
Opisanie expeditsii na dizel/elektohode Ob /955-1956 [An account of the expedition on the 
diesel/electric ship Ob /955-1957}. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk (Academy of Sciences 
Press: 17. 
249. Suzyumov, E. 1958. K shestomu materiku [To the sixth continent). Moscow: Geografizdat 
(Geographical Literature Press): 5; Nudelman, A. 1959. Sovetskie expeditsii v Antarktiku 1955-1959 
[Soviet expeditions to Antarctica 1955-1959}. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk (Academy of 
Sciences Press):8. 
25. Korotkevich, E. 1956. Otchet 0 rabotah expeditsionnoi gruppy KAE AN SSSR na die Lena 
14.12.1955-20.01.1956 [Reports of the expedition group of the USSR Academy of Sciences on board 
the diesel/electric ship Lena 14.12.1955-20.0l.l956]. St Petersburg. Russia: Arctic and Antarctic· 
Research Institute: Fondi: 2. 
2S1 Somov, M. 1959. Pervaya Kontinentalnaya Expeditsia /955-/957. Obschee opisanie [The First 
Continental Expedition /955 - 1957. A general account}. Leningrad: Morskoi Transport (Marine 
Transport Press): 11. 
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was a lot of cargo, more than expected, and we had to leave behind some timber, fuel 
containers, tractor sledges, and diesel fuel ordered in Rotterdam', wrote the 
geographer E. Korotkevich.254 Lena left port on 14 December fully loaded with 4250 
tons of cargo and its contingent of crew, members of the continental and marine 
expeditions and part of the building brigade.2SS The refrigerator-class support vessel 
Refrigerator 7 sailed from Riga the next day loaqed with. 313 tons of perishables. 
Ob arrived in Cape Town on 24 December 1955, where she was boarded by 
members of the Soviet consulate who were accompanied by the Czechoslovak 
consul, J. Patek, and greeted by masses of Christmas Eve revellers who came to the 
pier to see the Soviet icebreaker. The revellers were eager to talk and ask questions, 
although they were not allowed on board due to loading operations and time 
constraints. Contrasting with the revellers were what the expedition's scientific 
secretary, Suzyumov, took to be two policemen in khaki parading up and down the 
wharf in this . 'reactionary capitalist country'. The Soviets were particularly anxious 
to display their loathing of the concept of apartheid and solidarity with the oppressed 
peoples of the world. They pointedly invited the indigenous South African port 
workers to lunch in the ship's mess and allowed them full freedom to move about the 
ship, much to the annoyance of the 'parading policemen.' The final straw for these 
custodians of the law was when the ship's loudspeakers began broadcasting the peace 
songs of the well-known African American singer, civil rights activist and very good 
friend of the Soviet Union, Paul Robeson. According to Suzyumov, one of them ran 
off to report this latest provocation to his superiors.256 
The only representative of an official scientific body to visit the ship was an 
officer from the South African meteorological service, A. Crawford, of Tristan da 
Route of the USSR Naval Ministry in reference to the departure of the CAE]. Moscow: Rossiiskiy 
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Cunha fame, who brought meteorological reference books as gifts to. the Soviet 
expedition and shared his knowledge of the scientific bases and expeditions that were 
working in Antarctica at the time. He invited the Soviet meteorologists L. Sobolev 
and R. Usmanov to the meteorological observatQry in Cape Town where the 
Russians offered to provide continuing meteorological data to the observatory. The 
local press, in a piece entitled 'Russians spring a surprise', later called this exchange 
a positive sign of scientific cooperation between the two countries.257 In 1958 the 
South Africans presented Ob with a framed artistic photograph of Table Mountain in 
appreciation of this cooperation.258 The stay in Cape Town was so short that the crew 
and expedition staff had insufficient time to rest before their departure for the 
Antarctic.259 
The impression from all reports is that time was of the essence: summer was 
well advanced and Ob needed to reach its destination before winter conditions set in. 
So the ship proceeded at maximum speed and all four diesel electric engines were 
utilised to achieve an average speed of almost fourteen knotS.260 The ship arrived in 
Farr Bay (also known as Depot Bay) on 5 January 1956. After conducting air 
reconnaissance of the area to the west, it was decided to establish a base on an area 
of the Antarctic continent in Queen Mary Land near Haswell Islet. The coast 
between the West Ice Shelf and the Shackleton Ice Shelf (between King Leopold 
Astrid and Queen Astrid Coast and Knox Coast) was named the Pravda Coast after 
Pravda [truth/justice], the official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
'" Suzyumov, E. 1957. Mezhdunarodnye nauchnye svyazi expeditsii [International scientific relations 
of the expedition]. In: Sove/skie issledovaniya v Antarktike [Soviet research in the Antarctic}. 
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December: I. 
'" Kort, V. 1958. Tretiya Morskaya Antarkticheskaya Expeditsia. Otchet 0 rabote 3 MAE na die Ob. 
Chast 11 [Third Marine Antarctic Expedition. Reports of the 3rd MAE on board the dieseVelectric ship 
Ob. Part Il]. St Petersburg. Russia: Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute: Fondi: 300. 
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Press): 17. 
Union.261 This name has remained on Soviet maps and atlases of Antarctica, 
including those printed in 1980 and 2005?62 
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On 15 January 1956, Ob approached the future site of their main continental 
base Mirny and immediately commenced preparations for unloading, which 
continued round the clock in difficult weather conditions.263 Lena approached 
Haswell Islet five days after. Ob on 20 January and the construction of the base 
~ommenced on 22 January.264 Unloading Lena proceeded slowly and Vetrov decided 
to move closer to the Pravda shore to unload cargo directly on to the 20 metre-high 
ice edge, rather than onto the fast ice265 This was rather a risky manoeuvre due to the 
very real possibility of the edge collapsing, which did in fact happen several times, 
notwithstanding the attempts at stabilisation by using explosives to precipitate the 
collapse of unstable sections. Hodirev later recalled Mawson's remark when they 
were in Adelaide that 'nobody had ever dared to unload in such a manner. ,266 The 
danger inherent in such a situation led to the ice edge being named the Barrier 
Otvazhnih, [Barrier of the Courageous 1 emphasising the pioneering adventurous 
bravado of the expedition. Ob departed from Mimy on 28 February to continue its 
oceanographic observations, whilst Lena, which was being used as accommodation 
during the building of the base, was last to leave on 17 March after staying there 
261 Dubrovin, L. and M. Preobrazhenskaya 1987. 0 chem govoril karta Antarktiki [What does the map 
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almost two months. Delaying departure until well past the end of summer was a 
cause for some concern, since early February is the time during which the ice belt 
was expected to close. However, a reconnaissance flight towards the north of the 
Shackleton Ice Shelf assisted in finding a passage for Lena through the ice (Fig. 11 ). 
Fig. ll. Pilots of the first composite Antarctic expedition in the Kaliningrad port. 
Second from left is Hero of the Soviet Union I. Cherevichniy. Photo by A. Less 
(Archives of Film and Photo Documents, Krasnogorsk, Russia) . 
A party of ninety-two people was left to winter at the newly built base station with 
Somov as leader. 267 
4.2 Possible visit of Soviet ships: Australian concerns 
Meanwhile, on the Australian mainland, the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission received a message from Telegraphnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza 
[Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union], (TASS), on 29 February 1956 that Ob 
had left the Soviet expedition's base at Haswell Islet after spending one and a half 
months there and was 'at present sailing along the eastern shores of the Antarctic 
continent for the purpose of studying ocean currents and underwater mountain chains 
[and] might call at an Australian port during the next three months.'268 The 
Australian government had as yet received no official advice from the Soviets that 
2.7 Denisov, I. and G. Bregman 1959. Kalendar kompleksnoi Antarkticheskoi expeditsii [Chronicle of 
the composite Antarctic expedition). In: Burhanov, V. (Ed.). Na samoi yuzhnoi zemle [On the far 
south land}. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press): 441 . 
'61 Kevin J. C. G. 1956. Russian vessel Ob. Lener to the Secretary, Anomey General's department, 14 
March 1956. Canberra, Australia: National Archives of Australia A 1838, 1495/ 1/9/4 part 3. 
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Ob would call but 'had to take account of the possibility', wrote Assistant Secretary 
of the Department of External Affairs (DEA) J.C.G. Kevin on 9 March 1956269 after 
hearing of the T ASS report. He proceeded to inform all interested government 
departments of the background concerning the exchange of notes between the 
Australian and USSR governments regarding the Soviet Antarctic expedition. The 
background to this was that on 29 August 1955, Australia had sent a note to the 
USSR in which it welcomed the interest of other countries in the lGY and offered to 
consider any facilities that it could provide to assist any expeditions seeking to 
increase scientific knowledge of the Antarctic. Australia would have preferred to 
keep the USSR out of. Antarctica, but did not wish to risk international odium by 
appearing to go against the spirit of cooperation implicit in the JGY, hence the 
guarded 'welcome'. The note specified that the USSR, which did not recognise any 
claims for Antarctic territory, was proposing to carry out research in the Australian 
Antarctic Territory which 'consists of the territory lying between the 45 th and 136th 
meridians of east longitude and between the 142nd and the 160th meridians [east] 
south of 60th parallel of south latitude.,270 
By spelling out its claim, Australia attempted to place the USSR in a position 
in which the latter was forced at least to acknowledge that a claim had been made, 
but the ruse was unsuccessful: in its reply, the USSR avoided all reference to the 
AA T. It simply thanked Australia for the offer and asked that facilities to be provided 
in Australia for Soviet aircraft or ships involved in Antarctic research as mentioned 
in the note. Australia replied by asking for details of when it could expect the visits, 
but did not receive a reply. Kevin, however, set about preparing for an unannounced 
visit and advised other relevant government departments that it was quite possible 
that a Soviet ship would arrive without notice at an Australian port and assumed that 
each of the authorities concerned would apply its own appropriate procedures. One 
of these authorities, the Marine Branch of the Department of Shipping replied that it 
had advised its deputies in all states about the likelihood of Ob calling. The deputies 
had been instructed to give the ships every assistance within the limits of the 
269 Kevin J. C. 0: 1956. Antarctic visit of the Oh. Lener to Dr. Wynes, 9 March 1956. Canberra, 
Australia: National Archives of Australia A 1838, 1495/1/9/4 part 2. 
270 British Embassy Moscow 1955. Lener to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR from British 
Embassy Moscow 29· August 1955. Canberra, Australia: National Archives of Australia A 1838, 
1495/1/9/5 part. I. 
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Australian government's reply to the Soviei note and to be strictly correct towards the 
visitors 'without appearing officious and without giving the impression of trying to 
please them unduly,271 in keeping with the guarded, impartial tone of the reply. 
Kevin also wrote to the Attorney General's department seeking its advice on 
the question of whether the ships were 'to be regarded as public or private vessels 
and what regulations and administrative procedures could be applied [to them] while 
they were in Australian ports and waters.'272 This was of importance to the 
government since there is a vast difference between local laws and regulations in 
relation to a 'public ship' and a 'private ship'. Public vessels include state-owned 
vessels, which are on government and non-commercial service, as the Soviet ships 
were, and international law relating to public vessels is concerned in the main with 
the extent to which they are entitled to immunity from legal process. Since the ships 
belonged to a country with whom Australia had no diplomatic relations and was 
looked on as an adversary in the prevailing Cold War climate prevalent at the time, 
the Australian government would have preferred to keep a tight rein on Soviet 
activities on the Australian mainland, even if it could not do so on what it regarded as 
its own territory in Antarctica. 
The preliminary opinion of the Attorney General's department was that the 
Soviet ships were in fact public vessels and that there were two differing views as to 
how they should be treated. One was that administrative procedures such as 
boarding, customs inspection, the making of returns, the obtaining of permits on the 
payment of taxes (as distinct from paying for services) would be inapplicable to these 
vessels, whereas the other stated that such a vessel is bound to observe the ordinary 
laws of the port such as quarantine and sanitary regulation~, and not to assist in 
breaches of local revenue laws. Any failure to respect these laws and regulations 
wou'ld be a ground for diplomatic representations, and possibly for expulsion.273 The 
Department of External Affairs would have liked to apply the harsher conditions, but 
271 Department of External Affairs 1956. Antarctic - visit of Ob. Record of conversation with Mr. 
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was unsure of the finer points of international shipping law, and the search for an 
unambiguous legal opinion continued. 
The Australian authorities were expecting Ob to visit an Australian port, as 
the TASS message of 29 February suggested, but in fact it was Lena that arrived in 
Adelaide on 28 March with 'no prior notification from the Soviet Government' .274 
The Australian government was faced with a dilemma: advice from the Attorney 
General's department indicated that the ship was a public vessel, but a major concern 
for the government was the limited control that could be exercised over such ship. In 
a note to the Prime Minister, an unidentified official, possibly from the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) considered different scenarios: if the 
ship's master would be 'prepared to waive the normal immunities in this case, ASIO's 
job would be facilitated and certain restrictions could be placed on the crew and 
passengers'. If, on the other hand, the master claimed that the ship was a public one 
and refused to submit to controls, were facilities to be extended? 'In this case, 
awkward political questions could arise, for neither crew nor passengers could be 
kept under proper surveillance'. The suggestion was made that in. view of the 
proximity of important defence establishments to Adelaide (relating to the 
cooperative Australian-British rocket and atomic test programme), security 
considerations were paramount and that facilities should 'be granted only on the 
condition that the master of Lena agreed to waive the immunities that normally 
applied to a public ship.'275 The prevailing anti-communist mindset maintained that 
the Soviets were untrustworthy and had to be kept under surveillance in order to 
prevent them from coming into contact with any sensitive information relating to 
western strategic and defence capabilities. 
Meanwhile, the question concerning the ships' legal status and how they 
should be treated was still unresolved. It was decided that a conference of 
representatives from the Departments of External Affairs, Customs and Excise, 
Immigration, Health, and the Prime Minister's and Attorney General's offices be held 
at the Department of External Affairs on 23 March 1956 to prepare a submission to 
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the Cabinet' concerning how to treat the Soviet vessels. In his report of the conference 
to the Minister of External Affairs R. Casey, Kevin wrote that the conference felt that 
'Lena should be treated as a private vessel but without declaring to the ship's master' 
that that status was attributed to her. To avoid any charges of discrimination a crew 
muster should not be required, but the ship's master should be asked to produce a list 
of his crew and passengers; and that if any of the crew or passengers were to go 
ashore, 'they must carry papers of identity'. In making these suggestions, the 
conference was influenced by the fact that the Cabinet, when it settled its reply to the 
Russian Note of November 1955, had agreed that 'the expedition ship and its 
personnel would be subject in Australia to local jurisdiction and regulations. ,276 The 
Cabinet, in its Decision No. 114 of 23 March, noted that Lena was to arrive in 
Adelaide on 25 March and that the question arose as to whether she was to be treated 
as a public or as a private vessel. The Cabinet decided that Lena should be treated as 
any other passenger ship would be treated and that its personnel would be subject to 
local jurisdiction and regulations. This would allow adequate control of the Soviet 
visitors and would perhaps provide the opportunity for closer surveillance. The 
question of whether Lena was fonnally a public or private vessel should not be 
pursued. Further advice was however, sought by the Department of External Affairs 
from the United Kingdom government concerning how it defined public vessels and 
what facilities and immunities it accorded their crews, as well as its treatment of 
aircraft, as these questions were likely to arise before and during the IOy.277 
It appears that the whole point surrounding whether the vessel was public or 
private, which had aroused such official concern, was the fact that it belonged to a 
potential enemy. There was no question about any potential threat from vessels 
belonging to Australian allies. However much Australia would have liked to keep the 
USSR out of Antarctica and the Australian mainland, Australian involvement in the' 
IOY programme made it impossible to refuse to deal with the Soviets and their 
scientific expedition. Although the programme itself was scientific and avowedly 
non-political, the intrusion of cold war tensions made the participants suspect each 
other of using science to gain maximum political and strategic advantage by 
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expanding their sphere of influence and consolidating their presence in the region. 
Political considerations could not be totally excluded from purported scientific 
interactions and would often threaten to surface and put in jeopardy the non-political 
cooperative spirit of the IGY. 
4.3 Lena arrives 
Lena. arrived at Port Adelaide on 28 March 1956 to load a full cargo of 
Australian barley for German buyers. The ship's complement consisted of 65 
members of the crew and 81 passengers, all of Soviet nationality. Included in the 
passengers were a few scientists but the greater number were artisans who had been 
employed in the erection of a scientific base in the Antarctic. Each person on board 
was in possession of a valid Soviet seamen's passport. These, after examination by 
the boarding officer, 'were returned to the grantees so that the request made to the 
master that each person going ashore should be in possession of his or her passport 
could be complied with'. Everything went smoothly and all formalities were 
fulfilled, reported Edson, the migration officer for South Australia.278 
After their long Antarctic journey, the crew and passengers on Lena were 
keen to go ashore and to explore the city. Hodirev recalled that when they arrived in 
Adelaide, the ship's. Communist Party political officer, whose duty it was to ensure 
that everyone on board was drilled in party policy, and was appropriately patriotic, 
attempted to forbid anyone on the ship from going ashore. He was apparently afraid 
of provocation from Russian emigres, as it was usual for them to hand out anti-Soviet 
propaganda to visitors from the USSR and to encourage them to defect. However, the 
young communist party members convened a meeting at which they overrode the 
decision not to leave the ship, deciding that they would go ashore, as long as they did 
not go alone, but in groups of three. In ports, which were visited by Soviet ships, 
these groups of three were known as 'Russian troikas,279 until the practice ceased 
with the period of glasnost [openness] and the eventual break-up of the Soviet Union 
in 1991. 
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Fig. 12. Left to right: Douglas Mawson alongside Lena in Adelaide, unknown, 
M. Glaessner (South Australian Museum). 
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The Australian Antarctic explorer, Sir Douglas Mawson, was one of the first 
to visit the ship, to which the public was allowed free access during its stay in port 
(Fig. 12, 13). 
Fig. 13. Left to right: Douglas Mawson aboard Lena in Adelaide. The other person is 
M. Giaessner (South Australian Museum) 
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The Australia - USSR Friendship Society (founded in 1939) assumed an 
active role in organising onshore tours and meetings with local scientists, workers 
and youth. Two press conferences were held and an official visit was paid to the' 
mayor of the city?80 Besides the interest shown by the public and scientists, the 
Australian authorities showed interest of another nature. Lends visit provided an 
opportunity to obtain 'information of value' .to naval intelligence, so arrangements 
were made to exploit it. Two civilians, rather than naval intelligence officers, 
boarded the ship while it was open to the public, making sure that the suspicions of 
the Russians were not aroused, reported a secretary of the Australian Department of 
Navy to the Department of External Affairs on 9 May 1956.281 What this 
clandestinely obtained 'information of value' could have been is hard to fathom, as 
the scientists were quite willing to share their knowledge and demonstrate equipment 
to anybody who was interested as demonstrated in New Zealand when 'the Ob was 
thrown open for public inspection ... through which they [the public 1 were apparently 
permitted to wander without obstruction.' 282 
It would seem that the' government's focus on the use of intelligence officers 
rather than providing' encouragement to its scientific community to interact and 
exchange information compromised both the quality of information and the spirit of 
the IGY. Even though loading operations were completed, Lends departure was 
delayed for a few days due to the ship's financial commitments with the agent, and 
she finally cleared Port Adelaide direct for Hamburg at 08.15 hours on 13 April 
1956.283 Before departing, Captain Vetrov sent Mawson a telegram thanking him for 
his attention and kindness during the 'ship's stay in Adelaide.284 Lena returned to 
Leningrad on 8 June 1956. 
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4.4 Ob at Macquarie Island and in New Zealand 
During the time that Lena was in Adelaide, I. Adams, leader of Macquarie 
Island station, received a request from Ob on 2 April to call in and inspect the 
Australian National Antarctic Research Expedition's (ANARE) oldest station. A. 
Brown, one of the radio officers on the island, wrote that 'there was much running 
around in Canberra when we sent the Russian request back to ANARE headquarters 
in Melbourne, but to their credit, Canberra gave us permission to allow the Russians 
ashore.'285 This was the first time that a Russian ship had visited Macquarie Island 
since the sloops Vostok and Mirny of Bellingshausen's first Russian Antarctic 
expedition charted its coastline and conducted scientific investigations in November 
1820, and the first foreign ship to have visited the station since it was opened in 
1948. In anticipation of the visit, the Australians took the opportunity of writing 
letters home, as they felt sure that Ob would take them to send on. 
The next day, on 3 April, twelve people (according to Suzyurnov, "Yho named 
each one), thirteen according to the recollections of the Australians, from Ob came 
ashore, including the head of the expedition Professor Kort, Captain Man and the 
scientific secretary of the expedition Suzyumov, who 'took lengthy notes on 
everything during the whole stay' (Fig. 14, 15).286 
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Fig.14. Landing on Macquarie Island under the watchful eye of Captain Man 
(personal collection of Bob Dingle) 
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Fig.IS. Five members of the Russian team (names unknown) safe ashore. Second 
from left on front row is Kent Keith, Australian biologist 
(personal collection of Bob Dingle). 
The visit, which was to last one day, turned into two due to deteriorating 
weather conditions, as it became too dangerous to return to the ship in the dark.287 
The following day, after a difficult operation in the heavy surf, the Australians 
managed to get the Soviet personnel back to their vessel. Adams and two Australians 
accompanied their visitors to Ob, where they 'were given a rousing welcome as 
[they 1 walked up the gangway in front of whirring movie cameras. ,288 They were 
shown the facilities and presented with all manner of gifts including clothing, wine, 
vodka, books and Soviet postage stamps: overall, 'a very friendly atmosphere was 
287 Suzyumov, E. 1958. Kontakty s uchenymi i predstavitelyami obshestvennosti drugih stran 
[Contacts with foreign scientists and community representatives] . In Bardin. I. (Ed). Opisanie 
expedilsii na die Ob 1955-1956 {Accollnt olthe expedition on the diesel/electric ship Ob 1955-1956]. 
Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk (Academy of Sciences Press): 216. 
288 A. Brown, personal communication, December 2007. 
78 
apparent. ,289 When Ob finally departed, the unanimous opinion of the Australians 
was that 'there's nothing wrong with the Russian people - the fault must be their 
system! ,290 Soon after they left, Kort and Man .sent a radio message thanking the 
Australians for their hospitality: 
DEAR MR ADAMS LEAVING SHORE OF MACQUARIE ISLAND WE WISH 
GOOD LUCK YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES AND THANK YOU FOR A 
CORDIAL HOSPITALITY STOP YOU HAVE GIVEN US VERY GREAT 
IMPRESSION VISITING OF ISLAND MAKING ACQUAINTANCE WITH 
YOU AND YOUR BRAVE BEHAVIOUR DURING LANDING AND 
DEPARTURE STOP WISH YOU AND ALL OF YOUR COLLEAGUES GOOD 
HEALTH ON THE GREAT SUCCESS IN YOUR SCIENTIFIC WORK.291 
The visit had succeeded in establishing an atmosphere of good will and a 
genuine desire from all sides to continue friendly relations. 
After leaving Macquarie Island, Ob continued ·its work of mapping the New 
Zealand oceanic ridge. Man wrote that because the ship was so close to New 
Zealand, which was a participant in the IGY programme, it was considered 'a duty' 
to call in to Wellington on a courtesy visit and at the same time to take on fuel, water 
and fresh produce.292 The visit to New Zealand's capital city was not planned and 
was totally unexpected by the New Zealand government, whose cold war politics and 
attitude to the Soviet presence in Antarctica were very similar to those held by the 
US and Australia, although New Zealand, as opposed to Australia, had not had a 
rupture in diplomatic relations with the USSR. 
The Australian High Commission in Wellington reported to the Australian 
Department of External Affairs in Canberra that the New Zealand authorities were 
unenthusiastic about the visit and did not intend to make any particular arrangements, 
as they considered that the Soviet legation in New Zealand would use the visit for 
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propaganda purposes.293 On 6 April, an Aide Memoire was handed to the Soviet 
Charge d'Affaires, K. Efremov, laying down the procedure to be followed on arrival 
of Ob in Wellington. As a ship employed on a scientific expedition, it would be 
treated as a public vessel and 'exempted from the normal pilotage dues as well as 
harbour, port and wharfage dues', but not normal customs and health formalities. On 
arrival, customs, health and police officials would, in accordance with normal 
procedure, visit the vessel. 'Two members of the Soviet Legation [were to] 
accompany the boarding party. The Captain and the ship's doctor would be 
interviewed, and six copies of a list giving the names of all personnel on the ship 
would be required. Theship's register was to be inspected.'294 The Soviet legation 
was asked to provide information concerning the probable duration of the ship's stay, 
any repair facilities required, and whether shore leave would be granted to members 
of the ship's company. In the event of shore leave being granted, it would be 
necessary to inform the police authorities at the Central Police Station in Wellington 
of the number of personnel proceeding ashore and the time for which leave had been 
granted. Water, provisions and other supplies were to be procured by the vessel 
through normal commercial channels.295 Much to the chagrin of the New Zealand 
authorities, no reply was received from the legation and no answers to the questions 
were forthcoming. 296 
In the event, the ship was boarded by the customs, health and police officials, 
members of the Soviet legation and representatives of the press. 'The officials 
confined themselves to formalities and accepted the assurances of the captain that the 
regulations would be complied with. Copies of a list detailing the persons on board 
were provided as requested. In all, there were 119 persons on the ship, including 58 
scientists.'297 After berthing on the afternoon of 9 April, Man, who spoke some 
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English, met representatives of the press and explained through an interpreter that 
while the ship was taking on fresh water and supplies, 'the main reason for the visit 
was to bring good wishes to New Zealand. He spoke of the establishment of the 
Soviet Antarctic base Mirny, emphasising that this was part of the USSR's 
contribution to the IGY. He explained that Ob would proceed to Adelaide and then 
pass through Antarctic waters again on scientific work before its return to the Soviet 
Union.,298 
The Australian High Commission in Wellington further reported that, on 10 
April, in spite of earlier attempts by the New Zealand Department of External Affairs 
at discouragement' (probably because they were afraid of Soviet propaganda and 
influence) Man, Kort, Suzyumov, and the Soviet Charge d' AjJaires, Efremov paid 
official calls first on the Deputy Prime Minister, Keith 1. Holyoake, who had visited 
the Soviet Union the previous year, and then on the Prime Minister, Sidney G. 
Holland, the leaders of the National Party government. The Minister in charge of the 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Ronald M. Algie and the Minister 
for External Affairs, Tom L. Macdonald were with the Prime Minister. A call was 
also paid on the Mayor of Wellington, R. M. McAllister, who, according to 
Suzyumov was most helpful, offering the Soviet scientists and sailors freedom of the 
city and providing them with full co~peration and hospitality.299 
Later the same day, the Prime Minister, accompanied by Algie, visited Ob for 
an hour. They were shown scientific work in progress and were given refreshments. 
Invitations to visit the ship were issued to scientists and other selected individuals, 
and on the afternoon of 10 April, Ob was opened to the public for a four hour period, 
during which time 1426 visitors came aboard. Visiting times were extended due to 
the large number of people wanting to inspect the ship, and, in total, over 3,000 
people were able to see the onboard facilities?OO They were permitted 'to wander 
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about without obstruction'; scientists were in their laboratories in order to explain the 
instruments to the public, and a large number of charts and navigational aids were on 
view.30l 
A formal reception In honour of Man and Kort was given by the Soviet' 
legation on II April at which 200 people including members of the New Zealand 
government and the New Zealand parliament, scientists and public were present.302 
There were a number of contacts between the Soviet scientists and New Zealand 
scientists. Kort offered to give a lecture about the results of Soviet exploration in the 
Antarctic, and this was arranged under the auspices of the Royal Society of New 
Zealand (Wellington branch). Speaking through an interpreter, Kort began by saying 
that he believed that the 'meeting will help in the cause of the common knowledge of 
science and the common interest of both countries'. He outlined some of the 
oceanographic research carried out on Ob during its 5,200 mile voyage from when it 
left Mimy on 29 February until it ,docked in Wellington.303 
'Throughout Ob's visit, every effort was made by the Soviet legation and the 
ship's otlicers and company to cultivate the goodwill of the public and of the 
Government. Political subjects were eschewed by all concerned in order to ensure 
that the spirit of good will prevailed. The ship's otlicers were cooperative and carried 
out all instructions from local officials. No disorderliness or other ditliculties with 
members of the ship's company ashore were reported.'304 
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Fig. 16. Evgeniy Suzyumov (personal collection of Aleksei Suzyumov) 
Suzyumov (Fig. 16) mentions with a sense of pride that he was told that the 
cooperative behaviour of the Soviet expedition was in marked contrast to the 
behaviour of the American Antarctic expedition which had visited Wellington 
earlier: the American navy men had not been quite so orderly and their antics had 
delayed their vessel's departure by 24 hours.305 It appears that the Soviet visit 
developed rather further than had been expected or hoped by the New Zealand 
authorities, or at least by the Department of External Affairs, where the Soviet 
Legation's insistence that Ob had come on a courtesy visit had initially been resisted. 
The friendliness and openness of the Soviet crew and scientists, together with the 
natural curiosity of the New Zealand public, made it difficult to confine the visit to a 
mere taking on of supplies. There was little in the words or behaviour of the visitors 
to which exception could be taken. They stressed throughout the importance of 
international cooperation in attaining the scientific objectives of the IGy.306 The visit 
had taken on a high profile, notwithstanding the attempts of the Department of 
External Affairs of NZ to keep it low key. If building cordial relations was the Soviet 
aim, it certainly demonstrated the success of a 'showboat' rather than a ' gunboat' 
style of diplomacy. 
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The Department, however, was sure that the Soviet legation was intent upon 
deriving maximum political capital from the occasion and was especially piqued by 
the fact that the legation showed no disposition to comply with formal requests made 
by the department and had achieved all that it wanted. This was indeed the case. The 
visit developed friendly relations with government ministers, scientists and the 
general public and had presented impressive scientific capabilities in preparing for 
the IGY programme, thereby raising the international prestige of the USSR. The visit 
was indeed one of courtesy and certainly not intended to cause offence: it was 
somewhat unfortunate that the department felt it necessary to register a formal 
protest at the failure of the legation to provide answers to the questions asked about 
Ob's visit.307 
4.5 Ob in Australia 
Ob left New Zealand on 12 April to continue her oceanographic studies in the 
Tasman Sea en route to Adelaide where she arrived308 on 21 April to take on a load 
of barley for delivery to Germany. As soon as the vessel had docked, Professor M. 
Glaessner309 came on board with an invitation from Sir Douglas Mawson for twelve 
members of staff to have lunch at the Mawson residence the next day, 22 April.31O 
The Soviets were impressed by the cordial reception and stimulating exchange of 
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views on Antarctic research accorded to them by the Mawsons. The day after 
entertaining the Soviet visitors, Mawson, his wife Paquita, and Glaessner toured Ob, 
where they spent almost the whole day. They were interested in meeting the 
expedition staff and inspecting facilities, paying special attention to the geological 
and hydro-chemical laboratories. After the tour, a reception was held in honour of the 
esteemed visitor. Mawson congratulated the Soviet scientists on the extent of their 
research and wished them every success in their scientific endeavours. The following 
day, 24 April, Mawson again visited the ship, accompanied by Phillip G. Law, the 
Director of the Australian Antarctic Division of the Department of External Affairs, 
who had flown in from Melbourne. They brought with them some 50 volumes of 
Australian Antarctic research literature, which they presented to the ship. Man asked 
Mawson to 'express himself in the visitors' book, in which Mawson wrote: 
To captain Man, Professor Kort and all Scientific Staff, Officers and crew of the 
exploring vessel Ob. Your splendid organization, excellent equipinent and able 
personnel operating all departments of activity have greatly impressed me. I am 
convinced that the results of your Russian Antarctic expedition cooperating in the 
scientific programme of the IOY will very greatly advance knowledge, in all 
departments of science, concerning the Far Southern regions. [I sincerely believe that 
our friendly relations will bring mutual benefit for the scientific work undertaken by 
Australia and Russia] May this friendly association in scientific endeavour lead the 
way to wider international cooperation and understanding. Best wishes and good luck 
in the prosecution of your work. 
The sentence in brackets is omitted in Mawson's letter to Casey in which he 
d h· .. . . 311 h h . . S ' . f h 312 0 quote IS mscnphon, t oug It appears m uzyumov s versIOn 0 t e text. n 
the evening of 24 April, a large group of scientists from the ship attended a lecture by 
Law, which was delivered in the Mawson building of the University of Adelaide. 
Mawson himself said a few introductory words in which he welcomed the Soviet 
guests and looked forward to further strengthening relations between the Soviet and 
Australian researchers. Law continued with his lecture about the Australian 1956 
expedition on Kisla Dan, accompanied by a colour slide show. He was followed by 
Kort, who spoke briefly about the goals of Soviet Antarctic research in preparing for 
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the IOY and undertaking oceanographic research in the Southern Ocean.313 Friendly 
relations developed with many academics from the University of Adelaide and visits 
arranged to the mining, biology and other faculties, as well as the Bureau of 
Meteorology. The Australia - USSR Friendship Society organised sightseeing and 
study excursions around Adelaide and its environs, as well as a meeting of the eight 
Soviet women on board (M. Klyonova,"N. Tsouprinova, F. Borodina, V. Dolganova, 
E. Mitineva, A. ilyina, L. Boltayevskaya and V. Bushmanova) with a group of 
Australian women. Suzyumov believed that Mawson played a key role in forging 
these fruitful relations and in creating an atmosphere of friendship and 
understanding, which he realised, was not ail easy task, as there were no diplomatic 
relations between Australia and USSR.3J4 These sentiments were later echoed by 
Somov, the overall leader of the Soviet expedition, who in a telegram expressed his 
'gratitude to the Australian people, Douglas Mawson and Phi lip Law for their care to 
our expedition ships Lena and Ob at their stay in Ade\aide.'3J5 
On 25 April, Mawson reported on his visit to the Soviet ship to Minister of 
External Affairs Casey, and expressed the view that it was an outstanding 
opportunity for Australians interested in oceanography to' examine the latest 
specialised equipment, as much of the work that was routine on board Ob had never 
been attempted by Australians in their seas. He seemed to chide the government for 
not showing a more active interest in the ship's visit, saying that since the 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) was 
proceeding to develop the science of oceanography, an opportunity to view the latest 
technology and learn of the research that had been conducted had been lost. All the 
more so, since the expedition staff had without hesitation given all information 
sought concerning the detail of their plans, equipment and discoveries and readily 
acknowledged prior work done by Australian expeditions. Mawson attempted to 
allay any fears about Soviet intentions, saying that he did not expect that Russia 
would lay claim to the Australian Antarctic Territory. However, he considered that it 
313 SUzYumov, E. 1958. Kontakty s uchenimy i predstavitelyami obshestvennosti drugih stran 
[Contacts with foreign scientists and community representatives]. In Bardin, I. (Ed.) -opisanie 
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must be greatly encouraged to do so by the USA failure to recognise Australia's 
claims and that if Russia did stay in Queen Mary Land at the conclusion of the IGY, 
. the blame must be squarely borne by the USA. Acknowledging the government's 
concerns, he wrote: 'I see nothing directly political in their visit, only a desire for 
friendly relations and a desire for scientists, of what is destined to be a really famous 
expedition, to meet Australian scientists in like subjects.'316 
Casey concurred with Mawson's conclusion that the scientific personnel on 
Ob were concerned solely with scientific matters, as he wrote to the Defence 
Minister, Sir Philip McBride on 27 April, but was nonetheless wary of the fact that 
'the results of the oceanographic research could be of direct, practical value to the 
Russian Navy, particularly on the submarine side. The Russian scientists would not 
need to know anything about the end use of their researches by the Soviet Naval 
establishment.,317 Casey considered that the possibility that the Soviets would build a 
military base on the AA T was very real, and had asked Law to look for signs of 
military activity at Mirny when the Australians had visited the Soviet station on 30 
January 1956. Law had written a full report of his visit and helped allay Casey's fears 
by noting that the expedition appeared to be civilian and non-military.3l8 
While in Adelaide, Ob received an invitation to visit Melbourne from the 
chairman of the Australia - USSR friendship society, John Rodgers.319 Both Kort and 
Man expressed their desire to go and offered to take Mawson on the voyage for him 
to observe their equipment and staff in operation. Rodgers sent Casey an urgent 
telegram asking the government to approve the visit. Casey, however, was not 
prepared to make such approval: in his reply, he reiterated the Australian 
Government's position that, while it had agreed that transit and servicing would be 
available in Australia for the ships and aircraft of any country participating in the 
IGY, the occasion of such visits did not appear to call for any special arrangements. 
316 Mawson, D. 1956. A lener to Casey, 25 April 1956, Canberra, Australia: National Archives of 
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This was his diplomatic way of saying that approval for the requested 'special 
arrangements' was out of the question because only facilities that were strictly 
necessary were to be provided. The Soviets believed that Mawson was doing 
everything possible to make the visit a reality, but was being thwarted by Law, who 
was against the visit to Melbourne, which was the location of the headquarters of the 
Antarctic division. They were of the opinion that Law was not interested in raising 
the international prestige of the Soviets by having them display their superior level of 
technology and quality of research to the Australian scientists.32o 
A further telegram to Casey, this time asking for his assistance in having Ob 
call into Sydney, was sent by the acting federal secretary of the Building Workers' 
Industrial Union, but Casey's reply was identical to the one given to Rodgers. Casey 
was certainly being consistent and steadfast in his policy of rejecting the possibility 
of any special arrangements for the Soviet expedition. His reluctant attitude was 
virtually identical to the attitude displayed by the Department of External Affairs in 
New Zealand, but his job was made easier by the lack of diplomatic relations 
between Australia and the USSR. In New Zealand, the opportunities for more robust 
contacts with politicians and scientists were made easier by the presence of a Soviet 
legation, whereas in Australia the expedition did not have the support and 
connections of an embassy to assist them with their interactions with the Australian 
government. The expedition was more reliant on the good will of individual 
scientists such as Mawson, who had limited political influence, as well as 
organisations such as the Australia - USSR friendship society and trade unions. 
These had little sway with the government which suspected them of being 
communist sympathisers. The Australian Antarctic Division was a part of the 
Department of External Affairs, and as such was instrumental in transmitting 
government policy and unable to play a welcoming role to its Soviet scientific 
colleagues. Consequently, the Australian government was more successful than New 
Zealand in 'containing' the Soviet visit within strict boundaries, thus limiting any 
impact that it may have made on the broader public. 
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Some members of the public, however, did not understand the government's 
reluctance to widen the scope of the visit. Casey received a telegram from a Clive 
and Joan Jackson: 'ban ship Ob ridiculous are you frightened few Soviet 
explorers.'J21 There also did not appear to be a shortage of members of the general 
public interested in visiting the ship, which was berthed in Port Adelaide, 10 km out 
of the city. A large number of people came aboard on the ANZAC day holiday on 25 
April, with approximately 5,000 visiting on Sunday 29 April, the day before its 
scheduled departure. In total, over 10,000 people were able to look over the ship 
during its stay in Adelaide.322 On 30 April, the day of Ob's departure for Hamburg a 
reception was held in honour of the Soviet personnel, with fifty scientists from the 
University of Adelaide attending. The president of the scientific club, Professor F. 
Bull expressed an overall feeling of satisfaction about the visit and the broad 
scientific contacts that had been estabiished between Australian scientists and their 
Soviet colleagues.J2J Prior to departure, the master publicly expressed on behalf of 
the ship's personnel and himself, his pleasure at a most enjoyable stay in Port 
Adelaide. 
Ob returned to Leningrad on 8 July 1956 after calling in to Kerguelen on 20 
May and unloading in Hamburg from 27 June to 4 July (Fig. I 7).J24 
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Fig.17. Return of the Ob to Leningrad. Photo by N. Naurnenkov 
(Archives of Film and Photo Documents, Krasnogorsk, Russia). 
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During the whole voyage, Ob had covered 33,000 miles, 4,000 of those in ice 
conditions and 1,040 in shallow waters with no navigational charts and research 
work was conducted over 20,000 miles. Observations were made at 156 deep-water 
oceanographic stations, fifty-seven of which were in Antarctic coastal waters.32S The 
first composite Soviet Antarctic expedition was an ambitious project requiring 
considerable government funding and the Soviet government considered itself 
fortunate that it was able to charter Ob and Lena to deliver grain from Adelaide to 
Hamburg for a total sum of £ I 00,000 (which exceeded one million gold roubles 
when converted into Soviet currency) on the return journey from Antarctica. The 
charter enabled it to recoup over 70% of the Antarctic expedition's foreign currency 
expenses.326 
The expedition had fulfilled its primary task of building a base station on the 
Antarctic continent and conducting multifaceted research in the South Polar region. 
The USSR Academy of Sciences published the scientific reports of the marine 
component of the expedition in An account of the expedition on the diesel/electric 
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ship Ob 1955-1956 in 1958327 and the General description of the first continental 
expedition 1955-1957 in 1959,328 as well as many articles in scientific journals. 
However, in a meeting with the chief of G1avsevmorput, Burhanov, the scientists 
reported that in addition to the scientific achievements, a particularly important 
aspect of the expedition was the development of co-operation with scientists of other 
countries, especially the meetings with Australian expedition staff on Kista Dan and 
with scientists in Wellington and Adelaide. 329 
4.6 Conclusion 
The available documents illustrate the concerns that the Australian and New 
Zealand governments held about the intentions of the Soviet Antarctic programme 
and their lack of enthusiasm for Ob and Lena entering their ports. The governments 
considered ways of limiting any political impact that the visits may have made and 
ultimately refused to provide anything more than the facilities that they reluctantly 
offered to the expeditionary vessels. A variety of factors, including the fear of a 
Soviet Antarctic claim and defence implications, were considered in formulating this 
policy. However the fear of international opprobrium made it impossible for the two 
governments to follow their preferred option of totally denying access to their ports. 
While reluctantly allowing the vessels access, the governments sought ways of 
controlling them and their passengers during their stay in order to preve.nt the visit 
from acquiring a high profile and thus raising the prestige of a country considered to 
be an enemy. It also gave the authorities the opportunity of greater surveillance in 
case the visitors attempted to gather intelligence covertly, especially at the sensitive 
. atomic and rocket research laboratories located in Adelaide, as well as sending their 
own intelligence agents on board in order to collect any potentially 'valuable 
information'. While nominally adhering to the non-political scientific intention of the 
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IGY, the authorities' political and security considerations were the actual factors 
operating when dealing with the Soviet visitors. 
In contrast, a more fruitful and less politically fraught approach was 
epitomised by Mawson, who visited the ships several times during their stay, 
developed amiable relations and encouraged his 'colleagues at the University of 
Adelaide to do likewise. In a letter to Casey, he suggested that scientists from 
CSIRO be encouraged to inspect the ships, since the Soviet scientists were quite 
happy to share their research results and allow access to their equipment. Permitting 
greater freedom of movement between different ports, which the government 
discouraged, would have allowed a larger number of Australian scientists to inspect 
the Soviet facilities and collect more valuable information than that acquired by 
civilian intelligence officers, a method which the authorities seemed to favour. 
Although the government's reluctance limited the number of Australian 
scientists who were able to visit the ships, Mawson acted as a catalyst in creating an 
environment in the Adelaide scientific community that was more conducive to 
scientific interaction with the Soviets. The main interest of the scientists from both 
sides was the acquisition and exchange of knowledge, which became the common 
ground for forging lasting relationships and even friendships. An Australian 
expedition member expressed the commonly held perception that the Australians 
'found the Russians a friendly, sincere and polite lot who were always eager to share 
their aspirations with us, including their scientific results. I was very impressed, and 
so was everyone else in our expedition. We also established firm friendships with 
some individuals.'33o Mawson was hopeful that this association in scientific 
endeavour would have wider repercussions and lead to international co-operation and 
understanding. His opinion that 'if only the scientists of Russia were in political 
power, all would be well,331 could at that time have equally applied to the scientists 
of Australia. 
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Notwithstanding governmental suspicion and reluctance, it would seem that, 
on this occasion at least, the Soviet visitors had no sinister ulterior motives. The 
premier of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev, in March 1956 said that after Stalin's death 
in March 1953, the Soviets had 'convincingly proved our peace-making nature, and 
we will continue to prove it.'332 The behaviour of the Soviet personnel was in 
accordance with Khrushchev's declaration: their professed intention was to build 
'good will', and judging by the level of scientific and human interaction, their 
courtesy visits to Macquarie Island and New Zealand and their stop in Australia did 
in fact lead to a greater understanding and cooperation with the scientists of Australia 
and New Zealand, which continued during and after the IOY. 
332 Zubok, V. and C. Pleshakov 1996. Inside the Kremlin's cold war. Cambridge, Massachusetts; 
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. TOWARDS THE GREAT UNKNOWN: 
THE SOVIETS PREPARE FOR THEIR THRUST 
INTO THE ANTARCTIC INTERIOR333 
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National prestige and the desire to reap a rich scientific harvest were the 
forces driving both the Soviet and American expeditions in their quest to establish 
stations deep in the Antarctic interior in preparation for research to be carried out 
during the IOY. While American historians and expedition members have left a 
record of the American IOY exploits, little is known in the English speaking world of 
the men of the first Soviet Antarctic expedition who landed on the coast of the 
Antarctic continent in January 1956. They quickly built their main base, Mirny, and 
as a result gained a firm foothold from which to launch out into the icy interior 
towards the South Oeomagnetic Pole and the Pole of Inaccessibility. This chapter 
uses Russian sources to trace the preparatory steps taken by these pioneers in their 
attempt to reach and establish scientific bases in those remote locations. 
In the history of Antarctic exploration, the quest to reach the South Pole was 
a singularly potent force impelling individual explorers to undergo extreme 
privations, endure hardship and risk death for the honour of being the first to attain 
that almost mythical goal. 'There was danger in it - and glory if the South Pole were 
reached. There was also a lot of scientific work to be accomplished ... But even the 
most scholarly scientist could not resist the romance of the dream of reaching the 
South Pole, the uttermost part of the earth.,334 For some, like Robert F. Scott, it was 
the desire to 'secure for the British nation the honour of that achievement' as well as 
to 'bring back a rich harvest of scientific results. ,335 For others, like Roald 
333 This chapter is based on a paper which was prepared for the third SCAR workshop on the history 
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Amundsen, it was the aspiration to uphold his own prestige as a polar explorer336 and 
scientific investigator. The endeavour in the name of science and personal or national 
prestige is the leitmotif running through the history of Antarctic exploration (if one 
puts aside the specific commercial incentives of the sealers and whalers), starting 
from Cook's second voyage through to the IOY when sixty-seven nations of the 
world joined in a collaborative effort to study the globe with a special emphasis on 
Outer Space and the Antarctic. This leitmotif is certainly discernible in the 
apparently staid scientific efforts of the IOY. In fact, it was a critical factor driving 
the programs of the two most powerful participants: the USA and the USSR, with 
their Cold War rivalries and competing political ideologies. 
While discussing the American IOY Antarctic program, the veteran 
American Polar explorer and Officer in charge of the US Antarctic Program Admiral 
Richard E. Byrd, who burned with 'a fierce national pride', stressed his belief that 
'[t]o put down a base at the Pole and keep men living there will tax all our ingenuity 
and will in itself be a great national achievement. ,337 His interest in the Antarctic 
went far beyond the scientific interests of the IOY: Byrd was intensely keen for the 
Americans to establish a research base on the Oeographic South Pole because he 
wanted it said that 'the US had done the impossible.'338 Notwithstanding Byrd's 
desideratum, the scientists planning the American IOY program understood the 
immense difficulties involved in such a project and were not about to make a firm 
commitment to build a base on the South Pole without the full support of their 
government, which at that point demonstrated no particular interest in the idea.339 
However, a speech delivered by the Soviet delegate, Vladimir Belousov, at the First 
Antarctic conference of the Comite Special de I' Annee Oeophysique Internationale 
(CSAGI), the international planning body for the IOY held in Paris on 6 - \0 July 
1955/40 was a defining moment for both the American and the Soviet Antarctic 
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program. The American scientist Paul Siple recalls that Belousov 'dropped a 
bombshell' when he stated that the Soviets were planning to erect a station at the 
GeographiC South Pole. '[AlII eyes turned to the Americans for argument', but no 
argument ensued since 'the American delegation realized that the attitude of the 
American Govemment had not changed essentially' from its previous noncommittal 
stance.341 
It was left to the conference chairman, Georges Laclavere to relieve the 
tension by telling the Soviets that the conference had 'accepted the offer of the US to 
erect and man a South Pole station', although Siple points out that 'we had not gone 
anywhere near that far, but now we were committed. ,342 Siple seems unaware that, 
according to New York Times journalist Waiter Sullivan, the White House 'on the 
preceding March 28 ... had announced that there would be three American bases, 
including one at or near the South Pole' .343 Sullivan also differs from Siple in that he 
considers that everyone at the meeting 'knew that this was where the US planned to 
go and suspected that Belousov knew it too. It looked as though Soviet - American 
rivalry ... was now inevitable.'344 In order to deflect and guide this rivalry to the 
benefit of the international scientific program, Laclavere astutely recommended that 
the USSR consider an alternative site towards the centre of the continent (at the Pole 
of Inaccessibility) where no station has yet been proposed, and an intermediate 
station in the vicinity of the South Geomagnetic Pole. The question as to whether the 
Americans had already decided on a base at the Geographic South Pole, or whether 
the Soviets knew about it if they had, remains a moot point; what is obvious is that 
the Americans were now committed to the idea. Belousov did not insist on the South 
Pole, but promised to bring back to Moscow the alternative recommendations 
proposed at the conference?45 He was in no way confounded by Laclavere's 
suggestion, although the proposal to build and man a station at the most inaccessible 
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point not only of the Antarctic continent, but of the entire planet, was an even more 
'impossible' task than the American commitment to the Geographic South Pole. 
When leaving the conference, Siple remarked that now there could be no 
backing away from 'doing the impossible.'346 This was also true for the Soviets, 
since many conference delegates considered their plans to be 'in the realm of 
fantasy. ,347 The chief of the Directorate of the Northern Sea Route (Glavsevmorput) 
Vasiliy Burhanov, who was one of the Soviet delegates at the Paris conference, 
recalled that a delegate from another nation showed him a map of Antarctica with the 
Soviet bases deleted. When Burhanov questioned his colleague as to why this was 
done, he was told that the harsh climatic conditions at the proposed sites could not 
support life. It was considered impossible for the USSR to establish bases in such a 
hostile environment.348 However, like the Americans, the Soviets also felt that there 
could be no backing away from 'doing the impossible'; national pride served to 
strengthen their resolve to embark on the scientific conquest of their 'own Poles: the 
South Geomagnetic Pole and the Pole ofInaccessibility. 
5.1 Objective 
While there is ample literature in English outlining the American attempt at 
conquering the South Geographic Pole,349 literature in both English and Russian 
outlining the Soviet effort h~s not been coherently organized and re~ains rather 
scattered. The aim of this chapter is to construct a comprehensive record of the steps 
taken by the Soviet scientists in their attempt at conquering their Poles. Initial steps 
involved exploring the immediate vicinity of their coastal base Mirny; gradually 
extending further afield in order to observe and experience the conditions that would 
346 Siple, P. 1959. 90 South: The story of the American South Pole Conquest. New York: G.P. 
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be encountered towards the interior of the icy continent. These preliminary 
exploratory steps resulted in an unplanned fortuitous outcome which was a 
significant achievement for the USSR: it became the first IGY participant to establish 
a manned inner continental station in the Antarctic. The Soviet Antarctic expedition 
(SAE) also learnt some valuable lessons and drew conclusions from these 
observations and experiences which stimulated the development of new technology 
and tactics required to further advance the ultimate Soviet goal of building and 
manning bases on the South Geomagnetic Pole and the Pole of Inaccessibility. 
Fig. 18. A1eksandr Gusev (personal collection of Leonid Dolgushin). 
This chapter utilizes the written and oral recollections of several participants 
of the first and second SAE [Gusev (Fig 18), Dolgushin, Kapitsa, Kochetkov, Ruban 
and Tryoshnikov); documents from the Russian State Economics Archive (RGAE) 
and Russian State Archives of Contemporary History (RGANI) in Moscow; Arctic 
and Antarctic Research Institute (AARl) in St Petersburg; and secondary sources 
(Belov, Nude1man and Savatyugin) to construct the record of the beginning of the 
Soviet attempt at conquering their Poles. It traces how the Soviets established the 
first ever manned inner continental base on the Antarctic continent in which four 
men wintered during the austral winter of 1956. 
Richard Byrd has the distinction of being the first to spend the winter alone at 
the American Advance Base on the Ross Ice Shelf located 175 km from the 
American coastal base Little America Il (altitude 130 m) in \934.350 However, the 
3SO See: Byrd, R. 1938. Alone. London: Putnam, 302 pp. ; Savatyugin, L. 2007. Polus holoda [Pole of 
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Soviet party, consisting of Station leader A1eksandr Gusev (geophysicist), Leonid 
Dolgushin (glaciologist) (Fig. 19), Evgeniy Vetrov (radio operator) (Fig. 20) and 
Nikolai Kudryashov (tractor driver/mechanic) (Fig. 21), has the distinction of being 
the first to winter over at the initially unplanned Pionerskaya station 375 km from 
the Soviet coastal station Mirny at an altitude of 2741 m on the Antarctic ice cap.3SI 
The lowest temperature that these men experienced on 20th August was - 66.7° C and 
a wind velocity of \0 rnIsec.352 Although Byrd spent most of the winter of 1934 about 
10° latitude farther south, he was almost at sea level and therefore at a much warmer 
temperature. At the latitude of Pionerskaya (69 ° 44' S) there are a few hours of daylight 
most of the winter; Richard Byrd was mostly in the dark all 'day'.353 The exploratory 
steps and experience gained by the Soviets in establishing Pionerskaya station were 
vital for future Soviet progress in their push towards the South Geomagnetic Pole 
and the Pole of Inaccessibility and deserves to be examined in detail, which is the 
purpose of this chapter. 
Fig. 19. Leonid Dolgushin Fig. 20. Evgeniy Vetrov 
(personal collection of Leonid Dolgushin) 
[History of the discovery and investigation of Antarctica}. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical 
Literature Press), 431 p. 
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Fig. 21. Nikolai Kudryashov (personal collection of Leonid Dolgushin) 
5.2 Exploratory steps 
The pnmary task of the first SAE 
was to commence preparations for the 
Soviet IGY program by building a main 
base on the coast of Antarctica (Mirny) 
from which to launch their drive into the 
interior of the continent.3S4 The operation 
was well thought out and organized as a 
series of exploratory forays, with each step 
expanding and building on the knowledge 
gained from the previous one. An integral 
role was dedicated to the aviation team led 
by lvan Cherevichniy (1909 - 1971), a 
veteran Arctic aviator who had flown in the 
North Polar region since the 1930s and had 
tu.om; Pole of Inaccessibility in 1941 (Fig. 22. lvan 
Cherevichniy (http://mediateka.km.ru). 
JS4 Gan, I. 2009 .• Will the Russians abandon Mimy to the penguins or .. . willlhey stay?' Polar Record, 
45(233): 167-175; Gan, I. 2009. The reluctant hosts: Soviet Antarctic expedition ships visit Australia 
and New Zealand in 1956. Polar Record 45 (232), 37-50. 
lOO 
Fig. 23. Left to right: Li-2, 11-12, An-2 airplanes (personal collection of Leonid 
Dolgushin) 
The SAE was supplied with six aircraft specially outfitted for polar 
conditions: four airplanes consisting of one Ilyushin 12 (Il-12), one Antonov 2 (An-
2), two Lisunov 2 (Li-2) and two Mil ' 4 (Mi-4) helicopters3SS which were to be 
utilized initially for reconnaissance and later for supply of the planned inner 
continental bases (Fig. 23). 
After officially opening the coastal base named Mirny on 13 February 1956, 
the expedition leader Mikhail Somov set out on 24 February to search for a suitable 
site for the station to be built on the South Geomagnetic Pole on board the Li-12 
airplane crewed by Cherevichniy, Guriy Sorokin and Dmitriy Morozov. The round 
trip flight from Mirny to 78° S, 106° E covered a distance of 2800 km and lasted 9 
hours 40 min.356 When flying over the first 500 km, it was noted that the sastrugi 
covered surface of the icecap rose steeply, while over the next 1000 km it flattened 
and gradually increased in altitude to the south to an estimated height of 3500 m.3S7 
8yrd had previously flown over the South Geomagnetic Pole and informed Somov 
'" Cherevichniy, I. 1959. Lyotchiki v Antarktide [Pilots in the Antarctic]. In Burhanov, V. (Ed). Na 
samoi yuzhnoi zemle {On the far south land]. Moscow: Geograftzdat (Geographical Literature Press): 
140. 
'56 Denisov, I. and G. Bregman 1959. Kalendar kompleksnoi Antarkticheskoi expeditsii [Chronicle of 
the composite Antarctic expedition]. In: Burhanov, V. (Ed). Na samoi yuzhnoi zemle (On the far south 
land). Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press): 440. 
'" Tryoshnikov, A. 1963. /storiya otkrytiya i issledovaniya An/arktidi. {History of the discovery and 
investigation of Antarctica]. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press): 271 . 
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that it appeared that it would be very difficult to build a base on the proposed site and 
offered him the best of luck?58 
A triangular reconnaissance flight in the direction of the Pole of 
Inaccessibility (Mirny - 76° S, 79° E - 76° S, 98° E - Mirny) was made on 3 
March359 on the 11-12 airplane with the same contingent (except for Sorokin, whose 
place was taken by Aleksei Kash) and the surface of the ice cap was found to be 
similar to that noted on the previous flight. The Soviets used American maps based 
on US flights over the area in 1947 which indicated mountains situated 300 km from 
the coast. However, the Soviet party saw no sign of any mountains and decided that 
the Americans had mistaken a distant cloud bank for a mountain range.360 Perhaps the 
Americans did indeed see a cloud bank, but air navigation in 1947 and well into ·the 
1960s was notoriously bad, and errors of greater than 100 km in the reported location of 
mountain peaks actually seen and photographed were not uncommon?61 
These exploratory flights provided useful information about the interior of the 
continent, but the scientific committee of the expedition decided that this information 
was still insufficient to fully understand the ground conditions where it was intended 
to build the bases. The committee determined that the next step was to actually try to 
land il party onto the sastrugi covered ice dome about 400 km from Mirny at an 
altitude of 3000m. The party was to spend several days studying the ice surface and 
the climatic conditions,362 especially the degree of air-cooling, radio reception and 
magnetic deviation. The implications of the results of these studies would have a 
direct bearing on the next planning stage. 
358 Glavsevmorput 1956. Stenogramma soveshchaniya u nachalnika GSMP Burhanova, 10 Aprelya. 
Infonnatsiya pribivshih iz Antarktiki tOY. Avsyuk, Shumskiy i Markov [Transcript of the meeting with 
Burhanov, Chief of the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route.lnfonnation provided by Avsyuk, 
Shumskiy and Markov, 10 April 1956]. Moscow: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Economiki 
(Russian State Economics Archives) RGAE, f9570, op 2, tom 2, ed hr 2583. 
3S9 Denisov, 1. and G. Bregman 1959. Kalendar kompleksnoi Antarkticheskoi expeditsii [Chronicle of 
the composite Antarctic expedition]. In: Burhanov, V. (Ed). Na samoi yuzhnoi zemle [On the far south 
land). Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press): 441. 
360 Tryoshnikov, A. 1963. Istoriya otkrytiya i issledovaniya Antarktidi. [History of the discovery and 
investigation of Antarctica]. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press): 271 -272. 
361 Behrendt, J. 2005. The ninth circle: a memoir of life and death in Antarctica, 1960-1962. 
Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press: 52-53. 
362 Gusev, A. 1959. Na ledyanom kupole Antarktidi [On the Antarctic ice dome]. In: Burhanov, V. 
(Ed.). 1959. Na samoi yuzhnoi zemle [On the far south land]. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical 
Literature Press): 53. 
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On 5 March, the flight crew (Mikhail Chagin, Aleksei Chelyshev, Kash, 
Mikhail Kirillov) led by Gusev, who was an experienced aipinist,363 set out from 
Mirny on the An-2 ski plane (affectionately called Annoushka) and after two hours 
reached their proposed destination 400 km from Mirny, where they attempted a 
landing and take-off manoeuvre.364 The sastrugi were like 'frozen waves of an 
ocean.365 and a lack of oxygen at 3000 m led to loss of aircraft engine power, which 
made landing and take-off an incredibly bumpy and protracted affair, though not a 
total impossibility. 
At the location 700 10' S, 950 40' E, the party set up a hemispherical tent 
developed for use by the Soviet Arctic drifting stations (Fig. 24) and spent five days 
conducting observations ·in temperatures as low as _45 0 C to -500 C, while the 
temperature at Mirny was _50 C.366 Gusev relates that the temperature inside the tent 
never climbed higher than -300 C, even with the use of a propane/butane gas heater, 
due to the fact that the cold from the three kilometre thick ice dome penetrated 
through the deer skin covered tent floor. This was the opposite effect to what 
happened in the Arctic, where the tent floor in winter tended to conduct the warmth 
from the underlying ocean, which is always above freezing point.367 The first taste of 
inner continental conditions: lack of oxygen due to the low air pressure at high 
altitude; extremely low temperatures and snow drifts, which kept burying the aircraft, 
indicated that the future work of the expedition would turn out to be unlike anything 
that these Arctic veterans had ever experienced. 
363 Gusev, A. 1973. V snegah Antarktidi [In the snows of Antarctica]. Tryoshnikov, A. Zakovanniy v 
led [Locked in ice)." Moscow: Misl: 79-80; Ogni Mimogo 1957. [The lights of Mimy). Documentary 
film by A. Kochetkov. Krasnogorsk, Moscow region, Russia: Russian State Archives of Film and 
Photo Document [RGAKFD). 
364 Gusev, A. 1959. Na ledyanom kupole Antarktidi [On the Antarctic ice dome). In: Burhanov, V. 
(Ed). 1959. Na samoi yuzhnoi zemle [On the far south land]. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical 
Literature Press): 53-54. 
365 Ogni Mimogo. 1957 [The lights of Mirny). Documentary film by A. Kochetkov, Krasnogorsk, 
Moscow region, Russia: Russian State Archives of Film and Photo Document [RGAKFD). 
366 Tryoshnikov, A. 1963. Istoriya otkrytiya i issledovaniya Antarktidi. [History of the discovery and 
investigation of Antarctica}. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press): 272. 
367 Gusev, A. 1959. Na ledyanom kupole Antarktidi [On the Antarctic ice dome). In: Burhanov, V. 
(Ed.). 1959. Na samoi yuzhnoi zemle [On theiar south land]. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical 
Literature Press): 56. . 
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Fig. 24. Soviet Arctic tents (http://www.vokrugsveta.ruivs/article/2797D 
5.3 Preparatory traverses 
Initially, it was envisaged that the inner continental stations were to be built 
utilizing primarily the aircraft fleet for supplying building materials and labour.368 
However, after Gusev' s short foray into the interior, it became obvious that this plan 
would need to be reassessed. The scientific committee of the expedition, after 
discussing the first experience of the interior work done by Gusev and the aviators, 
decided to send a traverse 'at least a small distance from Mirny' to do further 
research of the interior.369 This was conveyed to the Minister of the Merchant Fleet 
responsible for the expedition, Victor Bakaev, who reported to the Council of 
Ministers of the USSR on 21 March 1956 that ' due to the immense difficulties of 
establishing the stations with the aid of aviation alone, a plan was prepared to use 
tractor trains which were to be supported by the aircraft. Bearing this aim in mind, 
the first 50 km long trial traverse into the interior to an altitude 900 m on two full-
track all terrain vehicles was organized. , 370 
3 • • Bakaev, V. 1956. V TsK KPSS, 21 Marta 1956 [To the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, 21 March]. Moscow: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Noveishei istorii 
(Russian State Archives of Contemporary History) RGANI, Fond 5, op 30, delo 181 . 
369 Tryoshnikov, A. 1963. /storiya ot/aytiya i issledovaniya Antarktidi [History of the discovery and 
investigation of Antarctica). Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press): 273 . 
370 Bakaev, V. 1956. V TsK KPSS, 21 Marta 1956 [To the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, 21 March] . Moscow: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Noveishei istorii 
(Russian State Archives of Contemporary History) RGANI, Fond 5, op 30, delo 181. 
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Prior to the traverse setting out, the area around Mirny was carefully 
explored, since it was known that the station was surrounded by a semicircular zone 
of crevasses. In order to frnd a safe route through the zone, glaciologists first flew 
over the area, after which they continued their observations on foot while roped 
together in case one of them fell into an unseen crevasse. They managed to locate a 
narrow passage between the crevasses 3 km west of Mirny suitable for the tractor 
sleds to pass.37i 
Fig. 25. GAZ 67 all terrain vehicle (personal collection of Leonid Dolgushin) 
On 14 March 1956, a trial traverse using two red Gorky Automotive Plant all 
terrain vehicles (GAZ 67) (Fig. 25) driven by Valentin Korsak and Konstantin 
Italiantsev and led by glaciologist Dolgushin accompanied by geophysicist Andrei 
Kapitsa, geologist Oleg Vyalov and journalist Evgeniy Ryabchikov left Mirny on 
their 50 km journey. Every kilometre the vehicles stopped to put up a bamboo 
marker pole and take altitude readings. It was found that the ice dome rose fairly 
steeply to 400 m over the first ten kilometres and then more gradually to 700 m at the 
50 km mark.372 The trial traverse had successfully negotiated the dangerous zone of 
17I Tryoshnikov, A. 1963. ISlOriya otkrytiya i issledovaniya Antark/idi. {History of the discovery and 
investigation of Antarctica]. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press): 273 . 
!7l Dolgushin 2006. Antarktida 1955-1957. Fotorasskaz 0 pervoi Sovetskoi expeditsii v Antarktidu i 
zimovke na pervoi vnutrikontinentalnoi stantsii Pionerskaya {Antarctica 1955-1957. Photographic 
Account of the first Soviet expedition to Antarctica and wintering at the first inner continental station 
Pionerskaya]. Moscow: Published by author: 60; Gusev 1973. V Snegah Antarktidi {In the snows of 
Antarctica]. Tryoshnikov, A. Zakovanniy v led {Locked in ice]. Moscow: Misl: 89; Kapitsa 2007. 
Pervie pohodi v Antarktide (iz Antarkticheskogo dnevnika) [First traverses in Antarctica (From the 
Antarctic diary)]. Zemlia i Vselennaya (rhe Earth and the Universe) 4: 72-73. 
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crevasses and had found and marked the exit to the plateau, proving that it was 
possible for the tractors to get through towards the interior. 
With the exit to the plateau marked, an improvised traverse with eleven men 
led by Mikhail Somov using two S-80 tractors, which were originally intended only 
for unloading the ship, set out in late autumn on 2 April 1956 towards the point 
where the An-2 had landed a month before, 400 km from Mirny at an altitude of 
3000 m. Three sledges carrying living quarters, scientific equipment, kitchen and 
food stores and ninety-six drums of fuel were attached to each tractor.373 The traverse 
aimed to reach the planned destination and return to Mirny within twenty to thirty 
days.374 
Progress was very slow and treacherous: two men roped together walked 
ahead of their machines to look out for crevasses and find a safe route,375 since men 
on foot could hear a hollow sound of a crevasse beneath their feet, whereas a ' tractor 
was deaf and blind' (Fig. 26).376 
Fig. 26. Left to right: Leonid Dolgushin and Mikhail Somov walking in front of the 
tractor train (personal collection of Leonid Dolgushin 
m Gusev, A. 1973. V snegah Antarklidi (In the snows of Antarctica). Tryoshnikov, A. Zakovanniy v 
led (Locked in ice). Moscow: Misl: 86, 87. 
m Ibid, 86. 
37l Ibid, 90. 
"6 Ruban, I. 1985. Ludi, Idi, vstrechi (People, ice, encounters). Leningrad: Hydrometeoizdat (Hydro 
meteorological Service Press): 121 , 122 
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After travelling some 20 km, it became obvious that the weight of the cargo 
was too much for the tractors to handle, and one sledge with a supply of fuel was 
uncoupled and left behind. This was to have repercussions for the future of the 
traverse.377 Every SO km, pyramid-shaped markers were placed on the ice to 
designate their route378 and were later used to calculate the movement of the 
continental ice cover.379 
On II April, I SO km from Mirny, weather conditions deteriorated rapidly and 
the traverse was almost buried by snowdrift caused by a blizzard which lasted for 
eight days. On 19 April the wind died down enough for the men to dig out the snow-
covered tractors and sledges and continue the journey (Fig. 27)]80 For the next two 
days the traverse was on a twenty-four hour per day regimen, crossing an area of tall 
sastrugi until another blizzard again brought it to a halt. The fuel supply was rapidly 
becoming depleted, and it became obvious that the traverse would be unable to reach 
the 400 km mark and return to Mirny as had been planned. 
Fig. 27. Snow-covered traverse (personal collection of Leonid Dolgushin). 
m Gusev, A. 1959. Na ledyanom kupole Antarktidi [On the Antarctic ice dome). In: Burhanov, V. 
(Ed) 1959. Na samoi yuzhnoi zemle {On the far south land}. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical 
Literature Press): 65. 
l7I Tryoshnikov, A. 1963. Istoriya otkrytiya i issledovaniya Antarktidi. {History of the discovery and 
investigation of Antarctica}. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press). : 274. 
J19 Gusev, A. 1973. V snegah Antarktidi {In the snows of Antarctica}. Tryoshnikov, A. Zakovannii v 
led {Locked in ice}. Moscow: Misl : 92 . 
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5.4 A change in plans 
Somov recognized that the lack of fuel demanded a change in plans. He 
. consulted with his colleagues and after further radio discussions with headquarters in 
Moscow decided not to turn the traverse back to Mirny. but to continue on as far as 
the fuel supply would allow. The tractors and sledges would be modified and 
reconfigured, further building and food supplies would be flown in from the main 
base, and a temporary scientific observatory established in the interior of the 
continent.381 This was to be the first manned inner continental station built in the 
Antarctic interior which would provide valuable knowledge about winter conditions 
at a location at such a distance from the coast. It was believed that these conditions 
would be similar to those to be encountered at their final destinations - the South 
Geomagnetic Pole and Pole of Inaccessibility, and that the experience and 
knowledge thus gained would be of benefit when planning for the more onerous task 
of reaching these ultimate goals. Considering the lateness of the season, the 
approaching polar night and plummeting temperatures, the spontaneous idea of 
establishing a new base posed quite a challenge. It required immediate attention and 
necessitated Somov's presence back at Mirny, where he and Dolgushin returned on 
22 April on one of the two airplanes that had flown in 700 kg of supplies,382 leaving 
Gusev in charge of the traverse (Fig. 28). 
381 Gusev, A. 1973. V snegah Antarktidi [In the snows of Antarctica]. Tryoshnikov, A. Zakovannii v 
led [Locked in ice}. Moscow: Mis!: 94. 
382 Tryoshnikov, A. 1963. Istoriya otkrytiya i issledovaniya An/arktidi. [History of the discovery and 
investigation of Antarctica]. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press): 274. 
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Fig. 28. An-2 supplies the traverse (personal collection of Leonid Dolgushin). 
Every time the traverse stopped, snowdrifts covered the tractors and sledges, 
and needed to be cleared away before the traverse could continue. Over the next 
three days it managed to cover about 75 km when the air temperature dropped to -
60° C, causing the metal steering rods to become brittle and break. An attempt to 
replace them with metal cables was unsuccessful, since the cables 'snapped like 
cotton thread,383 in the frigid temperatures. With the approaching polar night, 
daylight hours dwindled rapidly and the men were forced to walk ahead in the beam 
of the tractor headlights looking out for crevasses (Fig. 29). 
J83 Gusev, A. 1959. Na ledyanom kupole Antarktidi [On the Antarctic ice dome]. In: Burhanov, V. 
(Ed). 1959. Na samoi yuzhnoi zemle [On the far south land). Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical 
Literature Press): 66. 
Fig. 29. Igor Ruban. Into the heart of Antarctica. 
(http://www.polarpost.rulLibrarvlLitinskiy/main-drifingrossiya.html). 
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A Li-2 reconnaissance aircraft sent from Mirny on the 25 April advised that 
the traverse had successfully negotiated the crevasse zone and that there were no 
more crevasses to be encountered.384 They pushed on and from 2 May began 
searching for a relatively level site suitable to build a base and a landing strip for an 
airplane to bring in supplies from Mirny. On 4 May Gusev received a telegram from 
Somov advising him to halt the traverse. The traverse made a final stop at a position 
with the co-ordinates 69° 44' S, 95° 30' E, elevation 2,700 m 375 km from Mirny 
(Fig. 30). 
' S4 Nudelman, A. 1959. Sovetskie expedi/sii v An/arlctiku /955-/959 [Soviet expeditions to the 
An/arc/ic, /955-/959). Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR: 55; Gusev, A. 1973. V snegah 
An/arlctidi {In the snows of Antarc/ica). Tryoshnikov, A. Zakovanniy v /ed [Locked in ice). Moscow: 
Misl: 97. 
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Fig. 30. Map of Antarctica showing traverse route Mirny-Pionerskaya 
(Adapted from ' Map of Antarctic research during the IG Y 1956 - 1959' . 
Moscow: Ministry of the Merchant Fleet of the USSR, 1959) 
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III 
Provisions, building materials and carpenter Petr Firsov arrived from Mirny 
on the An-2 airplane, and building commenced using the existing superstructure of 
the sledges and the newly delivered materials. After unloading, the aircraft attempted 
to take-off, but unluckily hit one of the surrounding sastrugi and sustained damage to 
its skis, which left it grounded until the damage could be repaired. Spare parts were 
sent from Mirny on 6 May and a 1300 m landing strip was prepared to allow the 
larger Li-2 airplane to land. While the strip was long enough for the plane to land and 
deliver its cargo, it was found to be not quite long enough for take-off; the Li-2 
damaged its landing gear, though not badly enough to prevent it from leaving the 
same day with Boris Vtyurin, Mikhail Komarov and Pavel Senko on board.385 
The An-2 was repaired over the next eight days, and on 14 May was able to 
finally return to Mirny with aerologist Aleksandr Shchekin on board, leaving six 
. people to continue construction.386 Supplies, however, were once again running low, 
but the combination of foul weather and the darkness of the polar night prevented 
any new deliveries. Only by the end of May did an aircraft manage to drop food 
supplies for the future station, with Gusev becoming almost poetic when he 
described how the sky opened up like a 'horn of plenty and many wonderful things 
falling out': crates containing cans of meat, cocoa, condensed milk, sugar, sausages, 
packets of meat, chicken, bread and many other foodstuffs. 387 Unfortunately, the 
wind scattered the parachutes with attached crates over a wide area, and considerable 
effort was expended in retrieving them. Building works continued and were at long 
last completed by 27 May 1956, when the first Soviet Antarctic inner continental 
research station was officially opened. It was named Pionerskaya (Fig. 31) as a dual 
tribute to the pioneering achievement of the Soviet expedition in the Antarctic and to 
the communist children's' organization, the 'Pionery' (Pioneers). The first step to the 
'" Denisov, I. and G. Bregman 1959. Kalendar kompleksnoi Antarkticheskoi expeditsii [Chronicle of 
the composite Antarctic expedition]. In: Burhanov, V. (Ed). Na samoi yuzhnoi zemle [On the far south 
land]. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press): 443. 
386 Gusev, A. 1973. V snegah Antarktidi [In the snows of Antaretiea}. Tryoshnikov, A. Zakovanniy v 
led [Locked in ice]. Moscow: Misl: 99; Denisov, I. and G. Bregman 1959. Kalendar kompleksnoi 
Antarkticheskoi expeditsii [Chronicle of the composite Antarctic expedition]. In: Burhanov, V. (Ed). 
Na samoi yuzhnoi zemle [On the far south land]. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature 
Pres): 443. 
387 Gusev, A. 1973. V snegah Antarktidi [In the snows of Antarctica}. Tryoshnikov, A. Zakovanniy v 
led [Locked in ice]. Moscow: Mis!: 105. 
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Poles was symbolically likened to the child' s first step towards becoming a fully 
fledged member of the Communist Party. 
Fig. 31. Igor Ruban Pionerskaya station. 
(http://www.polaroost.rulLibrarylLitinskiy/main-drifingrossiya.html) 
On 6 June, pilot Cherevichniy flew in on the Li -2 aircraft with supplies and 
exchange personnel, but the landing strip was obliterated by a blizzard which 
covered it with sastrugi. He was unable to make a landing and returned to Mirny. The 
men at the station worked on the strip over the next twenty-four hours and succeeded 
in preparing the surface for another attempt at landing on 7 June, which this time was 
successful. More supplies and equipment were delivered, as well as two men who 
were to stay the winter: radio operator Vetrov and glaciologist Dolgushin. The An-2 
plane, which was expected to bring two barrels of fuel and a tractor driver/mechanic 
to replace Kudryashov was unable to locate the new station and barely made it back 
to Mirny. Vitaliy Babarykin, German Malikov, Andrei Kapitsa and Petr Firsov 
returned to Mirny on the Li-2,388 leaving four people to winter in the Antarctic 
interior: station leader Aleksandr Gusev, tractor driver/mechanic Nikolai 
Kudryashov, glaciologist Leonid Dolgushin and radio operator Evgeniy Vetrov. 
These Antarctic pioneers were to spend the next five winter months with no other 
human contact until 17 November 1956 when the An-2 arrived with a relieving 
party, although air drops of provisions and fuel were effected on 22 June (I ton of 
m Denisov, I. and G. Bregman 1959. Kalendar kompleksnoi Antarkticheskoi expeditsii [Chronicle of 
the composite Antarctic expediton]. In: Burhanov, V. (Ed). Na samoi yuzhnoi zemle [On the far south 
land). Moscow: Geograflzdat (Geographical Literature Press): 444. 
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provisions), 28 August (Li-2 provisions and fuel) and 5 October (11-12 1.8 ton 
cargo )?89 Meteorological, magnetic, astronomical, glaciological, aerological and 
other scientific observations were constantly conducted, both while the traverse was 
travelling and after it was transformed into a base and had settled in for the winter. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Back in Moscow, at a meeting on 10 April 1956, Glavsevmorput was most 
impressed with the progress of the traverse. The push south with winter rapidly 
approaching was acknowledged to be 'an unprecedented undertaking ... which was 
undoubtedly worth the whole expedition.'39o Somov also appreciated the importance 
of this first foray into the interior: he understood that 'observations conducted in 
Mirny and Pionerskaya will shed light on the possibility of a lengthy stay of men in 
the regions situated still closer to the centre of the continent, and help to solve the 
question of whether future plans for advancing to the south ... are practicable' .391 
Many lessons were learnt with regard to inner continental Antarctic topography, 
temperature, climate, human endurance and about the limitations of the equipment 
required to operate in such extreme conditions. These lessons were invaluable in 
future planning, design and development of new more suitable equipment, clothing 
and selection of personnel. 
The significance of the Soviet achievement was not lost on the neighbouring 
IGY national Antarctic expeditions, which would also benefit from the Soviet 
experience. Bill Bewsher, the Officer in Charge of the Australian Mawson station, 
sent a radiogram to the newly opened station expressing his 'hearty congratulations 
on the successful establishment of Pioneer stop A fine accomplishment soon after the 
389 Denisov, I. and G. Bregman 1959. Kalendar kompleksnoi Antarkticheskoi expeditsii [Chronicle of 
the composite Antarctic expedition]. In: Burhanov, V. (Ed). Na samai yuzhnai zemle {On the/ar south 
land}. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press): 445, 448 and 449. 
390 Glavsevmorput 1956, Stenogramma soveschaniya u nachalnika GSMP Burhanova, 10 Aprelya 
1956. Informatsiya pribivshih iz Antarktiki tOY. Avsyuk, Shumskiy i Markov [Transcript of the 
meeting with Burhanov, Head of the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route. Information 
provided by Avsyuk, Shumskiy and Markov, 10 April 1956]. Moscow: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy 
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Division Library Special Collection: I. 
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establishment of Mirny.,392 The Australians were later thankful that they were able 
'to draw on Russian experience with long-distance heavy tractor. transport on the 
Antarctic plateau. The information gained proved useful when we undertook our 
inland journey' .393 The French base on Terre Adelie also sent congratulations and 
asked the Soviets to share with them the 'conditions and with which means you 
could success in the building of your station (sic)' .394 Commander Herbert Whitney, 
the American naval officer responsible for all Antarctic naval station construction 
wrote in Russian that 'we consider your operations to be very interesting' and wished 
them all the best from the US expedition.395 
The first SAE had not reached either the South Geomagnetic Pole or the Pole 
of Inaccessibility, but a promISIng start had been made. A 'large and elaborate' 
coastal bas~ Mirni96 had been established 
from which to launch an assault on the interior. 
Airplanes had made a reconnaissance flight to 
the proposed station site at the South 
Geomagnetic Pole and another flight towards 
the Pole of Inaccessibility. A small party had 
landed on the Polar plateau and spent several 
days conducting observations. The area around 
Mirny was explored, a way through the 
surrounding crevasses was found and a short trial traverse had marked an exit to the 
plateau. A larger traverse had used the exit to travel 375 km into the Antarctic 
interior and build the first inner continental Antarctic station, which was to be 
392 Ogni Mimogo. 1957 [The lights of Mirnyj. Documentary film by A. Kochetkov. Krasnogorsk, 
Moscow region, Russia: Russian State Archives of Film and Photo Document [RGAKFDj; Gusev, A. 
1973. V snegah Antarktidi [In the snows of Antarctica]. Tryoshnikov, A. Zakovanniy v led [Locked in 
ice]. Moscow: Misl: 106; see Gan, I. 2009. The reluctant hosts: Soviet Antarctic expedition ships visit 
Australia and New Zealand in 1956. Polar Record45 (232): 37-50. 
393 Mather, K. 1957. ANARE Executive Planning Committee report on USSR Antarctic station at 
Mimy September 1957. Kingston, Tasmania, Australia: Australian Antarctic Division Library Special 
Collection. 
394 Ogni Mimogo. 1957 [The lights of MirnYj. Documentary film by A. Kochetkov. Krasnogorsk, 
Moscow region, Russia: Russian State Archives of Film and Photo Document [RGAKFDj. 
,., Ibid; Gusev, A. 1973. V snegah Antarktidi [In the snows of Antarctica]. Tryoshnikov, A. 
Zakovanniy v led [Locked in ice]. Moscow: Misl: 106 
396 Law, P.·1956. Report on visit to USSR base at Mimy. Kingston, Tasmania, Australia: Australian 
Antarctic Division Library Special Collection. 
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manned year round till the end of the IGY. (Fig 32. Postal stamp on the occasion of 
closing Pionerskaya station (http://www.philately.h14.ru!antarkt.html#all). 
This unplanned station, Pionerskaya, had given the SAE a head start in 
preparing for its national IGY program and had provided vital experience which was 
critical for successfully reaching the goal of building bases on the South 
Geomagnetic Pole and the Pole of Inaccessibility. But it was the men of the SAE 
who strived to secure for their homeland the honour of achieving their goal and to 
'bring back a rich harvest of scientific results.'397 Like Scott, Amundsen, Byrd and 
others who went before them, they displayed the same distinctive 'courage and 
endurance,398 in their attempt at 'doing the impossible.'399 And although Pionerskaya 
station no longer appears on contemporary maps of Antarctica, the route travelled by 
the first Soviet explorers is still used by the annual Russian traverses to this day. 
397 Mountevans, E. 1958. South with Scoll. London and Glasgow: Collins: I. 
398 Bixby, W. 1961. Alone. London: Putnam: (63. 
399 Siple, P. 1959. 90 South. The story of the American South Pole Conquest. New York: G.P. 
Putnam's Sons: 99. 
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6 
ASSAULT ON THE INTERIOR. ESTABLISHING THE IGY 
SOVIET ANTARCTIC INNER CONTINENTAL STATIONS4oO 
This chapter continues to examine the pioneering 'assault on the interior' of 
the second composite Soviet Antarctic expedition (SAE) in its attempt to establish 
stations in the unexplored and most inaccessible areas of the Antarctic continent: the 
South Geomagnetic Pole and the.Pole of Inaccessibility. The setbacks and obstacles 
encountered by this expedition drove the development of new Soviet technology and 
techniques to be applied in the hitherto unknown Antarctic conditions. The chapter 
will also briefly mention the first and third expeditions without touching on their 
other essential ingredient, the actual scientific investigations that were conducted 
concurrently during their operations. 
The journey towards the interior was seen as a step by step progress and is 
reflected in the naming of the stations. Pionerskaya, the first interior station, was 
named for the 'Pionery' (pioneers), the Communist Children's Organization; the 
second intermediate station, Komsomolskaya was named for the 'Komsomol', the 
Communist Youth League and the station planned for the Pole of Inaccessibility was 
Sovetskaya, named for the Soviets (councils) which were made up of fully fledged 
Communist Party members (Fig. 33). 
400 This chapter is based on a paper which is in Press: Barr, S. (Ed.) From Pole to Pole. Vol I. 
Springer Press (Gennany). 
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Fig. 33 . Map of Antarctica: Soviet IOY stations 
(Adapted from ' Map of Antarctic research during the IOY 1956 - 1959' . 
Moscow: Ministry of the Merchant Fleet of the USSR, 1959). 
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6.1 Preparations 
A decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 13 July 1955 established the 
composite Soviet Antarctic expedition, which was to consist of two parts: a 
continental expedition and a marine expedition. The first was to operate on the icy 
continent year round, whereas the second was to conduct research using expedition 
ships in coastal Antarctic waters and in the open sea.401 Scientists, aviators, mariners 
and other support personnel who had wide experience of working in the Arctic were 
assigned to the Antarctic IG Y effort. 
The Academy of Sciences of the USSR was instrumental in formulating the 
research programs and logistic support was to be provided by the Directorate of the 
Northern Sea Route (Glavsevmorput), the Ministry of the Merchant Fleet department 
responsible for Arctic research. The leaders selected for the first (1955 - 1957), 
second (1956 - 1958) and third (1957 - 1959) composite Soviet Antarctic expeditions 
(SAE) were oceanographer Mikhail Mikhailovich Somov; geographers Aleksei . 
Fedorovich Tryoshnikov; and Evgeniy lvanovich Tolstikov. Each had previously 
headed the Soviet Arctic Severniy Po/us (North Pole) drifting stations SP2, SP3 and 
SP 4 respectively. 
Two of the USSR's most modem icebreakers, the Ob and Lena, and a support 
vessel Refrigerator 7 were fitted out for the first SAE. Its complement of 429 
expeditioners and crew 402 was to make preparations for the requirements of the 
Soviet IGY commitment, including building a coastal base Mirny, which was opened 
on IJ February 1956. Additional aims of the expedition were selecting sites for the 
inner continental polar stations Vostok at the South Geomagnetic Pole, and 
Sovetskaya at the Pole ofInaccessibility. 
401 Korotkevich, E. and L. Dubrovin 1984. Two decades of Soviet Research in the Antarctic. In: 
Avsyuk, G. The Antarctic Committee report. Main results a/twenty years' research in the Antarctic. 
Washington: American Publishing Co: 3. 
402 Nesmeyanov, N. and V. 8akayev 1957. Kratkiye itogi raboty kontinentalnoi chasti kompleksnoi 
Antarkticheskoi expeditsii AN SSSR 1955-1957,3 Iyunya 1957 [A brief summary of the results of the 
continental component of the CAE of the Academy of Sciences ofthe USSR 1955-1957, 3 June 
1957). Moscow: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Economiki (Russian State Economics Archives) 
RGAE, File 9570, op 2, ed hr 2589. 
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The associated exploratory tractor-sledge foray into the interior of the 
continent resulted in the' establishment on 27 May 1956 of the research station 
Pionerskaya (altitude 2700 m) at a site located 375 km from the coastal base. 
Another station, Oasis, was established on 15 October 1956, 360 km to the east of 
Mirny in the Bunger Hills on an enigmatic ice-free part of the coast. 
From his base at Mirny, the expedition leader Somov had also undertaken 
reconnaissance flights to the South Geomagnetic Pole and towards the Pole of 
Inaccessibility.403 His observations indicated that the projected ai~ of building inner 
continental scientific observatories by hauling all necessary building material, fuel 
and equipment over the treacherous icy dome in deep snow at altitudes of 3400 -
4000 m on tractor-sledges would test men and equipment to the limit. The distance to 
be covered from Mirny was 1410 km to the South Geomagnetic Pole, located at an 
altitude of 3488 m and 2\00 km to the Pole of Inaccessibility, located at an altitude 
of3719 m.404 
6.2 The attempts 
The onerous task of actually building the stations Vostok at the South 
Geomagnetic Pole and Sovetskaya at the Pole of Inaccessibility 405 as well as the 
intermediate base station Komsomolskaya was left to the 625 man second SAE led by 
Tryoshnikov. After arriving at Mirny, he had a tractor-sledge train outfitted, and 
made ready to venture out to establish a foothold in preparation for the assault on the 
two poles. A team of ten men with three tractors hauling six sledges containing 
scientific equipment and huts. set out on 14 February 1957 along the crevasse and 
403 Belov, M. 1969. Istoriya otkritiya i issledovaniya [History of discovery and exploration]. In: 
ToIstikov, E. (Ed). Atlas Antarktiki Tom 11 [Atlas of Antarctica VollI]. Leningrad: Hydrometeoizdat 
(Hydro meteorological Service Press): 84. 
404 Lukin, V., N. Komilov and N. Dmitriev.2006. Sovetskiye i Rossiiskiye Antarkticheskiye expedi/sii 
v tsifrah ifaktah (1955-2005) [Soviet and Russian Antarctic expeditions - facts and figures (1995-
2005)}. St Petersburg: AARI: 436-437. . 
40S Bakaev, V. 1956. V Sovet Ministrov SSSR, 29 Oktyabrya 1956 [To the Council of Ministers of the 
USSR, 29 October 1956]. Moscow: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Economiki (Russian State 
Economics Archives) RGAE, File 9570, op 2, ed hr 2584. 
120 
sastrugi-covered terrain to Pionerskaya towards the proposed site of 
Komsomolskaya.406 
The rugged terrain and frigid conditions took their toll on fuel consumption. 
On 7 March, having travelled 860 km an? reached an altitude of3500 m, the traverse 
almost ran. out of fuel by the time it reached the proposed site for Komsomolskaya 
station. The expeditioners prepared to winter at the site, expecting supplementary 
fuel and supplies to be delivered by aircraft from Mirny. However, this did not prove 
feasible when the approaching polar night sent temperatures plummeting to _700 C, 
making further aviation extremely dangerous: 'all metal and plastic aircraft parts 
became as brittle as glass.'407 Tryoshnikov, fearing for the safety of his personnel, 
ordered the leader of the traverse Pelevin to evacuate his men and mothball the 
station till spring. The last three evacuees managed to take off on a plane filled with 
just enough fuel to reach Pionerskaya on 24 March when the temperature reached 
_65 0 C.408 
A second traverse, led by Averianov and consisting of eighteen men and five 
tractors towing ten sledges left Mirny on 28 February, two weeks after the first. 409 It 
followed the same route, but its mission was to establish a new station Vostok on the 
South Geomagnetic Pole. Being late autumn, the environmental conditions became 
increasingly more difficult: temperatures below -50 0 C led to mechanical failure as 
the tractors sank into the loose, porous snow.4IO After covering a distance of 620 km, 
the traverse faltered and ground to a hillt on 18 March.411 
406 Nudelman, A. 1966. Soviet Antarctic Expeditions 1955 - 1959. Jerusalem: Israel Program for 
Scientific translations: 58. 
407 Tryoshnikov, A., 1959. Na ledyanom kontinente [On the icy continent]. In: Burhanov, V. (Ed.). Na 
samoi yuzhnoi zemle [On the far south land}. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press): 
215. 
408 Ibid. 
409 Tryoshnikov, A. 1960. Vtoraya kontinentalnaya expeditsia 1956-1958. Materially nabludeniy 
[Second continental expedition. Observational data}. Leningrad: Morskoi transport (Marine Transport 
Press): 189; Savatyugin, L. 2007. Polus holoda [Pole of Cold]. Unpublished manuscript. 
410 Somov, M. 1957. In the Antarctic continent. Translated into English by Bureau for translations in 
Ottawa. Priroda (Nature), Moscow, No 11. Kingston, Tasmania, Australia: Australian Antarctic 
Division Library Special Collection: 9. 
41\ Tryoshnikov, A. 1960. Vtoraya kontinentalnaya expeditsia 1956-1958. Materialy nabludeniy 
[Second continental expedition. Observational data}. Leningrad: Morskoi transport (Marine 
transport): 10, 172. 
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News of these difficulties raised concerns at the Directorate of the Northern 
Sea Route operational headquarters about the ability of the expedition to achieve its 
objectives. A verianov was urged to push on to at least 650 km and open a temporary 
intermediate station on the Antarctic plateau.412 The traverse laboriously pressed on 
for a further IS km, but the altitude of 3252 m, combined with the harsh early winter 
conditions, were an obstacle impossible to overcome. With the tractor - train unable 
to proceed, Tryoshnikov made the decision for the 635 km mark to become the site 
of the interim Vostok 1 station, which was officially opened on 12 April 1957.413 The 
seven men who were left to man the station and conduct research over winter 
endured extreme privations: they suffered from altitude sickness, temperatures of 
- 80° C and severe frostbite. TrY9shnikov reported that had he known of the 'natural 
conditions of a severity hitherto unknown to mankind,414 prevailing at Vostok 1, he 
would never have allowed his men to stay there for winter. 
Glavsevmorput feared that the evacuation of Komsomolskaya, mechanical 
failure, unexpected excessive fuel consumption and the severe conditions at Vostok i 
indicated that the Soviet IGY program may be in jeopardy.m Plans for building 
bases on the South Geomagnetic Pole and Pole of Inaccessibility were in danger of 
collapse, and immediate measures needed to be taken to ward off this danger. The 
accumulated knowledge gained during the first and second SAE led the Deputy 
Director of Glavsevmorput, Tolstikov, to conclude that the solution lays in utilizing 
specially designed technical support and a more rigorous health screening of 
personnel. He made the decision to assume the leadership of the third SAE himself, 
with the objective of handpicking his men and organizing the design and 
412 Tolstikov, A. 1980. No polyusah Anrarktidy {On the Poles of Antarctica]. Leningrad: 
Hydrometeoizdat (Hydro meteorological Service Press): 19. 
413 Lukin, V., N. Komilov and N. Dmitriev. 2006. Sovetskiye i Rossiiskiye Antarkticheskiye expeditsii 
v tsifrah ifaktah (1955-2005) [Soviet and Russian Antarctic expeditions -facts and figures (1995-
2005)]. St Petersburg: AARI: 436. 
414 Somov, M. 1957. In the Antarctic continent. Translated into English by Bureau for translations in 
Ottawa. Priroda (Nature), Moscow, No 11. Kingston, Tasmania, Australia: Australian Antarctic 
Division Library Special Collection: 9. 
41S Tolstikov, A. 1980. No polyusah Antarktidy [On the Poles of Antarctica]. Leningrad: 
Hydrometeoizdat (Hydro meteorological Service Press): 18. 
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development of specialized equipment. Orders were placed for a new solid fuel, 416 
turbo equipped aircraft,417 'Penguin' tractors, sledges, navigational aids and 
protective clothing more suited to inner continental Antarctic reality. Tolstikov also 
suggested that Sovetskaya station be built not on the Pole of Inaccessibility, but as an 
intermediate half way station within range of a Li-2 aircraft flying out of 
Komsomolskaya station.418 
6.3 Partial Success 
Meanwhile, Tryoshnikov was determined that the second SAE achieve as 
much of its program as possible. He attributed the delay in setting out for the interior 
to the late arrival of his expedition at Mirny and attempted to make up for lost time 
by thorough planning for the coming summer season during the winter hiatus. He 
resumed his assault on the Antarctic interior on 8 October by leading a traverse from 
Mirny to Vostok 1 and on to the mothballed Komsomolskaya station, which he 
manned and opened on 6 November.419 The traverse continued on in the direction of 
the South Geomagnetic Pole for 280 km, where an intermediate supply depot was 
established. It then turned back to Komsomolskaya, which it reached on 17 
November.42o After reviewing plans and co-coordinating actions, the crew went on to 
Vostok 1 to assist in transporting the huts and supplies to the South Geomagnetic 
Pole. On 20 November they arrived at Vostok 1 and began excavations to extricate 
the temporary station, which had been buried under the winter snowdrifts, from its 
blanket of snow. Work was completed by 1 December when the augmented traverse 
was able to set forth and cover the distance of 775 km to the South Geomagnetic 
416 Tolstikov, A. 1958. Losevu, Insitut goryuchih iskopaemih, 25 Iyulia [To Losev, Institute of fuel, 
25 July 1958]. Moscow, Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Economiki [Russian State Economics 
Archives], File 9570, op 2, ed hr 2595. 
4J7 Nudelman, A. 1966. Soviet Antarctic Expeditions 1955 - 1959. Jerusalem: Israel Program for 
Scientific translations: 32. 
418 Tolstikov, E. 1980. No polyusah Antarktidy [On the Poles of Antarctica}. Leningrad: 
Hydrometeoizdat (Hydro meteorological Service Press): 20,42. 
419 Tryoshnikov, A. 1959. Na ledyanom kontinente. In: Burhanov, V. (Ed). No samoi yuzhnoi zemle 
[On the far south land]. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press): 220 
420 Nudelman, A. 1966. Soviet Antarctic Expeditions 1955 - 1959. Jerusalem: Israel Program for 
Scientific translations: 61. 
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Pole in fifteen days.421 The next day, on 16 December, Vos/ok station was officially 
opened on the South Oeomagnetic Pole. Against great odds, Tryoshnikov had 
overcome the previous setbacks and showed that the Soviet IOY plans were 
attainable and now seemed to be within reach. 
6.4 The Last Hurdle 
It was now up to Tolstikov and the third SAE (\957 - 1959) to continue the 
battle of man and machine against the hostile elements to secure a foothold and 
establish a station on the most inaccessible site of the Antarctic continent. It was 
fortunate that this expedition had consolidated and built on the knowledge acquired 
by the first two expeditions, since the conditions that it encountered were perhaps 
even more difficult than that faced by its predecessors. 
A traverse left Mirny on 26 December 1957 for Komsomolskaya and then 
across the Antarctic plateau, which the expeditioners' named 'Plateau Sovetskoye' 
(Soviet Plateau),422 towards the proposed .new site for the intermediate station. 
Sove/skaya station was opened and manned on 16 February 1958 as a base from 
which to launch the assault on the Pole ofInaccessibility, but the approaching winter 
prevented any further progress. Only the following spring on 23 October 1958 did a 
traverse leave Mirny bound for the Pole of Inaccessibility, which it reached in less 
than two months. On 14 December 1958, in the last days of the IOY, a base for 
episodic research was finally established on Pole of Inaccessibility and was 
operational till the close of the year. 
6.5 Conclusion 
By . establishing its network of inner continental stations: Pionerskaya, 
Komsomolskaya, Vos/ok, Sove/skaya and Pole of Inaccessibility, the Soviet Union 
had completely fulfilled its commitment to the International Geophysical Year of 
1957 - 1958. The country welcomed the expeditioners back as heroes and the media 
421 Tryoshnikov, A. 1960. Vtoraya kontinentalnaya expeditsia 1956-1958. Materialy nabludeniy 
[Second continental expedition. Observation material). Leningrad: Morskoi transport (Marine 
Transport Press): 180-181. 
422 Tolstikov, E. 1980. Na polyusah Antarktidy [On the Poles of Antarctica}. Leningrad: 
Hydrometeoizdat (Hydro meteorological Service Press): 126. 
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extolled their exploits and perseverance, while it mourned the loss of 
mechanic/driver Ivan Hmara during the First SAE and hydrologist Nikolai 
Buromskiy and student of the Leningrad Military Engineering Maritime College 
during the Second SAE. Fortunately, there were no deaths recorded during the Third 
SAE.42J 
Soviet national prestige had been upheld and its science and technology had 
been globally showcased and recognized. The USSR had shown the world that it was 
seriously interested in the South Polar region and most definitely intended to 
participate in any international regime for the Antarctic. Whether this was a transient 
or long term interest will be investigated in the following chapter. 
423 Based on Lukin, V.; N. Kornilov and N. Dmitriev. 2006. Sovetsk;ye i Rossiisk;ye 
Antarkticheskiye expeditsii v tsifrah ifaktah (1955-2005) {Soviet and Russian Antarctic expeditions-
facts andfigures (1955 - 2005)]. St Petersburg: AARI: 416. 
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7 
'WILL THE RUSSIANS ABANDON MIRNY TO THE PENGUINS 
AFTER 1959 ... OR WILL THEY STAy?,424 
When in 1948 the US attempted to exclude the USSR from participating in 
any future international regime for the Antarctic,425 the latter set in train a consistent 
and single-minded policy that would ensure that it had an influential voice in any 
such development. In 1950, the USSR had notified the US and the other countries 
with Antarctic interests of its intention to participate in any negotiations on any 
international regime.426 Soviet policy to achieve this aim was, in the main, 
implemented as a reaction to various initiatives of international scientific 
organisations involved in planning the International Geophysical Year (IGY). This 
chapter will identify major initiatives and show how Soviet support and expansion of 
these proposals, combined with an active encouragement of national Antarctic 
research, contributed to strengthening the USSR's position in Antarctic matters. This 
occurred much to the consternation of the Western nations with interests in the South 
Polar region. Australia, in particular, was concerned by the Soviet presence on the 
Australian Antarctic Territory (AA T)427 and was extremely interested in whether the 
USSR intended to stay for the long term. Although the Australians hoped otherwise, 
the evidence shows that this was indeed the case - from the day the Soviets set foot 
on the Antarctic continent, they had no intention ofleaving. 
After the USSR officially opened its first scientific observatory Mirny on the 
Antarctic continent on 13 February 1956 as the beginning of its contribution to the 
424 This chapter is based on a paper which was published in Polar Record 45 (233): 167-175 (2009). 
42S Gan, 1. 2006 in press. The Soviet preparation for the IG Y Antarctic program and the Australian 
response: politics and science. Santiago, Chile. Paper prepared for the second SCAR workshop on the 
history of Antarctic research entitled 'Multidimensional exploration of Antarctica around the 1950s', 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Santiago, Chile, 21-22 September 2006. 
426 USSR 1950. Soviet Memorandum of 7 June 1950 on the participation of the Soviet Union in any 
international settlement concerning Antarctica. In: Bush, W. 1982. Antarctica and International Law. 
A Collection of inter-state and National Documents, vol 3. London-Rome-New York: Ocean 
Publications Inc.: 208-209. . 
427 Gan, 1. 2009. 'Will the Russians abandon Mirny to the penguins or ... will they stay?' Polar Record 
45 (233): 167-175. 
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IGY, a question arose that was to vex the Australian government (as well as the 
governments of other IGY participants) for the duration of that eighteen month long 
'year' which was to end on 31 December 1958. It was most vividly posed in a 
newspaper article by David Burke entitled 'Red flag near South Pole.'428 The 
question was: 'Will the Russians abandon Mirny to the penguins after 1959 ... or will 
they stay'? The potential approaches for resolving conflicting Antarctic territorial 
claims of the claimant countries (such as Australia, which had a claim on that sector 
of Antarctica where the Soviets were planning to establish their bases) and non-
claimants (such as the USA and the USSR) hinged on the .answer to this question. If 
the Soviets stayed, their views on the future of the Antarctic would need to be 
considered. And the weight of these views would be considerable, given the size of 
their contribution to the international scientific endeavour, the location of their bases 
and their status as a world power. 
7.1 Soviets and the IGY 
The proposal for Soviet scientists to cooperate with the worldwide scientific 
community in investigating the Earth and atmosphere during the IG Y involved the 
USSR in research activities in both the Arctic and Antarctic while its previous Arctic 
experience was significant, its experience in the South Polar region was limited to 
whaling operations which commenced in the Southern Ocean in the austral summer 
of 1946. The IGY proposal became the catalyst for expanding and intensifying 
Soviet interest in the Antarctic, and provided the USSR with the perfect opportunity 
to secure a major presence on the icy continent with their large scale scientific 
programme. Scientists from other countries conducting Antarctic research recognized 
the Soviet program as being 'most comprehensive' reported the Head of the 
Australian National Antarctic Research Expedition (ANARE), Philip Law.429 He 
noted that '[t]here seems little doubt that the Russian Antarctic expedition will make 
a major contribution to the scientific programme of the IGY' (Fig. 34).430 
. 428 The Sun Herald, Sydney, 5 August 1956. 
429 Law, P. 1956. Report on visit to USSR base Mimy. Kingston, Tasmania, Australia: Australian 
Antarctic Division Special Collection: 9. 
430 Law, P. 1956. Report on visit to USSR base Mimy. Kingston, Tasmania, Australia: Australian 
Antarctic Division Special Collection: 7. 
127 
, 
Fig. 34. Left to right: Somovand Law at Mirny on 30 or 31 January 1956. 
Photographer unknown (Australian Antarctic Division Multi-Media co\1ection) 
Law's assessment was confinned by the Australian Antarctic explorer Sir 
Douglas Mawson who wrote that ' [t]he contribution of Russia wi\1 be very 
significant. ,431 Dr Brian Roberts of the Scott Polar Research Institute, Cambridge, 
and part time civil servant of the British Foreign Office, believed that ' [t]heir work is 
likely to lead to rapid and major increases in knowledge of the Antarctic. ,432 Even 
the Americans were worried that the US was ' very apt not only to be second to 
USSR, but a very poor second' in both polar regions.433 They later conceded that 
' [t]he overland transport of supplies to build [Soviet] inland bases ranks as one of the 
most substantial achievements of the IGy.,434 
An indication of Soviet resolve to gain a foothold in the Antarctic was the 
solemnity of the symbolism when opening their first station. A box containing earth 
brought from Stalingrad was laid at the foundation of the flagpole where the Soviet 
flag was first hoisted above the icy continent (Fig. 35). 
431 Quoted in Suzyumov, E. 1968. A life given to the Antarctic. Adelaide: Libraries Board of South 
Australia: 57. 
432 Quoted in Bourchier, M.G.M. 1956. For the Secretary, Department of External Affairs. Soviet 
Antarctic Policy, 23 July 1956. Canberra, Australia: National Archives of Australia A1838, 
1495/ 11914 part 4. 
433 Crary to Odishaw quoted in Belanger, D. 2006. Deep Jreeze. The United States. the International 
Geophysical Year, and the Origins of Antarctica 's Age of Science. Colorado: University Press of 
Colorado: 39 . 
• " Quoted in Klotz, F. 1990. America on the Ice. Antarctic Policy issues. Washington: National 
Defence University Press: 29. 
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Fig.35. The officer in charge of the first Soviet coastal base Mirny Hariton Greku 
places a box containing earth from Stalingrad at the foundation of the flagpole 
(personal collection of Leonid Dolgushin) 
The Battle of Stalingrad (1942 - 1943) was still fresh in the minds of the 
expedition members, most of whom had fought in World War II (which lasted from 
1941 to 1945 as far as the Soviet Union was concerned) as the decisive battle of the 
war on the eastern front. Now, the 'Red expedition' to the Antarctic was securing the 
beachhead in readiness for its ' assault on the sixth continent. , 435 Leonid Dolgushin, a 
Russian glaciologist present at the flag-raising ceremony, saw the inclusion of 
Stalingrad earth in the flagstaff base as a 'symbol that the Soviet Union has come to 
Antarctica in earnest and for a very long time. ,436 
This resolve was driving the Soviet campaign to attain its objectives: to 
conquer the harshest climatic conditions and unforgiving terrain in their attempt to 
'" Gusev, A. 1959. Shturm shestogo continenta [Assault of the sixth continent). Moscow: Politizdat 
(Political Press); Solyanik, A. 1957. Poselok Mimy Tryoshnikovu. 27 Fevralia 1957 [To Tryoshnikov 
at Mimy, 27 February 1957). St Petersburg: Tsentralniy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv nauchno-
tehnicheskoi dokumentatsii [Central State Archives of scientific and technical documentation), File 
369,opl-I , d 1117. 
43' Dolgushin, L. 2006. Antarktida 1955-1957. Fotorasskaz 0 pervoi Sovetskoi expedi/sii v Antarktidu 
i zimovke na pervoi vnutrikantinentalnai stantsii 'Pionerskaya ' [Antarctica 1955-1957. Photographic 
Account of the first Soviet expedition to Antarctica and wintering at the first inner continental station 
Pionerskaya). Moscow: Published by author: 44. 
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reach two of the most remote unexplored parts of the Antarctic continent, the South 
Geomagnetic Pole and the Pole of Inaccessibility. There could be no thought of 
failure; any setbacks were causes for great concern which led to a larger allocation of 
resources and a redoubling of effort. When the tractor sledge traverses which set out 
to establish the inner continental stations were faced with overwhelming difficulties 
in reaching the proposed sites, the Deputy Chief of the Glavsevmorput [Northern Sea 
Directorate] Evgeniy Tolstikov was determined that 'we cannot allow that our JGY 
program not be fulfilled' (Fig. 36).437 
J 
Fig. 36. Evgeniy Tolstikov (personal collection of Lev Savatyugin). 
He proposed to assume leadership of the third composite Soviet Antarctic 
expedition (1957 - 1959) with the objective of hand picking his personnel who would 
undergo more rigorous health screening and to design and develop equipment more 
suited to Antarctic conditions. 
Soviet policy certainly placed no obstacles in his way: on the contrary, the 
government was ready to provide all necessary resources for the success of its 
Antarctic endeavours, which was now a matter of national prestige. This was quite 
obvious to Dr. Roberts, who was sent on an exchange visit to Moscow and Leningrad 
with his colleague Or. Armstrong in the first week of June in 1956. Roberts 'gained 
an impression of technical competence and scientific ability of a high order ... and 
virtually no financial restrictions. Most of the equipment and instruments are 
excellent. On these aspects we have a much more significant "competitor" in the 
437 Tolstikov, E. 1980. Na polyusah Antarktidi [On the Poles of Antarctica). Leningrad: 
Hydrometeoizdat (Hydro meteorological Service Press): 19 
130 
Antarctic than we expected. ,438 One of the questions of more than passing interest to 
the Foreign Office was: how long did this 'significant competitor' intend to stay and 
'compete' in the Antarctic? The answer to the question was of just as much interest 
to the Australians, who were hoping that the USSR would share their discoveries 
under the IGY and then ' quietly withdraw. , 439 
Dr. Roberts was given a hint of Soviet intentions in his conversation with the 
Chief of the Glavsevmorput and Deputy Minister of the Merchant Fleet Vasiliy 
Burhanov, who was also responsible for Antarctic matters (Fig. 37). Burhanov 
mentioned to Roberts that ' present Soviet plans for the Antarctic only extended to the 
end of the IGY, but they would like to extend all the IGY stations for an indefinite 
period after the IGy.'44o 
Fig. 37. Chief of Glavsevmorput Vasiliy Burhanov (seated far left) at a meeting of 
the Council for Antarctic Research (Archives of Film and Photo Documents, 
Krasnogorsk, Russia) 
Although there were not yet any concrete Soviet plans for post IGY Antarctic 
activities, the desire for a permanent presence in the South Polar region had in no 
431 Bourchier, M.G.M. 1956. For the Secretary, Department of External Affairs. Soviet Antarctic 
Policy, 23 July 1956. Canberrn, Australia: National Archives of Australia A 1838, 1495/ 11914 part 4. 
". The Times, London, 6 February 1957, quoted in Hanessian 1958. Antarctica: Current National 
interests and legal realities. American Society of International law proceedings, April : 153. 
44(J Quoted in Bourchier, M.G.M. 1956. For the Secretary, Department of External Affairs. Soviet 
Antarctic Policy, 23 July 1956. Canberrn, Australia: National Archives of Australia A 1838, 
1495/ 11914 part 4. 
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way diminished. All that was required for the desire to become reality were the 
appropriate circumstances, which were not long in arriving on the scene. 
7.2 Proposal to continue Antarctic research post IGY 
In December 1956, the US National Committee for the IGY made a proposal 
to the Comite Special de l'Anoee Geophysique lnternationale (CSAGI) to continue 
the IGY Antarctic program for another year. The proposal was approved at the 
Fourth CSAG! conference held in Paris on 13 - 15 June 1957. Professor Vladimir 
Belousov, the head of the Soviet delegation at the conference, stated that the Soviet 
IGY committee 'recognized the interest of the extension for one year of the 
geophysical observations in the Antarctic.' He expressed considerable interest in the 
formation of a special [CSU committee to look into post [GY Antarctic programs on 
an international scale (Fig.38).441 
Fig.38. President of the Geophysical and Geodesy Union, Vladirnir Belousov 
(standing centre) at a press conference detailing the achievements of the IGY 
(Archives of Film and Photo Documents, Krasnogorsk, Russia) 
The question was referred to the International Council of Scientific Unions 
(ICSU) Executive Board which decided to create an ad hoc group that was to meet in 
Stockholm in September to consider the desirability of continuing scientific 
investigations of all kinds in the Antarctic which were inspired by, but not an 
441 Hanessian, J. 1958. Antarctica: Current National interests and legal realities. American Society of 
Inlernationaiiaw, proceedings, April: 157. 
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extension of, the IOy.442 The Soviet representative to the ad hoc group was the 
former Head of the first composite Soviet Antarctic expedition (1955 - 1957) 
Mikhail Somov, who, after returning to Leningrad from the Paris meeting, was 
appointed to the newly created position of Deputy Director in charge of Antarctic 
Research at the USSR Arctic Research Institute (ARI) in July 1957. The creation of a 
new position dedicated to Antarctic research indicates that the proposal to continue 
scientific investigations was being taken seriously by the Soviet side. It was in his 
new role as Deputy Director in charge of Antarctic Research that Somov attended the 
meeting in Stockholm on 9 - 11 September 1957. 
Delegates to the meeting were divided in their views regarding the 
desirability of continuing to coordinate Antarctic research in the post IOY period. 
Those 'in favor included the US, 'Chile, Argentina, and USSR, whereas the UK, 
France and Norway were opposed; likewise, letters from countries not sending 
representatives indicated that New Zealand is on the fence, South Africa favorable, 
Australia opposed, Belgiurn opposed.'443 The Australian opposition to the proposal 
was driven by the fear that a favourable response would give the Soviets an 'official' 
excuse to 'squat' on the AAT and 'that Australia's chances of getting the Russians to 
leave at the end of the IOY' would be negligible.444 The Australian government 
hoped that 'the governments of other ICSU countries, whose scientists favour an 
official extension of research, will refuse to make the necessary funds available for 
political reasons.'445 
After the conclusion of the meeting, there was some conflict in interpreting 
Somov's statements regarding Soviet intentions in Antarctica after the IOY between 
the US representative Dr. Harry Wexler (Chief Scientist of the US IOY Antarctic 
Program) and the British representative, Sir David Brunt (Secretary of the Physical 
Section of the Royal Society of London). The former reported that Somov 'indicated 
on a map where the Soviet Antarctic stations were and where they wanted to go, said 
442 SCAR Bulletin No I, January 1959: 360; Hanessian, J. 1958. Antarctica: Current National interests 
and legal realities. American Society of International law, proceedings, April: 149. 
443 Quoted in Wilson, R. 1957. To Ambassador Dreier 20 September 1957. The ICSU Antarctic 
Conference Held at Saltsjoabaden, Sweden. Canberra, Australia: National Archives of Australia 
A1838/2 1495/1/9/4/ part 6. 
444 -Sun, Sydney, 14 November 1957, Sunday Times, Perth, WA. 
445 Sunday Times, Perth, WA, 17 November 1957 .. 
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they expected to continue their studies in the Antarctic, and expressed the opinion 
that while Russia did not wish to influence other countries to go ahead if they didn't 
wish to do so, they felt in such case new nations should be invited in to carry on the 
studies.'446 Brunt, however, had the impression that Somov was not keen to continue 
research in the Antarctic if only the two most interested countries, the US and USSR 
were to continue their programs with no other countries participating. The Americans 
felt that the elderly Brunt was somewhat disoriented and did not understand the gist 
of what was actually being said.447 Jt does indeed seem highly unlikely that the newly 
appointed Deputy Director in charge of Antarctic Research would have been opposed 
to continuing Soviet investigations in the Antarctic. According to the Australians, it 
was only natural that the Soviets would 'jump on the bandwagon,448 of the American 
proposal and consequently 'have the perfect excuse for staying on.'449 
In fact, Somov managed to electrify the meeting 'by announcing [the] USSR 
intention to continue all six of their stations in Antarctica: Mirny (37 scientific 
personnel); Oasis (7) (including radiosounds observations); Pionerskaya (6); 
Komsomolskaya (4); Vos/ok (10); and Sove/skaya' built during the IOy'45o He 
explained that it would be 'uneconomical to go to the enormous expense and effort to 
. 451 
establish inland stations and then keep them going for only one year.' John 
Hanessian, the executive officer of the US IOY Committee responsible for the 
American scientific program in the Antarctic, quotes the ICSU - SCAR report that 
the USSR stated 'its intention to continue operations of all its stations, with further 
over-snow seismic traverses and additional oceanographic cruises in Antarctic 
waters.m Although opinion was divided, the group finally recommended that the 
446 Hall, R. 1994. International regime formation and'leadership. The origins oflhe Antarctic Treaty. 
Thesis Doctor of Philosophy, University of Tasmania: 113. 
447 Ibid, 113-114. 
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ICSU establish a committee to undertake the task of further international scientific 
activity in the Antarctic. This committee, the Special Committee on Antarctic 
Research (SCAR), was established by the ICSU Bureau at its meeting on 18 - 19 
September 1957 when it invited the twelve nations actively engaged in Antarctic 
research to nominate a delegate to the Special Committee.453 Somov himself was 
also acutely aware of the political ramifications of the Stockholm conference.for an 
international agreement on Antarctica. He felt the full weight of his .own 
responsibility when he attended the first meeting of the SCAR held at The Hague on 
3 - 5 February 1958. Somov considered this to be a 'crucial meeting' which would 
have long term international repercussions when it formulated its research 
objectives454 and prepared plans for the scientific exploration of Antarctica in the 
years following the IGy.455 As the sole Soviet delegate, Somov presented wide 
ranging Soviet ideas for future work in the Antarctic, which were received with 
much interest.456 He also suggested establishing seven additional coastal and five 
inland stations on the Antarctic continent, a proposal later adopted by one of the 
Conference's working groupS.457 Following the meeting, he wrote in his report that 
the Soviet side had not realized the importance of the occasion and had sent him as 
the one and only delegate, which significantly reduced the effectiveness of the Soviet 
delegation. He was also frustrated by the fact that the interpreting support provided 
by the local embassy was totally inadequate and 'reduced [his input] to a minimum, 
detracting from the prestige and authority of the Soviet Union in resolving questions 
relating to Antarctic research which have not only scientific, but huge political 
implications.'458 His report produced the desired result and all future Soviet 
453 SCAR Bulletin No I, January 1959: 360; Hanessian, J. 1958. Antarctica: Current National interests 
and legal realities. American Society of International law, proceedings, April: 149. 
454 Somoy, M. 1958. Otchet ob uchastii v SCAR v Gaage 03-05 Fevralia 1958 [Report of participation 
at SCAR in The Hague 03-05 Feb 1958]. St Petersburg: Tsentralniy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv. 
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delegations to the SCAR consisted of at least two scientists, one of whom had 
knowledge of the appropriate language. 
7.3 Soviet reactions to the proposal 
Following the SCAR meeting at The Hague, the Academic Council of the 
ARI convened on 24 May 1958 to discuss the preliminary results of the second 
continental Soviet Antarctic expedition, the. hydro graphic and cartographic work of 
the third Marine Antarctic expedition and plans for the fourth Soviet Antarctic 
expedition. Particular mention was made of the widening international scientific 
research in the Antarctic agreed to at The Hague conference and the widening role of 
Soviet science in the region. The Academic Council considered it necessary to 
investigate the little known geography of areas adjacent to the Bellingshausen and 
Amundsen Seas and suggested building a small permanent coastal observatory in that 
vicinity. This was all the more important since these areas were 'first discovered by 
the Russians'. The Council noted that there was 'insufficient geological and 
glaciological research undertaken by the Soviet scientists' and proposed a 
transcontinental seismoglaciologic traverse from Mirny - Pionerskaya - Vostok-
South Geographic Pole and then on to the new station on the Bellingshausen Sea, as 
well as' a general geological investigation of Dronnings Maud Land and the 
Bellingshausen Sea coast.459 There seemed to be a great emphasis placed on research 
in the shelf, shoal and ice covered waters of the Bellingshausen Sea, to which the 
Marine expedition was to pay special attention.46o Once again, the plans were on a 
grand scale, and it seems likely that the attempt to establish a base on the coast 
adjoining the Bellingshausen Sea and the investigations of the sea itself had more 
than scientific value: occupation of the Antarctic continent in an area 'first 
discovered by Russians,461 and hitherto unclaimed by any other country would have 
a distinct advantage for any potential future Soviet claim. 
45' Gordienko, P. and A. Burdikina 1958. Vipiska iz protokola no lO zasedaniaya uchenogo Soveta 
Arkticheskogo insituta ot 24 Maya 1958 [Excerpt from protocol no 10 of the Academic Council of the 
Arctic Institute, 24 May 1958]. Moscow, Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Economiki [Russian 
State Economics Archives], File 9570, op 2, ed hr 2595: 2. 
460 Ibid: 5. 
461 Gordienko, P. and A. Burdikina 1958. Vipiska iz protokola no 10 zasedaniaya uchenogo Soveta 
Arkticheskogo instituta ot 24 Maya 1958 [Excerpt from protocol no lO of the Academic Council of 
the Arctic Institute, 24 May 1958]. Moscow, Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Economiki [Russian 
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Political factors were also a consideration in the question of processing the 
accumulated data collected by the Soviet expeditions. The Academic Council 
recommended that the ARl and the expedition take positive steps to expedite the 
publication of preliminary reports of the expedition members.462 The Acting Director 
of the ARl, Pavel Gordienko (1913 - 1982) (Fig. 39), and the secretary of the 
Institute 's Communist Party organization, L. Balakshin, wrote to the Deputy Minister 
of the Merchant Fleet, Aleksandr Afanasiev, that the situation regarding data 
processing was critical and required a government decision. Afanasiev granted his 
approval for the Director of the ARI, Vyacheslav Frolov, to edit and publish a 
journal entitled the Information Bulletin of the Soviet Antarctic Expedition,463 the 
first issue of which came out in August of that year and which continued to be 
published until 1999. 
Fig. 39. Pavel Gordienko. Portrait by S. Gesin (hanging at AARl) 
Gordienko and Balakshin further argued that the USSR Council of Ministers' 
draft resolution on the Antarctic that included the intention to create an Antarctic 
Institute independent of the Arctic Institute was 'untimely and economically 
462 Ibid: 6. 
463 Afanasiev, A. 1958. Direktoru Arkticheskogo Instituta V. Frolovu, 24 Maya 1958 [To the Director 
of the Arctic Institute V. Frolov, 24 May 1958]. Moscow, Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv 
Economiki [Russian State Economics Archive], File 9570, op 2, ed hr 2595. 
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unwarranted', with the Leningrad City Executive Committee being 'categorically 
against' locating an institute in Leningrad. '[O]nly specific political considerations 
coul<;l contribute to a positive decision regarding such an Institute.'464 Instead, they 
suggested setting up a large division capable of supporting all the goals of the Soviet 
Antarctic expedition. This would be either a branch or department of the ARI 
dedicated exclusively to Antarctic research and headed by the leaders of the 
composite Soviet Antarctic expedition. The Academic Council of the ARI met on 12 
June 1958 and resolved that due to the fact that the Antarctic had become an essential 
component of the research interest of the ARI, its name would be changed to the 
Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute.465 The resolution to formally incorporate 
Antarctic research into permanent mainstream Soviet academe was ratified by a 
decree of the Council of Ministers on 25 June 1958466 and demonstrated that 
Antarctic research was to continue on a long term basis. 
A further major opportunity for the USSR to provide input for future 
. Antarctic plans presented itself at the Fifth General Assembly of CSAGI held in 
Moscow 30 July - 9 August 1958 and at the second SCAR meeting (4 - I I August 
1958) which was held in conjunction with the CSAGI Assembly at the same venue. 
One of the four principal matters to be taken up by the CSAGI Assembly was the 
question Of future international cooperation in geophysics at the end of the IGY. The 
Soviet delegation, supported by Communist China, Poland and East Germany 
proposed that the IGY be extended for another year to complete IGY tasks that were 
not completed by the end of 1958, especially in the study of Antarctica. It also 
proposed to extend cooperation to allow time to organize a pennanent arrangement 
464 Gordienko, P. and A. Balakshin 1958.' Zamestitelu Ministra Morskogo Flota Nachalniku 
Glavsevmorputi A. Afanasievu, 21 Aprelya 1958 [To the Deputy Minister of the Merchant Fleet and 
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Economiki [Russian State Economics Archives], File 9570, op 2, ed hr 2595. 
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issledovatelskogo instituta Glavsevmorputi, 12 Iyunya 1958 [Excerpt from protocol No 12 of the 
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for such cooperation.467 The Soviet proposal was optimistically positive in its 
assessment of the IGY, stressing that '[t]he IGY became a symbol of wide 
international co-operation based on mutual benefit. New forms of co-operation are 
being built on the foundation of World Data Centres, World Days Centres, etc'. The 
USSR was eager to continue the momentum of international collaboration and called 
on the countries involved 'to expand the success of international scientific co-
operation' and continue the IGY activities for one year till 31 December 1959.468 
This proposal was referred to the Advisory Council for the IGY which recommended 
that the IGY should be succeeded by a program of International Geophysical Co-
operation 1959 where all nations willing and able to continue their research would 
participate. The ICSU meeting in Washington in October 1958 endorsed this 
proposal.469 
It is noteworthy that H. Newellfrom the US Naval Research Laboratory in 
Washington DC, who was substituting for Lloyd Berkner in the coordinating role of 
CSAGI Reporter for Rockets and Satellites at the Moscow assembly, reported that 
'[f]rom their position on this question ... it appeared that the Soviet scientists need the 
IGY name and organization to help them maintain their position at home and their 
outside contacts and the freedom of intercourse that has been achieved so far. 
Apparently this need is a very urgent and demanding one in the opinion of the Soviet 
geophysicists and solar physicists.'47o 
Newell's views are borne out by the fact that Somov and Burhanov were keen 
to expand ties with other countries by inviting their scientists to participate in the 
Soviet program. They had, by this time, experienced the beneficial effects of having 
the American exchange meteorologists Gordon Cartwright participate in the second 
467 Sullivan, W. 1961. Assault on the unknown. The International Geophysical Year. London: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company: 408 -409. 
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composite SAE471 and Morton Rubin in the third expedition,m wintering at Mirny 
during the IGY. In Moscow at the SCAR meeting, the Soviets invited the Danish 
delegate to send a scientist on the next SAE after the IGy.473 At their urging, 
Afanasiev prepared a draft resolution to include both a Polish and a Danish scientist 
in the coming Soviet Antarctic expedition, which he sent off for approval to the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). However, 
the Central Committee was not quite as keen as Afanasiev, Somov and Burhanov to 
encourage fraternisation with Western scientists, and suggested that they find ways 
to 'tactfully deny permission' to the Danish scientist, but it was happy to approve the 
Eastern bloc representative from Poland.474 For the Australians, who continued to be 
wary of Soviet plans in the Antarctic, 'the introduction of additional bloc scientists 
into Antarctic research is noteworthy, in view of persistent Soviet desires to broaden 
accession to the A[ntarctic] T[reaty] to be negotiated in October 1959.,475 
The wariness of the Australian government was not allayed by the decision to 
continue international geophysical co-operation in 1959. It was placed in a situation 
whereby the USSR was 'presented with an "official" excuse to remain' in the 
AAT.476 The Australian government had previously 'welcomed' the Soviet scientists 
onto the territory it claimed on the Antarctic continent for the period of the IOY, 
even though the Soviets·refused to acknowledge any c1aims.477 It had hoped that the 
Soviet scientists would leave at the conclusion of the IGY, but now felt the need to 
once again attempt to gain recognition of its claim by 'conveying to the government 
471 Cartwright, G. 1958. I lived with the Russians in Antarctica. The Saturday Evening Post, 1958, 18 
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of the USSR their approval for the continuance of scientific research by Soviet 
scientists in the AA T.'478 By agreeing to these activities, the Australian government 
wished to make it clear that it reserved its position in relation to the AA T. This 
Australian 'approval' was certainly not in answer to any Soviet request for 
permission, since the USSR was insistent that it recognized no claims. The Soviet 
lawyer Movchan relates Khruschev's reply to Melbourne's The Herald newspaper 
correspondent of 23 June 1958, who asked the Soviet leader to comment on the 
alarm about Australian sovereignty caused by the Soviet request 'to prolong the 
Russian scientists' stay in the Antarctic'. Khrushchev told the journalist that his 
question 'seems to be based on a misunderstanding. We have not made any such 
request to anyone': the USSR had never requested Australian permission to conduct 
research in the Antarctic. He explained that the continuing Soviet presence on the icy 
continent was decided 'at the meeting of the special committee on Antarctic 
investigations under the International Council of Scientific Unions, held at The 
Hague in February this year' and not on the permission of a claimant whose claims 
were not recognized by either the USSR or the USA. Moreover, he reiterated the 
Soviet position that 'according to international practice, all interested countries 
should take part in discussing the question of jurisdiction over any area of 
international importance. The Soviet government considers that this international 
practice should be followed in deciding the question of jurisdiction over the 
Antarctic.'479 
Meanwhile, at the SCAR meeting in Moscow (4 - 11 August 1958), the 
USSR reported that it was in the process of forming a new National Antarctic 
Committee, since Australia, Belgium, France, Japan, New Zealand and South Africa 
had already formed their own. The USA already had a Polar Committee that would 
478 Brady, G. 1959. To the Secretary, Department of External Affairs. 13 May 1959. Antarctica -
Notes to Polish and Soviet Governments (Transfer of Soviet Station at Bunger's Oasis). A note of the 
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act as a National Antarctic Committee for the purposes of SCAR. The USSR 
intended to continue work at existing bases but reduce work at Oasis and close 
Pionerskaya, [which was in fact closed on 17 November 1958 and transferred to the 
Polish Academy of Science on 23 January 1959 who renamed it Dobrovolski in 
honour of the Polish geophysicist and Antarctic explorer 480 and move Sovetskaya to 
the Pole of Inaccessibility in October or November 1958. A traverse from Vostok to 
the South Pole and back to Sovetskaya was also planned, as well as establishing 
small bases south of the Bellingshausen Sea and Dronning Maud Land which would 
assist the transcontinental traverse planned for the future. 481 The Soviet intention to 
set up a small base on the Bellingshausen coast in the unclaimed sector of Antarctica 
raised questions as to whether motivations of a political nature lay behind their 
intention. The Australians in particular were unsure of Soviet intentions: they 
recognized that they 'may indicate a Soviet desire to establish some connection 
between present Soviet scientific work in the Antarctic and the explorations of 
Bellingshausen early in the 19th century, with a view to an eventual Soviet claim to 
territory in the sector.'482 Overall, however, the Australians now acknowledged that 
it was important 'to ensure the continuation of the co-ordination of international 
scientific programmes in Antarctica which had proved so effective during the IGY 
and to foster the admirable spirit of international friendship and co-operation which 
had grown up. The establishment of SCAR placed Antarctic research on a firm long~ 
term footing for the first time in Polar history. ,483 
Among other investigations proposed by the USSR at the SCAR meeting was 
a comprehensive, coordinated mapping program with various nations co-operating to 
produce a map of Antarctica on a scale of 1 :3,000,000484 with the aid of aero 
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photography. Australia revealed its insecurity with regard to the Soviet proposal by 
attempting to stall this initiative, which would allow the Soviets to utilize their 
superior logistic capabilities to map the AA T on which they had built their bases. 
The AAT had not yet been extensively mapped by the Australians themselves, and 
their claim to the territory may have been significantly weakened if the Soviets were 
the ones responsible for producing a map of the area claimed by Australia. K. Bullen, 
the Australian delegate, declared that he was unable to discuss the matter without his 
government's approval. The majority of the other delegates, however, agreed to the 
proposal,485 and Australia had no alternative but to accept the formation of a 
cartography working group under the chairmanship of Georges Laclavere. Australia 
not only resigned itself to the Soviet proposal, but played host to the Third SCAR 
meeting in Canberra on 2 - 6 March 1959, where the Soviet delegate Somov and his 
adviser Boris Dzerdzeyevsky gave impetus to the proposal by asking that preparation 
of the I :3,000,000 map of Antarctica be begun without delay.486 Ironically, the 
Australian Director of National Mapping, Bruce Lambert, was appointed hthe new 
post of Permanent Secretary of the Working Group on Cartography.487 
7. 4 Conclusion 
The eagerness with which the USSR embraced US and other initiatives in 
international scientific collaboration and introduced its own grand proposals was a 
consistent policy followed by the USSR as a consequence of its determination to 
solve the political question of its participation in any international regime for the 
Antarctic. The goodwill engendered by such international collaboration had provided 
the USSR with a mechanism for continuing to engage in high quality research in the 
Antarctic, and the means by which to extend and maintain a significant presence in 
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Moscow 4-11 August 1958]. Moscow: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Economiki [Russian State 
Economics Archives] RGAE, File 9570, op 2, ed 2594. 
486 SCAR Bulletin 1959, 3 (September): 593; Somov, M. 1959 Tretiya sessiya spetsialnogo kom·iteta 
po Antarkticheskim issledovaniyam v Kanberre 2-6 Marta 1959 [Third session of SCAR in Canberra 
2-6 March 1959]. Iiformatsionniy Bulleten Sovetskoi Antarkticheskoi Expeditsii [Information bulletin 
of the Soviet Antarctic expedition] 1959, No 8. : 32. 
487 Gunson, N. 1963. Australian Antarctic Territory. In Greenwood, G. and N. Harper. Australia in 
world affairs /956-/960. Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire: 397. 
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the region. This meant that it had become impossible to exclude the. USSR from any 
scientific, and ultimately from any political, discussions about the future of the 
Antarctic as the US had attempted to do with its 1948 proposal for an 
internationalization of Antarctica.488 As regards the scientific discussions, 
enthusiastic Soviet support of the short term CSAGI and the long term SCAR had 
given the USSR a substantial voice in formulating research programs in the 
Antarctic. Although the SCAR was merely a scientific. body that wielded no 
executive power, it became the instrument which could 'ensure the continuation of 
the co-ordination of international scientific programs in Antarctica which had proved 
so effective during the IGy.'489 The creation of such an instrument had repercussions 
which extended much wider than the world's scientific community; Gunson contends 
that 'the fact that world scientists consider the Antarctic such an important field for 
scientific research has had a powerful influence on political thinking. ,490 Thus, the 
ICSU decision to create the SCAR was pivotal in accelerating and focussing the 
political processes that would lead to an international agreement on the Antarctic. 
Hall considers that the Soviet announcement in Stockholm regarding the USSR's 
continuing presence in the Antarctic was' a crucial turning point on the path toward a 
conference on Antarctica and, ultimately, an Antarctic agreement.'491 His view is 
confirmed by Soviet international law expert Vladimir Golitsyn, who writes more 
generally that the international cooperation achieved during the IGY had laid the 
groundwork for both the creation of the SCAR and indeed of a future agreement on 
the Antarctic. 492 
And of course the answer to the rhetorical question of whether the Soviets 
would 'abandon Mirny to the penguins after 1959 ... or will they stay?' was becoming 
488 Hall, R. 1994. International regime fonnation and leadership. The origins of the Antarctic Treaty. 
Thesis. Doctor of Philosophy, University of Tasmania: 81 - 82. 
489 Burhanov, V. 1958. Doklad ot 14 Avgusta 1958 ob 'uchastii Sovetskoi delegatsii v rabote 
Spetsialnogo Komiteta po Antarkticheskim issledovaniyam s 4 po II Avgusta 1958 v Moskve [Report 
of 14 August 1958 about the participation of the Soviet delegation in the deliberations of SCAR in 
Moscow 4-11 August 1958]. Moscow, Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Economiki [Russian State 
Economics Archives I RGAE, File 9570, op 2, ed 2594. 
490 Gunson, N. 1963. Australian Antarctic Territory. In Greenwood, G. and N. Harper. Australia in 
world affairs 1956-1960. Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire: 396. 
491 Hall, R. 1994. International Regime Fonnation and Leadership: The Origins of the Antarctic 
Treaty. Thesis, Doctor of Philosophy. Hobart, University of Tasmania: 154. 
492 Golitsyn, V. 1983. Antarktika: mezhdunarodno-pravovoi rezhim {Antarctica: international legal 
regime]. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie otnosheniya (International relations Press): 37. 
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more and more obvious. The stake that the Soviets had placed on science to achieve 
their Antarctic political interests was paying dividends, and they believed that they 
should continue to play their winning card. While relaxing in Sydney after the 
conclusion of the Third SCAR meeting III Canberra, the Soviet delegate 
Dzerdzeyevskiy, was able to finally show his hand to the journalist who had 
originally posed the question: '[a]s long as there is need for scientific investigation, 
the Soviet expedition will be in Antarctica.,493 
The following chapter explores the thinking of both political and scientific 
figures in the USSR that helped shape Soviet scientific investigation of the Antarctic 
after the IOY. The political perspective is e~emplified by the deputy chairman of the 
USSR Council of Ministers and member of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union Aleksei Kosygin, and the scientific perspective by the 
deputy director of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute Mikhail Somov. The 
fact that there was interplay between both viewpoints when planning the Soviet post 
IOY Antarctic programs shows that political considerations did not always prevail 
over the scientific, with national prestige being an area where their interests 
overlapped. 
493 Su~ Herald, Sydney, 15 March 1959. 
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8 
SOVIET ANTARCTIC PLANS AFTER THE IGY: CHANGES IN 
POLlCy494 
The distinguished American academic Christopher Joyner concluded in 1991 
that '[t)he Soviet Union's polar policies are products of its national interests. As 
such, they mirror the Soviet government's foreign policy objectives and international 
priorities' .495 
Soviet foreign policy objectives in regard to the North Polar region were most 
forcefully set out in a report ill 1945 by the first deputy director of the Arctic 
Maksimov (19 \0 1977) (Fig. 40. 
(http://www.aari.aq/default en. hlm\) to the 
deputy chief and head of the political 
department of the Glavsevmorput [Northern 
Sea Directorate) Valerian Novikov, where 
Maksimov stresses the importance of 
preserving the priority of Soviet research and 
exploration in the North Polar region. He saw 
this priority as being under threat from 
'powerful and active competitors' in Northern 
America who were displaying a 'rapidly 
growing interest' in the Arctic.496 During the 
mid 1940s these competitors, specifically, the 
'94 This chapter is based on a paper which is in Press in Polar Record, doi: 
10.10 17/S0032247 .409008456. 
,., Joyner, C. 1991 . A comparison of Soviet Arctic and Antarctic politics. In: Brigharn, L. (Ed.). The 
Soviet Maritime Arctic. London: Belhaven Press: 298. 
'96 Maksimov, I. 1945. Dokladnaya zapiska zamestitelyu nachalnika Glavsevmorputi pri SNK SSSR 
V. Novikovu, Sentyabr 1945 [Report to the Deputy Director of Glavsevmorput at the Council of the 
People's Commissars, V. Novikov, September 1945). Moscow, Russia: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy 
Archiv sotsialno politicheskoi istorii [Russian State Archives for Social and Political History), File 
475,op I, d 43: 196. 
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US and Canada, were already in the process of organizing the Arctic Institute of 
North America, which was to be based in Montreal, Canada.497 
While concentrating attention on practical aspects of Arctic research, 
especially on increasing the possibility of sea and air transport, the director of the 
ARI Viktor Buinitskiy (1911 - 1980) (Fig. 41 (http://www.aari.ag/defaulten.html)) 
recognized that a wider study of both Polar regions would lead to a greater 
understanding of the earth' s atmospheric 
processes. To this end, at a meeting at the 
ARI in November 1945 dedicated to the 
25 th jubilee of its foundation, he proposed 
that 'Soviet scientists embark on systematic 
research in the Antarctic by establishing a 
permanent geophysical observatory, 
particularly in the area of the South 
Pole.'498 At the time, Buinitskiy' s bold 
proposal fell on barren ground, since the 
USSR's polar policy was much more 
focussed on expanding the economic 
potential of the Soviet Arctic; it had not yet 
given serious consideration to the South 
Polar region, although the commencement 
of operations of the Soviet Slava whaling flotilla in the Southern Ocean in 1946 
demonstrated that the possibility of obtaining economic benefits from that far flung 
part of the globe was certainly recognized. This chapter will examine the Soviet 
Antarctic policy which was being shaped in the concluding months of the IOY, when 
intersecting proposals for continuing international scientific cooperation and an 
international political regime for the Antarctic were being debated. Soviet 
government policy as outlined by the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of 
Ministers and member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) Aleksei Kosygin, and the aims of Soviet Antarctic scientists as 
m McDonald, R. 2005. Challenges and accomplishments: a celebration of the Arctic Institute of 
North America. Arctic 59 (4): 440. 
' 98 Buinitskiy, V. 1945. Osnovniye itogi i perspektivi nouchno-issledovatelskih rabot Arkticheskogo 
instituta [Main results and opportunities for scientific research of the Arctic institute). Moscow and 
Leningrad: Izdatelstvo Glavzevrnorputi (Glavsevrnorput Press): 13. 
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envisaged by the deputy director of the by now renamed Arctic and Antarctic 
Research Institute (AARI) Mikhail Somov did not always coincide. This' chapter 
illustrates the different political and scientific perspectives and demonstrates that 
post IGY Antarctic policy was ultimately shaped by a compromise between the two 
viewpoints. 
S. Wolk, writing in the Bulletin oJ the institute Jor the study oJ the Soviet 
Union in 1958, argues that the commencement of operations of the Slava flotilla was 
in fact 'the first practical Soviet step towards getting a foothold in the Antarctic after 
the ratification on 20 November 1946 of a new international convention on 
whaling' .499 By 1958, the flotilla consisted of fifteen vessels: ten whale hunting 
vessels, four to tow the carcasses and one, the Gorbach (Russian: humpback whale) 
fitted out for conducting biological, oceanographic and meteorological research.500 
'A group of scientists from the All-Union Research Institute of Marine Fishery and 
Oceanography (VNIRO) has accompanied [the flotilla], studying, in addition to 
problems peculiar to the whaling industry, the natural features and climate of the 
Antarctic. ,501 Although scientific research was already being carried out on the 
whaling flotilla in the Southern Ocean, according to the perverse Stalinist logic of the 
time, Buinitskiy's 'fantastic plans of an expedition ... to the Antarctic' to conduct 
research and establish an observatory were alleged to be an avenue for his own self-
aggrandizement. 502 After the end of World War II when relations between the USSR 
and the West rapidly deteriorated, Stalin made a decision to abolish all interactions 
of Soviet citizens with countries outside the Eastern bloc.503 The Ministry of State 
Control was instructed to ensure that all government institutions complied with the 
499 Wolk, S. 1958. The basis of Soviet claims in the Antarctic. Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of 
the USSR 5: 44. 
'00 Tryoshnikov, A. 1963. Istoriya otkritiya i issledovaniya Antarktidi [History of the discovery and 
investigation of Antarctica]. Moscow: Geografizdat (Geographical Literature Press): 394. 
SOl Wolk, S. 1958. The basis of Soviet claims in the Antarctic. Bulletin of the Institutefor the Study of 
the USSR 5: 44. 
'.2 Timofeev, 1947. Doklad 0 reshenii kollegii Glavsevmorputi ot 26.09 [1947] 0 vipolnenii 
postanovleniya partsobraniya Arkticheskogo institute ot 1.08.1947 po delu professorov Kluevoi i 
Roskina [Report of the Glavsevmorput board decision regarding the implementation of the party 
meeting resolution of 1.08.1947 concerning the case of professors Klyueva and Roskin]. Moscow, 
Russia: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv sotsialno politicheskoi istorii [Russian State Archives for 
Social and Political History], File 475, op I, d 43: 17. 
'.3 See Pollock, E. 2006. Stalin and the Soviet science wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
269 p. 
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new edict, to which end in September 1947 the Ministry conducted an audit of the 
ARl in Leningrad. According to the auditors, Buinitskiy and other ARI staff had 
divulged scientific data 'which were considered to be state secrets ' and had 
corresponded and exchanged publications with western colleagues. Based on these 
revelations, the USSR Council of Ministers ordered that Buinitskiy stand trial in a 
Communist Party 'court of honour' to answer the charges against him.504 Predictably, 
the court found Buinitskiy guilty as charged and relieved him of his position as 
director of the ARl. As a fmal humiliation, his manuscripts were burned. sos 
However, his ideas for Antarctic research were conveniently remembered by 
Professor Vladimir Vize (1886 - 1954) (Fig. 42) on 10 February 1949 at a meeting of 
the USSR All - Union Geographical Society. 
Fig. 42. Vladimir Vize (http://www.aari.ag/defaulten.htm!) 
Buinitskiy's proposal for an observatory on the icy continent was brought up 
as evidence of the USSR's ongoing interest in the region during the Society's 
S04 Timofeev 1947. Doklad 0 reshenii kollegii Glavsevrnorputi ot 26.09 [1947] 0 vipolnenii 
postanovleniya partsobraniya Arkticheskogo institute ot 1.08.1947 po delu professorov Kluevoi i 
Roskina [Report of the Glavsevrnorput board decision regarding the implementation of the party 
meeting resolution of 1.08.1947 concerning the case of professors Klyueva and Roskin] . Moscow, 
Russia: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv sotsialno politicheskoi istorii [Russian State Archives for 
Social and Political History], File 475, op I, d 43: 14 - 15. 
so, Boiko, L. 2007. Ot vseya Rossii blagodarnost i vechnaya v svete slava [From the whole of Russia: 
gratitude and eternal glory]. Unpublished manuscript (copy in possession of author). 
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deliberations about the US proposal for an international regime for the Antarctic 
which attempted to exclude the participation of the USSR.506 
The US attempt to exclude the USSR was the catalyst that drove the Soviet 
government into giving serious consideration to its foreign policy objectives in 
regard to the South Polar region.507First and foremost, these objectives were directed 
at gaining a voice in the formation of any 'proposed international regime, and in the 
initial stages, Soviet scientists were at the forefront of formulating and directing this 
policy.508 The meeting of the USSR All - Union Geographical Society on 10 
February 1949 helped develop the argument for the priority of Russian discoveries in 
the Antarctic and attempted to demonstrate the continuity of that inte'rest from the 
time of Bellingshausen's expedition in 1819 - 1821. The resolutions adopted by the 
meeting were mirrored in the note of the Soviet government of 7 June 1950 to the 
Argentine, Australian, British, French, New Zealand, Norwegian and the US 
governments, which insisted on the right of the USSR to participate in the discussion 
and solution of all problems relating to the Antarctic.509 Later, during preparations 
for the IGY, the USSR Academy of Sciences and many other scientific research 
institutions were recruited to help draw up and contribute to the national Antarctic 
research program. Toward the latter part of the. IGY, however, the parlous state of 
the Soviet living standards and economy was such that the government felt it 
necessary to undertake a reassessment of its whole national economic and 
agricultural policy by calling for an extraordinary Congress of the CPSU, which was 
506 Berg, L. 1949. Russkiye otkritiya v Antarktike i sovremenniiy interes k nei [Russian discoveries in 
the Antarctic and present-day interests).lzvestiya Vsesoyuznogo geograficheskogo obschestva (Report 
of the All Union Geographical Society 2: 145. 
507 For how this affected Soviet scientists and Stalin's influence on post war Soviet science, see 
Pollock, E. 2006. Stalin and the Soviet science wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 269 p. 
508 Gan, l. in Press. The Soviet preparation for the IGY Antarctic program and the Australian 
response: politics and science. Santiago, Chile. Paper prepared for the second SCAR workshop on the 
history of Antarctic research entitled 'Multidimensional exploration of Antarctica around the 1950s', 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Santiago, Chile, 21-22 September 2006; Gan 2009. 'Will the 
Russians abandon Mirny to the penguins after 1959 ... or will they stay'? Polar Record 45 (233): 167-
175. 
509 USSR 1949. Resolution of 10 February 1949 concerning Antarctica adopted by the All-Union 
Geographical Society. In: Bush, W. 1982. Antarctica and Intermitional Law. A Collection of inter-
state and National Documents, vol 3. London-Rome-New York: Ocean Publications Inc.: 207-208; 
USSR 1950. Soviet Memorandum of 7 June 1950 on the participation of the Soviet Union in any 
international settlement concerning Antarctica. In: Bush, W. 1982. Antarctica and International Law. 
A Collection of inter-state and National Documents, vol 3. London-Rome-New York: Ocean 
Publications Inc.: 208-209; Wolk, S. 1958. The basis of Soviet claims in the Antarctic. Bulletin of the 
Institute of the Study of the USSR 5: 45. 
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to take place from 27 January to 5 February 1959. Antarctic policy, though not high 
on the list of priorities, was one of the questions addressed during preparations for 
the Congress. As one time Professor of Political Science at Kent State University 
Boleslaw Boczek pointed out, 'at the political level, Soviet Antarctic activities are 
coordinated and supervised by superior government and party organs' . 510 
Consequently, on about 29 September 1958, the deputy chairman of the USSR 
Council of Ministers and member of the Central Committee of the CPSU Aleksei 
Kosygin (1904 - 1980) wrote (presumably to the Interdepartmental Committee on 
Antarctic Research) a set of instructions outlinirig the USSR government's view on 
the question of Soviet Antarctic activities, which will be discussed in this chapter. 
Soviet planning and economic organs were instructed to prepare a draft plan 
for a seven year period, from 1959 to 1965, which was presented to a one day 
plenum of the Central Committee on 12 November 1959. The plan was approved and 
later published as 'theses' for a report by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (1894 
- 1971) to the XXI" Congress of the CPSU (Fig. 43).511 The 'theses' made the 
ideological point that 'the seven-year plan for the development of the national 
economy of the USSR for 1959 - 1965 will represent a decisive stage in the creation 
of the material and technical basis of communism' and emphasised a greater 
economic competition with the West, particularly the US. An economic victory for 
the socialist system was seen as a guarantor of world peace and international 
relations were to be systematically directed towards a peaceful foreign policy, 
reducing international tensions and strengthening socialism and friendship between 
the socialist bloc countries.512 This much more specifically national economic 
interest, together with the desire for 'peaceful foreign policy', which, at least in 
relation to Antarctica, was made more likely by the positive experience of 
international cooperation of the IOY, was becoming apparent when the Soviet 
government turned its attentions to the future of its activities in the Antarctic. 
SlO Boczek, B. 1984. Soviet Union and the Antarctic Treaty. The American Journal of International 
Law 78 (4): 844. . 
511 Conquest, R. 1961. Power and Policy in the USSR. The study of Soviet Dynasties. London: 
MacMillan and Co Lld: 360. 
512 Pravda. Moscow, 28 January 1959. 
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Fig. 43. Nikita Khruschev (http://www.gopb.ruIlibrary/exibitionl20s.htm) 
At this time, political questions regarding an international regime for 
Antarctica were very much at the forefront of the Soviet government's Antarctic 
agenda, as was the desire to maintain a scientific presence in the region. Wolk 
contends that '[t]here appears little reason to doubt that the motive for the newly 
found interest in Antarctica is not economic or scientific, but political, especially in 
view of the region' s military and strategic importance in the event ofa major conflict 
with the West.,513 The documentary evidence suggests that while the political factor 
was indeed of primary importance, there is nothing to suggest that the Soviets had 
any intention of using the Antarctic for military purposes, although they certainly did 
recognize its strategic significance. They were keenly aware of the fact that the US, 
by keeping them out of the region and playing a leading role in any international 
Antarctic regime, would unquestionably gain a strategic and military advantage. 
Obviously, the militarization of the Antarctic was not ruled out by the American 
Defense Force. This is shown by the studies conducted in defence educational 
institutions by military personnel, for example L. Beall's thesis 'Strategic Importance 
of the Antarctic' submitted to the Air War College (AWC) in April 1959 and H. 
Croswell's 'Antarctica: Strategic Asset or Political Liability?, submitted to the same 
institution in May 1958.514 
'" Wolk, S. 1958. The basis of Soviet claims in the AD!arctic. Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of 
the USSR 5: 48; Sullivan, W. 1957. Antarctica in a Two-Power World. Foreign Affairs 36: 154-166. 
'" Mann, E. 1974. National security policy for the Antarctic. Alabama: Air University: 88,90. 
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Active and extensive Soviet participation in the IGY was, however, making 
the possibility of excluding the USSR from involvement in any decision making 
process regarding an international regime for the Antarctic more remote. 515 This 
reality was now recognized by the US, and its note of 2 May 1958 'to the Foreign 
Ministers of each of the eleven other countries participating in the IGY activities in 
Antarctica: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, South Africa, the USSR, and the United Kingdom,516 inviting them to 
participate in a conference on Antarctica confirmed that the USSR was now being 
taken seriously as an interested party. The purpose of the conference 'to join together 
in the conclusion of a treaty' to assure freedom of scientific investigation and 'to 
ensure that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only,517 was consistent with the 
desires of the iJSSR. In its reply of 2 June 1958 518 the USSR agreed in principle 
with the aims of such a conference and, understandably, accepted the invitation, 
since this was exactly the outcome that it had been seeking. A discussion of 
preparations for the Antarctic conference is beyond the scope of this chapter, but a 
comprehensive and well researched analysis of the events leading up to the US 
invitation and the progress towards an Antarctic Treaty can be found in Robert Hall's 
unpublished doctoral dissertation entitled 'International regime formation and 
leadership: the origins of the Antarctic Treaty.'519 
Intersecting with the US proposal for an Antarctic Conference was the 
. 
proposal to extend international Antarctic scientific cooperation after the conclusion 
of the IGY. At previous international scientific gatherings, Soviet scientists had 
515 See Hall, R. 1994. International Regime Fonnation and Leadership: The Origins of the Antarctic 
Treaty. Thesis. Doctor of Philosophy, University of Tasmania; Gan, 1. 2009. 'Will the Russians 
abandon Mirny to the penguins after 1959 ... or will they stay'? Polar Record 45 (233): 167-175. 
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517 Ibid. 
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indicated a strong interest in continuing Antarctic research. 52o As a result, on 11 Jul~ 
1958 the USSR Council of Ministers issued a decree according to which the USSR 
Interdepartmental Committee suggested to the Comite Special de I' Annee 
Geophysique Internationale (CSAGI), which was to meet in Moscow from 30 May -
9 August 1958 of that year, to extend the IGY for one year (from 1 January till 31 
December 1959). The decree also directed the Minister of the Merchant Fleet, Viktor 
Bakaev (1902 - 1987), to take into budgetary consideration the new obligations 
which were taken on by the USSR during the IGY extension. The direction was 
passed down the line by the acting chief of the Glavsevmorput, Vasiliy Burhanov 
(1908 - 1982) who wrote to the acting director of the AARI, Pavel Gordienko (1913 -
1982), instructing him to start planning the implementation of the new 
commitments.521 The CSAGI decision to extend the IGY by one year and name it the 
year of International Geophysical Cooperation (lGC) was seen by the 'official 
historian of the AARI' Belov,522 as in effect extending research for a period much 
longer than one year, i.e. until the International Quiet Sun Year of 1964 - 1965.523 
This is significant in that the extension of the IGY and the American proposal for a 
conference on Antarctica were international developments favourable to Soviet 
interests. These latest realities now needed to be incorporated into government 
discussions. about new opportunities opening up for Soviet Antarctic strategy, 
particularly in view of the government's seven year plan which was to be presented 
at the XXI" Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in early 1959. 
8. 1 Kosygin's instructions 
In the process of preparing the seven year plan, the deputy chairman of the 
USSR Council of Ministers and member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 
Aleksei Kosygin requested the Interdepartmental Committee to 'prepare a' 
520 Gan, I. 2009. "Will the Russians abandon Mirny to the penguins after 1959 ... or will they stay"? 
Polar Record 45 (233): 167-175. 
'" Burhanov, V. 1958.1.0. Direktora AANll P. Gordienko, 23 Avgusta 1958 [To the acting Director 
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Economiki (Russian State Economics Archives) RGAE, File 9570, op 2, ed hr 2595. 
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523 Belov, M. 1969. Istoriya otkritiya i issledovaniya [History of discovery and exploration]. In: 
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154 
comprehensive memorandum about our Antarctic operations' which would formulate 
long term plans for Antarctic research and specify allocations for each year 'at least 
until 1965 '. The memorandum was to: 
• indicate what was achieved In 1958; what plans were submitted to 
international bodies; and what was envisaged for 1959; 
• provide a basic outline of long term plans; which stations were to be 
maintained and which stations wound down; and 
• provide information about the operations of other countries in Antarctica and 
the Sub-Antarctic; their expenditure; and the extent and thrust of their 
operations. 
The committee was also asked to prepare a draft of a decree of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU on the question of further Antarctic research endorsing the 
seven-year operations plan as well as 'the long term maintenance of our stations in 
Antarctica'. The instructions indicated the issues which were to be considered in 
drafting the memorandum and the decree, and directed that 'this information should 
be provided to comrade Kosygin within one week, i. e. by the 6 October [1958]. ,524 
Fig. 44. Aleksei Kosygin (http://www.pravda.ruiphoto/report/kosigin-80/0D 
'" Kosygin, A. 1958. Ukazaniya tovarischa A.N. Kosygina [Comrade A.N. Kosygin's instructions]. 
Moscow, Russia: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Economiki (Russian State Economics Archives) 
RGAE, File 9570, op 2, ed hr 2595. 
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Kosygin (Fig. 44) was insistent that the key issue to be considered was the 
Soviet national interest: the Antarctic should not be viewed solely through the prism 
of Soviet IGY commitments, 'because in the future, operations in Antarctica will 
have a 60 - 70 percent bearing on the sovereignty of the Soviet Union and its right 
to take part i~ political discussions about the Antarctic.'S25 He suggested that the 
committee, when considering the direction of Antarctic research, should bear in mind 
'operations necessary for our nation, irrespective of whether they are part of the IGY 
program ... It is not strictly necessary to fulfil all our IGY commitments. The interests 
of our own country should be uppermost, whatever other countries may say of us. ,526 
Kosygin further suggested that Soviet operations should be relocated to ice free 
areas of exposed rock in locations 'which could be of interest' such as Queen Maud 
Land and the Bellingshausen Sea coast, particularly since West Germany and Italy 
were intending to conduct research in Queen Maud Land. Due to the fact that Soviet 
Antarctic operations had such strong international political ramifications, those 
responsible for implementing the Soviet Antarctic program were to 'liaise with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding operation plans and the establishment and 
maintenance of new stations.'527 
Joyner asserted that' [s ]ince 1958, the Soviet Union has worked steadily to 
bolster and firm up the legal basis for a claim in Antarctica, if someday that 
development were to become warranted.'528 That this was indeed the case can be 
construed from the fact that one of the Soviet aims was to establish bases that 
covered 'the entire continent' with a view to building up 'a legal basis for a possible 
future territorial claim. This time it would rest not just on discovery, but on extensive 
exploratory, scientific and similar activities,.which [were spreading] from the initial 
bases in the Australian sector to all other parts of the continent.'529 Joyner's 
reasoning was based on post IGY Soviet Antarctic activities, which had 'taken on a 
'" Kosygin. A. 1958. Ukazaniya tovarischa A.N. Kosygina [Comrade A.N. Kosygin's instructions]. 
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multifaceted character through more extensive and enhanced scientific, exploratory 
and research-related activities throughout the continent.,530 Colonel Frank G Klotz, 
one time Research Fellow' at the US National Defense University, considered that, 
paradoxically, it seemed that the IGY 'gentleman's agreement' between those 
participants having Antarctic territorial claims and those who had not made a claim 
(whereby their IGY activities were to have no bearing on any future claims) had in 
fact given 'the claimants - as well as the United States and the Soviet Union -
greater legal ammunition· for asserting title to the Antarctic territory.'531 To add to 
this 'legal ammunition', Kosygin urged that Soviet researchers concentrate their 
attention 'on the applied practical goals of their research: in the first instance to 
conduct aerial photography of the entire coast in order that the Soviet Union obtain a 
reliable map of the coastline with its bays, inlets, mountain ranges, submarine 
contours and the hydrological and biological characteristics of Antarctic waters,.532 
. The question of mapping the Antarctic continent and its waters was one which was 
seen by the Soviets as 'reinforcing the leading role of [our] researchers in Antarctic 
exploration,533 and, as a consequence, reinforcing any legal rights that may accrue 
from such exploration. The practical thrust of the proposed activities led Joyner to 
conclude that the USSR was also motivated by 'the prospects that these multifaceted 
activities will enhance the Soviet Union's future opportunities in securing access to 
hard minerals and hydrocarbons in the Antarctic, if indeed any are ever discovered 
and subsequently developed. ,534 
Joyner's analysis is probably closer to the mark than Wolk's; Wolk, after all, 
wrote his paper prior to the Conference on Antarctica and the signing of the 
Antarctic Treaty, which excluded the possibility of militarisation of the South Polar 
530 Joyner, C. 1991. A comparison of Soviet Arctic and Antarctic politics. In: Brigham, L. The Soviet 
Maritime Arctic. London: Belhaven Press: 296. 
531 Klotz, F. 1990. America on the Ice. Antarctic Policy Issues. Washington: National Defence 
University Press: 30. 
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Moscow, Russia: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Economiki (Russian State Economics Archives) 
RGAE, File 9570, op 2, ed hr 2595. 
S33 Lebedev, V. 1960. Spravka 0 podgotovke atlasa Antarktiki, 8 Avgusta 1960 [Memorandum 
regarding the preparation of an Antarctic Atlas, 8 August 1960]. Moscow, Russia: Rossiiskiy 
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regIOn. An article co-written by Vsevolod Polushkin (an engineer from the 
department of marine expeditions) and Sergei Ushakov (a member of the council for 
Antarctic research) which appeared in the Soviet magazine Tekhnika Molodezhi in 
March 1956 intimated that if any economically viable mineral or oil deposits were 
discovered in the Antarctic, there 'is no doubt that they will be developed.' 535 
Although a note from the chief of the Glavsevmorput Burhanov and deputy chief 
Tolstikov to the Central Committee of the CPSU criticized the article on the basis 
that it may lead to a distorted view of Soviet Antarctic policy overseas536 (and 
resulted in a ban being placed on the dissemination of the magazine) it seems that 
after the enthusiastic international scientific cooperation of the IGY, the USSR was 
altering the course of its A!1tarctic research. Just as prior to the IGY the 'pursuit of 
expedition objectives that might substantiate national interests were major reasons 
for exploration activities in Antarctica,;537 after the conclusion of the IGY the USSR 
was realigning its oWn activities in line with these national interests. The change 
from 'pure' science to a more practical approach is clearly evident in Kosygin's 
'Instructions', which note with approval the whale studies conducted ~y the Soviet 
marine expedition.538 Kosygin praises the help rendered to the Slava whaling fleet by 
the expedition ship Ob in locating areas with large whale populations and 
recommends that such close collaboration continue in the future. 
More importantly, he emphasizes the necessity of compiling not only 
geographical, but also geological maps of ice free areas which would identify 'useful 
resources'. The. results of this more practical research were to be used solely for the 
benefit of the USSR, and for that reason Kosygin displays certain sensitivity about 
sharing the results of Soviet research with other nations involved in the Antarctic. He 
suggests that Soviet scientists '[play particular regard to collecting reciprocal data so 
that our publications contain data equivalent to that received by our country' and 
'" Polushkin, V. and S. Ushakov 1956.44 coprosma pod Antarktide [44 questions about Antarctica]. 
rekhnika Molodezhi 2 (March) 1956: 8. 
,,, Burhanov, V. and E. Tolstikov. 1956. V Tsentralny Komitet KPSS tOY. Pegovu, 29 Marta 1956. 
[To the Central Committee of the CPSU, 29 March 1956, attn. comrade Pegov]. Moscow, Russia:. 
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components. 
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raises the question of processing and publishing data 'bearing in mind our 
international obligations as well as the interests of our country', concluding that 
'perhaps we shouldn't publish geological findings and characteristics, especially if 
we don't receive others' work in retum.'539 This policy of quid pro quo was more or 
less consistently applied in the exchange of data with other countries, and on 
occasion was a source of frustration for other national expeditions attempting to 
extract information from the Soviets about the research results of their Antarctic 
programme. However, other countries also applied such a policy in regard to the 
Soviets when they did not receive equivalent data. For example, the Australian 
Department of External Affairs reminded Dr. Fred Jacka,' chief scientist of the 
Australian Antarctic Division that '[y ]ou will be aware of the Prime Minister's 
circular memorandum of 1956 relating to exchange with Iron Curtain countries, and 
: the instruction that information may only be transmitted from Australia when there is 
reciprocal exchange which is equal in value. The evident reluctance of the Russians 
to meet your request must necessarily result in a curtailment in data supplied by 
Australia' . 540 
Kosygin had urged Soviet scientists to 'thoroughly research the set-up of 
similar foreign observatories, expeditions and stations, analyse their operations, 
review their programmes in relation to. ours and apply what is rational in their 
technology and organization to our observatories and stations.'541 This, of course, 
was not an unusual practice for Antarctic researchers of all countries: the Director of 
the Australian Antarctic programme, Phillip Law also 'asked all members of the 
[Australian] Expeditions (sic)' to write short reports at the end ofa visit to the Soviet 
Mirny station 'on subjects in which they were competent'. Earlier, the Australians 
had drawn on the experience of the first Soviet traverse into the interior of tiJe 
continent; the officer in charge of the Australian Mawson station in 1957 Keith 
Mather wrote that the Australians were able 'to draw on Russian experience witiJ 
". Kosygin, A. 1958. Ukazaniya tovarischa A.N. Kosygina [Comrade A.N. Kosygin's instructions]. 
Moscow, Russia: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Economiki (Russian State Economics Archives) 
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541 Kosygin, A. 1958. Ukazaniya tovarischa A.N. Kosygina [Comrade A.N. Kosygin's instructions]. 
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long-distance heavy tractor transport on the Antarctic plateau' which 'proved useful 
when we undertook our inland journey several months later.,542 From their side, the 
Soviets showed interest in the construction of the Australian station which 'was built 
. from light, fireproof alloys and very well equipped. ,543 
An additional concern for Kosygin was to reduce the substantial government 
funding required to continue the Soviet presence in the Antarctic. During the IGY, 
the USSR government placed 'virtually no financial restrictions' on the Soviet 
Antarctic expedition.544 However, the parlous state of Soviet agriculture and the 
reassessment of economic priorities in the new seven year plan necessitated a 
tightening of purse strings. The USSR had by that time also embarked on extensive 
and very expensive research and development of its space program and various types 
of military ballistic missiles.545 In addition, it had resumed nuclear weapons tests 
after a short hiatus in response to 'a long series of tests' conducted by the US and 
Great Britain in the summer of 1958,546 which measures required a huge government 
outlay and were considered to have a greater significance for national security than 
Antarctic scientific research. 547 Kosygin called for the committee to 'come to the 
conclusion about the necessity of curtailing the extent of Soviet [Antarctic 1 
542 Mather, K. 1957. ANARE Executive Planning Committee report on USSR Antarctic station at 
Mirny, September 1957. Kingston, Tasmania, Australia: Australian Antarctic Division Library Special 
Collection; Gan in Press. Towards the great unknown: The Soviets prepare for their thrust into the 
Antarctic interior. Ohio, USA. Paper prepared for the third SCAR workshop on the history of 
Antarctic research entitled 'National and transnational agendas in Antarctic Research from the 1950s 
and beyond', 8yrd Polar Research Center, Columbus, Ohio, USA, 25-26 October 2007. 
543 Afanasiev, A. 1962. V Ministerstvo Morskogo Flota. Savinovu, 8 Yanvarya 1962 [To the Ministry 
of the Merchant Fleet. Radiogram to Savinov. 8 January 1962]. Moscow, Russia: Rossiiskiy 
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operations and the corresponding outlay.' 548 He was quite specific In his 
recommendations about how this was to be done. The committee was to: 
• reconsider the necessity of the USSR's IGY commitment of establishing a 
station at the Pole ofInaccessibility; 
• consider winding up the continental stations and reducing operations at Mirny 
observatory; 
• decrease the size of the expedition considerably, possibly to about 145-150 
people; 
• press ahead with more active seasonal work in the favourable summer period 
and have fewer people wintering, no more than the Americans (80 - 84 
people); 
• reconsider the advisability of undertaking a transantarctic traverse; 
• change over to air transport in the future with shipping only being used for 
heavy cargo; 
• restrict expenditure on the Antarctic to no more than 50 million roubles for 
1959, 45 million roubles for 1960 and 35 million roubles or even 25 million 
roubles for the following years; and 
• transfer Soviet stations intended for closure to Eastern bloc countries such as 
Poland and Czechoslovakia if they were willing to take them. 
The interdepartmental committee's reply to Kosygin's instructions were not 
found in the archives, but by examining the directions that Soviet research was 
taking in the Antarctic, it is possible to gauge the effect of his instructions on future 
Soviet Antarctic activity. The interdepartmental committee had already confirmed 
the Soviet plans at the international" CSAGI assembly and associated SCAR meeting 
in Moscow on 4 - 11 August 1958549 prior to receiving Kosygin's instructions. 
Although the instructions broadly supported the thrust of the plans agreed to by the 
USSR national committee, they appeared to be steering the scientists to adopt a more 
frugal and less international slant to their research. However, the scientists, 
notwithstanding their Communist Party melT!bership and obligation to follow Party 
5" Kosygin, A. 1958. Ukazaniya tovarischa A.N. Kosygina [Comrade A.N. Kosygin's instructions]. 
Moscow, Russia: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Economiki (Russian State Economics Archives) 
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directives, demonstrated no great enthusiasm to curtail research or deviate from their 
international scientific obligations in the Antarctic. The deputy director of the AAR1 
Somov, who was responsible for Antarctic research shrewdly resisted Kosygin's 
suggestion to discontinue observations at the inner continental stations by using both 
scientific and political counterarguments. 
Fig. 45. Mikhail Somov (personal collection of Lev Savatyugin). 
From the perspective of scientific enquiry, Somov (Fig. 45) argued that 
Voslok station (Fig. 46), which was located at the South Geomagnetic Pole, was 'one 
the most important locations for studying the geophysical phenomena of our planet' 
and followed up with the politically fraught observation that its closure 'would be a 
blow to the prestige of the Soviet Union in Antarctic research, since the USA will 
continue observations on both its inner continental stations. ,550 
"" So·mov, M. 1959. Poyasnitelnaya zapiska k planu rabot 5 SAE 1959-1961 [Explanatory note about 
plans for the fifth SAE 1959-1961]5 May 1959. Moscow, Russia: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv 
Economiki (Russian State Economics Archives) RGAE, File 9570, op 2, ed hr 3759. 
Fig. 46. Igor Ruban. At Vostok station. Work at temperature -80. 
(http://www.ruban.rulpaintry/38.html) 
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He acknowledged the necessity of an extensive geographical and geological 
investigation of the Antarctic in order to discover areas suitable for future Soviet 
operations and made the observation that by postponing exploration of the 
Bellingshausen Sea, the USSR will lose its priority acquired by Bellingshausen's 
expedition and leave it open for the USA to entrench itself there 55t 
Likewise, the national prestige gained in being the first expedition to reach 
the Pole of Inaccessibility and being true to its international scientific conunitments 
was instrumental in the SAE being able to continue with its formidable task of 
building an ' official' IOY station and conducting observations in this remotest of 
locations. m The ' unprecedentedly difficult assault on the Pole of Relative 
Inaccessibility,553 resulted in opening the station on 14 December 1958 at a location 
82° 06' S, 54° 58 ' E, where meteorological, actinometrical and glaciological 
observations were conducted for the last two weeks of the IOY (Fig. 47). The fact 
that the station was actually opened, albeit for a short period of time, and that 
'" Somov, M. 1959. Poyasnitelnaya zapiska k planu rabot 5 SAE 1959-1961 [Explanatory note about 
plans for the fifth SAE 1959-1961 , 5 May 1959. Moscow, Russia: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv 
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Somov's argument for continuing operations at Vostok station ultimately prevailed 
over Kosygin' s suggestions was indicative of the influential role that scientists 
played in Soviet Antarctic policy. 
Fig. 47. Pole o/Inaccessibility station. Photo by V. Babarykin (AAD Library) 
8. 2 Impact on further Soviet Antarctic expeditions 
Despite the lack of enthusiasm of the scientists for the suggestion to curtail 
their activities in the Antarctic, Kosygin ' s instructions could not go unheeded. Prior 
to the instructions being issued, the acting chief of Glavsevmorput, Burhanov, wrote 
to the acting director of the AAR!, Gordienko, on 23 August 1958, asking him to 
start planning the implementation of the new international obl igations during the 
1959 fourth SAE. The fifth Assembly of the CSAGI recommended that all 
participant countries maintain the same level of research in 1959.554 However, on 19 
November 1958, immediately prior to the departure of the fourth SAE from 
Kaliningrad, plans were modified in line with Kosygin's instructions. The director of 
Glavsevmorput Aleksandr Afanasiev (1903 - 1991) ordered that ' in consideration of 
the cutbacks of the marine Antarctic expeditions and the reduced manpower of the 
continental Antarctic expedition', measures be taken to sort through all the 
' " Burhanov, V. 1958. 1.0. Direktora AANII P. Gordienko, 23 Avgusta 1958 [To the acting Director 
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equipment, specialized clothing and other materials which were ready to be loaded· 
and return the excess to the AARI for use in the Arctic.555 Structural changes had 
resulted in the expedition no longer having a separate marine component as was the 
case in the first three expeditions - the marine expedition had now been reduced to 
an oceanographic unit headed by the partially rehabilitated Buinitskiy on board the 
Ob. Another consequence of the cutbacks was the decommissioning of the Oasis 
station in the Bunger Oasis on 17 November 1958 and its transfer to the Polish 
Academy of Sciences on 23 January 1959.556 Observations were continued on the all-
year stations, the coastal Mirny and Vostok at the South Geomagnetic Pole; 
Komsomolskaya station (used as an intermediate base in the Soviet effort to reach the 
Pole of Inaccessibility and the South Geomagnetic Pole) was transformed from all-
year station to a summer one, and the other intermediate stations Sovetskaya, 
Pionerskaya as well as the Pole of Inaccessibility station were closed. A new station, 
Lazarev (named in honour Mikhail Lazarev, the second in command of 
Bellingshausen's Antarctic expedition of 1819 - 1821) in an area previously explored 
by the Russian expedition which had approached the Antarctic ice shelf as close as 
69° 23' S on 16 January 1820, was built in Queen Maud Land on the Princess Astrid 
Coast close to the Wohlthat Massif and the ice free Schirmacher Oasis at a position 
69° 58' S.557 It would seem that the intention in building the new station was both to 
assert priority of discovery and to conduct geological exploration aimed at evaluating 
the possible economic potential of these mountainous and ice free areas of 
Antarctica.558 Although not all of Kosygin's instructions were implemented by the 
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fourth SAE of 1958 - 1960 in the year of IGC, they were starting to have a tangible 
effect. 
First explicit mention of the fact that an expedition was being organized in 
accordance with the seven year plan for Antarctic research (1959 - 1965) is made by 
Somov in his explanatory note about plans for the fifth SAE, which was to continue 
and expand Soviet observations in the Antarctic.559 He gives an overview of what 
has been accomplished thus far: a total of two coastal and six inner continental 
stations were built where meteorological, glaciological and geophysical research was 
carried out. The two coastal stations, Mirny and Lazarev and the inner continental 
station Vostok were continuing operations. Somov argues that it was essential for 
operations at Mirny to be kept at their current levels because it was the main Soviet 
base. The location of Vostok at the South Geomagnetic Pole and the fact that the 
Americans were retaining their inner continental station required that the USSR 
maintain operations, at its only permanent inner continental station. Lazarev, too, 
should continue operations mainly because it was to be the base for exploring the 
large ice free areas of Queen Maud Land, as well as being the terminal point of a 
seismo-glaciological survey route. It was envisioned that Lazarev would later 
become the main base instead of Mirny. Half of East Antarctica has been explored by 
air and a large section of its coastline has been photographed (from 450 to 168 0 E) 
with geographical, geological and glaciological work being undertaken at various 
sites on the ground. 
Draft plans for the fifth SAE took into account the stipulation of the Minister 
of the Merchant Fleet, Bakaev, regarding the 'need for wide geographical and 
geological exploration of Antarctica with the aim of determining regions suitable for 
further attention of the Soviet Union' by including a . geologic/geographic team of 
eight men who were to conduct reconnaissance work in ice free areas of the 
continent. The shores of the Bellingshausen Sea were also to be explored using the 
expedition ship, since reports from tlie Slava whaling fleet in March 1959 had 
indicated that ice conditions in the area were favourable. Somov conveys a sense of 
55. Somov, M. 1959. Poyasnitelnaya zapiska k planu rabot 5 SAE 1959-1961, 5 Maya 1959 
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urgency for exploring the Bellingshausen Sea area, Since the Americans had 
indicated at the SCAR meeting in Canberra on 2 - 6 March 1959 that they too were 
interested in exploring the same area: the USSR should be there first to shore up its 
priority of discovery of the area by Bellingshausen's expedition in 1819 - 1821. 
Somov concludes by noting that after the end of the IGY, 'the range of activities 
conducted by the SAE has been drastically curtailed': total expenses incurred by the 
third SAE (1957 - 1959) constituted 83 million roubles and it had a wintering party 
(excluding the aviation team) of 147 men and 112 summer personnel whereas the 
fourth SAE (1958 - 1960) incurred expenses of 35 million roubles and had a 
wintering party of 93 and 30 men during the summer season.560 Further significant 
savings could have been made only by cancelling exploration of the Bellingshausen 
Sea or closing Vas/ok or Lazarev, but the 'impelling need for conducting work in all 
these areas is evident.,561 
Somov, in his capacity as deputy director of the AARI responsible for 
Antarctic research, put forward compelling reasons against the financial restrictions 
imposed by Kosygin, and even attempted to obfuscate the issue of numbers of men 
who were left to winter in Antarctica. The proposed budget for the fifth SAE (1959 -
1961) was 34 million roubles with a wintering party of 83, although due to the 
amount of work required to be done by the geology/geography team, which was 
meant to be seasonal, it was more appropriate that the eight members of the team 
stay for the winter, thus making the wintering party only two less than the previous 
year. 562 The summer seasonal team, however, was reduced to eight (nine according 
to Savatyugin 2004 and Lukin 2006). 'Further decrease in the complement of the 
expedition would be inappropriate, since it would not significantly reduce the cost of 
the expedition, but would substantively affect the extent of observations and damage 
the prestige of Soviet science and of the Soviet government in general in Antarctic 
research'. He concludes with the observation that the fifth SAE should continue with 
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exploration of East Antarctica and begin exploration of West Antarctica 'in order to 
determine over the next 2 - 3 years the most promising areas for further 
investigation.,563 Somov continued to push the boundaries of the limits imposed on 
Antarctic research by the financial restrictions to the point where his draft plans for 
the sixth SAE (1960 - 1962) were rejected by the deputy director of the 
Glavsevrnorput Tolstikov. Tolstikov wrote that Somov's plans 'according to the new 
scheme' should have led to a significant reduction in the winter personnel of the 
expedition and '[o]nly in that case could the plans be considered appropriate for 
realization. ,564 Apparently, Somov was also seeking greater freedom in decision 
making during the expedition, whereby the expedition leaders would develop plans 
in the field, taking into consideration local Antarctic conditions. Tolstikov advises 
Somov that, to the contrary, plans should be 'firm, concrete, practicable and worked 
out by the AARI, the leaders of the Fifth SAE and other interested institutes. In 
Antarctica, the plans should be strictly adhered to. ,565 
Further evidence that the Soviet Antarctic program was adopting Kosygin' s 
instructions were the plans for trial flights of Il-18 and An-12 aircraft from Moscow 
to Antarctica with the view of utilizing these aircraft for operational support of the 
SAE as drafted by the director of the AARI Aleksei Tryoshnikov (1914 - 1991) (Fig. 
48,49.50,51). 
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Fig. 48. Aleksei Tryoshnikov (personal collection of Lev Savatyugin) 
Fig. 49. llyushin 11-18 (http://afl461.1ivejournal.comlI2113I.htm\) 
Fig. 50. Antonov An-12 (http://www.airshow.ru/photoslan-12.htm) 
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Fig. 51. Postal stamp commemorating Moscow-Antarctica flight 
(http://www.ivki.ru/kapustinlstempel/page 01.htm) 
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Both aircraft were to leave Moscow simultaneously in December 1961 
carrying equipment and members of a traverse (which was to depart from Vos/ok 
station) as well as a team of specialists to carry out meteorological, actinometrical 
and high altitude observations from on board the An-l2. On arrival at Mirny, the An-
12 was to change its landing gear to skis and begin supply flights to Vos/ok, whereas 
the 11-18 was to return to Moscow with the previous year's wintering party.S66 These 
566 Tryoshnikov, A. 1961 . Plan probnih poletov v Antarktiku na samolyotah 11 18 i An 12 v sezon XlI-
1961 - Ul-1962 [plan of trial flights to Antarctica of Il 18 and An 12 planes in the XlI-1961 - 111-
1962 season]. Moscow, Russia: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Economiki (Russian State 
Economics Archives) RGAE, File 9570, op 2, ed hr 2609. 
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historic Moscow - Antarctica - Moscow flights were viewed by the leader of the 
seventh SAE Aleksandr Dralkin (1911 - 2007) as a 'new glorious page in the 
evolution of Soviet aviation opening up prospects for a permanent air link between 
the capital of our motherland Moscow with the distant new continent Antarctica.'567 
Dralkin went on to wish his comrades 'new remarkable successes in their work for 
the benefit of the motherland in the name of communism.'568 
8. 3 Conclusion 
From the above, we can see that there were both differences and similarities 
between the Soviet goverrunent's and the Soviet scientists' view of the thrust of 
Soviet research in the Antarctic. Several of Kosygin's instructions were adhered to, 
others were disregarded: 
• All permanent inner continental stations except Vastok ceased operations, 
although operations at Mirny were not significantly reduced, which was a 
compromise solution. 
• Whereas the first three SAE had a high number of personnel, only the fifth, 
sixth and seventh SAE had numbers in line with Kosygin' s instructions as 
seen in the table below 569 
SAE number Summer Winter Total personnel 
personnel personnel 
1 SAE 1955-1957 131 92 223 
2 SAE 1956-1958 233 190 423 
3 SAE 1956-1958 130 185 315 
4 SAE 1958-1960 64 113 177 
5 SAE 1959-1961 9 129 138 
6SAE 1960-1962 22 115 137 
7 SAE 1961-1963 58 83 141 
567 Dralkin, A. 1962. Radiogramma Afanasievu 03.02.1962 [Radiogramme to Afanasiev 03.02.1962]. 
Moscow, Russia: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Economiki (Russian State Economics Archives) 
RGAE, File 9570, op 2, ed hr 2612. 
568 Ibid. 
569 Based on Savatyugin, L. 2004. Rossiiskaya nauka v Antarktike [Russian science in Antarctica}. 
Moscow: Gorodets: 31. 
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• A trial flight directly from Moscow to Antarctica vIa Tashkent, Delhi, 
Rangoon, Jakarta, Darwin, Sydney, Christchurch, McMurdo, Bunger Oasis 
on to Mirny and return was accomplished from 15 December 1961 to 2 
February 1962 at the beginning of the seventh SAE570 as recommended by 
Kosygin. 
• A transantarctic traverse from the intermediate Komsomolskaya station to 
Amundsen Scott base at the South. Pole was completed in November 1959 
(4th SAE) and a Mirny - Komsomolskaya - Vostok traverse completed in 
October 1960 (5th SAE), whereby the desire of the scientists prevailed over 
Kosygin's recommendation. 
• Expenditure for the third SAE (1957-1959) was 83 million roubles, reduced 
to 35 million for the fourth (1958-1960) and Somov's projected costs for the 
fifth SAE were 34 million roubles571 
• Oasis station was transferred to Poland on 23 January 1959 and renamed 
Dobrovolski. 
The last two points were also in line with Kosygin's instructions. Clearly, 
government policy and the associated financial constraints were making it more 
difficult for the scientists to conduct research in the Antarctic to the extent that they 
may have wished. Nonetheless, Somov's persuasive line of reasoning had the 
definite effect of retaining a number of Soviet research initiatives that may otherwise 
have come to an end. 
In August 1961, Antarctic operations 'for the benefit of the motherland in the 
name of communism' acquired an even more long ranging perspective than 
Kosygin's seven year plan. Once again, the country's political leaders were preparing 
for the next Party Congress (the xxnnd), which was held from the 17 to 31 October 
1961. In the USSR under Nikita Khrushchev, while 'the business of administration 
was oil the whole left to the machinery of the state, there was no doubt that the 
570 Savatyugin, L. and M. Preobrazhenskaya 1999. Rossiiskiye issledovaniya v Antarktike. Tom I 
[Russian research in the Antarctic. Vol Ij. St Petersburg: Hydrometeoizdat (Hydro meteorological 
Service Press): 114. 
'" Somov, M.1959. Poyasnitelnaya zapiska k planu rabot 5 SAE 1959-1961, 5 Maya 1959 
[Explanatory note about plans for the fifth SAE 1959-1961,5 May 1959]. Moscow, Russia: Rossiiskiy 
Gosudarstvenniy Archiv Economiki [Russian State Economics Archives] RGAE, File 9570, op 2, ed 
hr 3759. 
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direction of policy ... fell upon the shoulders of the party.'S72 This time, the Party was 
in the process of formulating a program and setting a goal for making a transition 
from socialism to a fully fledged communist society by the year 1980. 'The current 
decade (1961-1970) is to be occupied in building the material base for this happy 
event: in the following decade, by 1980, Soviet society will be approaching 
communism.'s73 Soviet policy on the Antarctic was also addressed in the lead up to 
the xxnnd Congress. The Interdepartmental Committee of the USSR Academy of 
Sciences for Antarctic Research submitted new plans for investigations in the 
Antarctic for a twenty year period, from 1961 to 1980, in accordance with the time 
frames for attaining the 'happy event' of a communist society where the principle of 
'from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs' will be 
implemented. 
The USSR's Antarctic plans, which were confirmed by the director of 
Glavsevmorput, Afanasiev, on 11 August 1961, were far less nebulous than the hope 
for a communist society. In the main, they focussed on scientific studies in the fields 
of glaciology, hydro and aero meteorology, geophysics and geology. Special note 
was made of the geological exploration carried out in the area of Novolazarevskaya 
station (its predecessor, Lazarev, was built on moving ice and had to be relocated to a 
more stable site), which had shown promising signs of valuable mineral deposits as 
well as of the importance of Antarctica for satellite tracking. S74 On 12 April 1961, 
Yuri Gagarin became the first man to be propelled into space. Consequently 
extensive satellite tracking facilities were a l:Jigh priority for the USSR space 
program. The plans raised the possibility of regular aircraft flights over the Antarctic 
continent and merchant ship movements in Sub-Antarctic and Antarctic waters 
which would require research of a more practical nature to ensure the safety of any 
such operations. The rapid decline in the numbers of whales in the Southern Ocean 
put forward research prospects for finding ways of extracting oil directly from other 
biomasses available in Antarctic waters. Overall, this 'huge expanse of the globe 
should be studied in as much detail, and as comprehensively as that of other regions -
S72 Schapiro, L. 1963. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. London: Methuen & Co Ltd.: 606. 
S73 Ibid, 606. 
'" Tryoshnikov, A. 1961. Plan Sovetskih issledovaniy v Antarktike 1961-1980. [Plan of Soviet 
Research in Antarctica in 1961-1980]. Moscow, Russia: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv 
Economiki (Russian State Economics Archives) RGAE, File 9570, op 2, ed hr 2609. 
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of our planet.,575 As a result of the ratification of the Antarctic Treaty, this particular 
region had become a zone of peace, and Soviet participation in international 
scientific programmes opened the way for developing wide contacts and regular 
scientific exchange with other countries. In 1963, the administration of the AARI 
~as transferred from Glavsevmorput, which was dissolved in 1964, to the chief 
administration of the hydrometeorological service under the Council of Ministers of 
the USSR (now Federal Service of Russia for Hydrometeorology and Monitoring of 
the Environment - Roshydromet). During the seven year plan of 1959-1965, the 
Soviet Antarctic programme had in many ways adopted a more nationally focussed 
direction as demonstrated by the interplay of political and scientific interests outlined 
above and was ready for a new even longer term phase in its development. 
'" Tryoshnikov, A. 1961. Plan Sovetskih issledovaniy v Antarktike 1961-1980. [Plan of Soviet 
Research in Antarctica in 1961-1980]. Moscow, Russia: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv 
Economiki (Russian State Economics Archives) RGAE, File 9570, op 2, ed hr 2609. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the motives underlying the Soviet interest in the 
Antarctic prior to the Antarctic Treaty. It has done so through a framework of 
analysis provided by Bertram, who identified five chief motives for a state's 
Antarctic involvement, especially in the immediate post World War II period: the 
adventurous; the economic; the scientific; the political; and the strategic. Bertram's 
analysis, although at first glance simplistic, is nonetheless a logical and helpful to 
understand the interests that countries displayed towards the Antarctic in the post war 
period. Bertram' s motives provided a lens through which Soviet Antarctic 
endeavours can be examined. A chronological examination of Soviet activities in the 
Antarctic undertaken in this thesis indicates that all five motives played a role in the 
Soviet desire to become active in the Antarctic and drove Soviet Antarctic policy. In 
the particular case of the USSR, the motives constantly fluctuated in relative 
importance, although, as the thesis makes clear, the predominant one was always the 
political imperative to gain an ongoing voice in any international decision about a 
regime for the Antarctic. 
The thesis has argued that the USSR had a consistent, long-term policy which 
gradually intensified and expanded its presence in the South Polar region. The 
fortuitous acquisition of the Antarctic whaling flotilla, which was handed to the 
USSR by the Allied Tripartite Commission as war reparations, was the beginning of 
the Soviet presence in the Antarctic. The Commission recognized that an Antarctic 
whaling flotilla would be exploited in a manner compatible with its designation. As it 
turned out, the whaling flotilla's activities were not limited to whaling. One of the 
flotilla's ships was always given over to a scientific group, with scientists from the 
All-Union Research Institute of Fishery and Oceanography and the State 
Oceanographic Institute on board conducting systematic research of the climate, 
flora, fauna, hydrology and ice. Commencement of these activities in the Southern 
Ocean directly led to the USSR becoming a signatory of the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, which bestowed further legitimacy on a 
continuing Soviet presence in the Antarctic. Successful operations would furnish the 
war ravaged USSR with more than increased scientific understanding of the South 
Polar region and the economic benefits of whale oil, meat and other products of the 
whaling industry. Its fortuitous insinuation of its presence into the region would 
175 
potentially add a greater weight to Soviet attempts to participate In any future 
negotiations in any arrangements for an international regime for the Antarctic, which 
was its underlying political motivation. 
The thesis demonstrates that from the time of its reaction to the 1948 
American proposal for a solution of the 'Antarctic Problem' that attempted to 
exclude the USSR, the latter has always insisted on a wider international solution to 
the problem, as outlined in its Memorandum of 7 June 1950. From that time on, the 
USSR has consistently adhered to this position. It has proactively participated in all 
major international initiatives involving the Antarctic, such as the IOY, SCAR and 
JOC. This participation provided it with internationally justifiable opportunities to 
expand and intensify its long term physical presence on the Antarctic continent, even 
in areas claimed by other countries, thereby adding greater weight to its opinions in 
formulating international Antarctic policy. The concurrent Soviet policy of not 
recognizing any claims and not restricting itself to any specific area of the continent 
by making a claim gave the USSR the freedom to occupy any location on which it 
had the desire and the capability to build a base. This policy, however, did not 
exclude the possibility of a Soviet Antarctic claim. In fact, the Note of the USSR 
government to the US of 2 June 1958 unambiguously stated that '[t]he Soviet Union 
reserves all rights based on the discoveries and explorations by Russian navigators 
and scientists, including the right to present appropriate territorial claims on the 
Antarctic.' 576 
Soviet Antarctic activities were a matter of concern for countries that had 
already proclaimed sovereignty over Antarctic territory. Australia, in particular, 
found itself in a difficult position especially immediately prior to and during the 
JOY. The USSR intended to establish a primary coastal base on Antarctic territory 
claimed by Australia, with which it had recently broken diplomatic relations. The 
latter was most unenthusiastic about the prospect of a Soviet base on the Australian 
Antarctic Territory, but was unable to voice disapproval without earning 
international opprobrium for its lack of grace in supporting a fellow JOY participant. 
5" USSR 1958. Soviet note of2 June 1958 to the United States accepting the United States invitation 
to attend an international conference on Antarctica. In: Bush, W. 1982. Antarctica and International 
Law. A Collection of inter-state and National Documents, vol 3. London-Rome-New York: Ocean 
Publications Inc.: 213. 
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Not only was it unable to voice disapproval, it was placed in the unenviable position 
of issuing a half-hearted invitation to the Soviet expedition. A further aggravation to 
Australian sensitivities was the Soviet decision to name their base Mirny (peaceful), 
in honour of one of Bellingshausen' s sloops, which underscored both the Soviet 
claim to priority of discovery in Antarctica and the peaceful purpose of the Soviet 
expedition. It comes as no surprise that the Australians officially refused to call the 
base by name, preferring to refer to it simply as the' Russian scientific camp in the 
Australian Antarctic Territory'. Australian lack of enthusiasm for the Soviet presence 
did not deter the latter from pursuing their course of politically symbolic 'good will 
visits' to the Australian mainland and to the neighboring New Zealand. In this time 
of Cold War tensions and unresolved Antarctic claims, the Australian and New 
Zealand governments were intensely wary of Soviet intentions and barely tolerated . 
these visits by Soviet expeditions. The Soviet scientists, however, played an 
important role in overcoming political differences through their efforts at 
international cooperation to fulfil the scientific objectives of the IOY and a number 
of them developed lasting working relationships with Australian and New Zealand 
scientists and expedition members. 
Initially, the Soviet choice of potential sites for establishing their IOY 
observatories was governed by the sites' political symbolism and scientific 
significance. Although the Soviets' first preference was to build a base on the 
symbolically prestigious geographic South Pole, this option was appropriated by the 
United States. The alternative option for the Soviets to build on two sites, the Pole of 
Inaccessibility and the South Oeomagnetic Pole, however, provided them with both a 
significant challenge and the opportunity to earn national prestige by accomplishing 
their aims in the most difficult and remote locations, a task most observers 
considered unachievable. The Soviets believed that 'achieving the unachievable' 
would reinforce the world wide recognition of the leading role of their researchers in 
Antarctic exploration and, as an added benefit, reinforce any legal rights that may 
accrue from such exploration.577 These rights would rest not just on discovery, but on 
extensive exploratory, scientific and similar activities. In time, the Soviets intended 
to establish bases which spread from the initial bases in the Australian sector to all 
'" Lebedev, v. 1960. Spravka 0 podgotovke atlasa Antarktiki, 8 Avgusta [Memorandum regarding 
the preparation of an Antarctic Atlas, 8 August 1960]. Moscow: Rossiiskiy Gosudarstvenniy Archiv 
Economiki (Russian State Economics Archives) File 9570, op 2, ed hr 2604. 
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other parts of the continent. Western observers considered that this was done with a 
view to building up a legal basis for either a possible future territorial claim. 
Although Soviet policy was overwhelmingly dictated by the political motive, 
Bertram contends that there are scientists who appreciate that governments will 
provide funds for science even though they may not be motivated by science and that 
there are politicians who fully recognize that political ends may be achieved under a 
scientific cloak. This thesis shows that the interaction between political and scientific 
interests helped mould Soviet Antarctic policy during the final months of the IOY 
when the USSR was planning its post IOY Antarctic programmes, although the two 
perspectives did not always correspond. The scientists attempted to resist reductions 
in science funding, whereas the politicians would have liked to obtain maximum 
political advantage for minimum financial outlay. Compromises were made on both 
sides, with national prestige being an area where the scientists and the politicians 
appeared to be in full agreement. 
Political considerations and scientific endeavour were closely intertwined 
with the adventurous motive - curiosity, courage, excitement, the search for 
knowledge, the desire to be first and the desire to help one's nation. The exploits of 
Soviet nationals in the Antarctic were a continuation of the accomplishments of the 
nation's Arctic polar explorers, and the 'myth spun out of them became an important, 
even central, part of the socialist-realist worldview.'578 This sentiment was clearly 
illustrated in the case of the whaling flotilla by the reception that it received on 
returning from the Antarctic: '[a]1I the ships in port struck up a deafening chorus of 
welcoming blasts. The piers, the embankment, the Shevchenko Park, and the 
adjacent streets as far as the eye could see were thronged - a great mass of people 
and flowers.' 579 
As for the Soviet Antarctic expeditions, 250 distinguished participants of the 
first five Soviet Antarctic expeditions 'were rewarded for their services in the 
scientific investigations of the Antarctic and for courage shown there' at a Kremlin 
'" McCannon, J. 1998. Red Arctic. Polar Exploration and the Myth of the North in the Soviet Union. 
1932-1939. N. Y: Oxford University Press: 82. 
579 Solyanik, A. 1956. Cruising in the Antarctic. An account of the seventh cruise of the Slava whaling 
Flotilla. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House: 76. 
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ceremony on 21 SI August 1961 by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev.580 The timing of the decision to honour these 
distinguished members of the expeditions was an eloquent sign that all the 
interconnected motives driving Soviet interest in the Antarctic had achieved the 
ultimate political goal: the full-blown participation of the USSR in negotiating an 
international settlement of the Antarctic problem. Symbolically, the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR made its decision on precisely the day that all its 
Antarctic endeavours culminated in a new international Antarctic regime - the 23 
June 1961, the day that the Antarctic Treaty came into force. 
This thesis has described the practical steps taken by the Soviets to get to the. 
table to negotiate the Antarctic Treaty. It ends at the beginning of a long and 
complex process fraught with difficulties for all of the twelve states that participated 
in these negotiations. Although the archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 'is not in possession of material' that can be accessed regarding the Antarctic 
Treaty negotiations and the national strategies that were pursued by the USSR to 
expand its Antarctic interests, other archives such as the Russian State Archives of 
Socio - Political History in Moscow (former Central Party Archive) may provide a 
fertile field for further study. 
58. Brezhnev, L. and M. Georgadze. 1961. Ukaz Prezidiuma VerhovDogo Soveta SSSR [Decree of the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR OD 23 JUDe 1961. Informatsionniy Bulleten Sovetskoi 
Antarkticheskoi Expeditsii {Information bulletin of the Soviet Antarctic expedition] 29: 5. 
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